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1. Executive summary 
This report investigates how the immigration judicial review system is operating in practice. 
In 2013, most immigration judicial reviews were transferred from the Administrative Court to 
the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). At the start of the study in 2017, 
there were some 12,000 immigration judicial reviews lodged each year with the Upper 
Tribunal (the caseload has subsequently declined). Judicial review is a critical mechanism for 
challenging immigration decisions. However, there is comparatively little detailed evidence 
on how it is used by claimants and how the system works in practice. Policymakers wanted a 
more detailed understanding of this area of litigation. We therefore undertook an empirical 
study to fill this important gap in the evidence. We did this by collecting data from a sample 
of case-files. We also interviewed Upper Tribunal Judges, representatives, claimants, and 
others. We were assisted by an Advisory Group comprised of representatives, officials, and 
an Upper Tribunal Judge. Our key findings are as follows. 
 
Many immigration decisions can be challenged by way of judicial review. The caseload varies 
over time. Following the transfer of most immigration judicial reviews from the 
Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal in 2013, the tribunal’s caseload was initially very 
high, but has since declined. Most judicial reviews are fact-specific; they turn on their own 
specific facts and circumstances and tend not to raise wider points of law and policy. Many 
claims raise issues concerning the application of asylum and human rights law, especially the 
right to respect for family and private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Many judicial reviews are lodged in an attempt to secure an in-country right 
of appeal. While there is an ongoing debate about the relative advantages of appeals as 
against judicial review, the removal of appeal rights under the Immigration Act 2014 does not 
seem to have led to a significant increase in judicial reviews. 
 
Many judicial review claims are refused permission because the Upper Tribunal decides that 
they are unarguable. The use of template, standard, and unparticularised grounds of 
challenge is a common, though not universal, feature. There are continuing concerns 
regarding the variable quality of representation for claimants. Action has been taken to deter 




this may have led to a reduction in the volume of judicial reviews. There is evidence that some 
people are at risk of exploitation by unscrupulous advisers. At the same time, good quality 
representatives work under a range of pressures and find that this can hinder their work. 
 
The majority of judicial review claims are refused permission to proceed. Nonetheless, there 
are concerns about the quality of initial Home Office decisions. We encountered instances of 
poor decision-making challenged by way of judicial review. We found that 20 per cent of the 
cases we examined are settled out of court with agreement that the case be reconsidered by 
the Home Office. We also encountered the phenomenon of “repeat judicial reviews.” That is, 
when a second judicial review is lodged against a fresh Home Office decision which is very 
similar to the initial decision. The overall process could operate more efficiently if there were 
greater communication and co-operation between the parties throughout the process. 
 
As regards the categories of immigration judicial reviews, there is a wide range of immigration 
decisions that are challenged by way of judicial review. However, much of the caseload is 
concentrated within a few categories of case: asylum and human rights claims certified as 
clearly unfounded; fresh asylum and human rights claims; and removal decisions. Many 
judicial review challenges are lodged either to secure an in-country appeal or to prevent or 
delay an individual’s removal from the country. Challenges to Home Office delay used to 
feature prominently in the caseload, but this is no longer the case. 
 
There is a wider debate concerning the appropriate remedies that should be available. Judicial 
review is an important remedy, but its scope is relatively limited. By contrast, appeals to 
tribunals involve a full re-hearing of a case. We encountered the view from representatives 
that a right of appeal to the tribunal is a more preferable and effective remedy than judicial 
review. We also encountered the argument that some specific types of decisions that affect 
an individual’s fundamental rights, but are currently non-appealable, should attract a right of 
appeal. These include decisions concerning human trafficking, statelessness, and domestic 
violence. As regards the empirical data, we found there to be little evidence that the 





As regards claimants, we found evidence that they are often desperate and find the process 
difficult to understand and stressful. Most, though not all, claimants are legally represented, 
but the quality of such representation varies enormously. Most claimants are self-funding. 
Very few claimants appear to be in receipt of legal aid. The process for seeking Exceptional 
Case Funding is perceived as being difficult. We encountered concerns about the ability of 
litigants in person to navigate the system effectively. The judicial review process was not 
designed with litigants in person in mind and there is accordingly a need to address the 
situation of litigants in person by, for instance, greater provision of guidance. The Upper 
Tribunal is fully aware of this challenge. Greater understanding of the process would be 
assisted by more and better data on costs and how these drive the behaviour of litigants. 
 
The wider programme of tribunal modernisation will in the future mean that aspects of the 
judicial review process will be digitalised. This will include both online applications and 
document-sharing. This is likely to enhance the efficiency of the process. Nevertheless, the 
parameters of the project are still being developed. More information needs to be made 
public about the project to enhance transparency and give the public and stakeholders the 
opportunity to scrutinise the project’s development. The greater use of Tribunal Caseworkers, 
another part of the ongoing reforms, will free up judicial time, but needs appropriate 
monitoring and oversight. There is little reason to think that alternative dispute resolution 
would operate effectively as an alternative to judicial review in the immigration context. 
Nonetheless, the various forms of alternative dispute resolution already built into the 
process, such as administrative review, re-application, and settlement, could be made to work 
more effectively. The full implications of the withdrawal of appeal rights by the Immigration 
Act 2014 requires wider evaluation. The question whether to restore full appeal rights is a 
policy question. Nonetheless, it is arguable that certain decisions affecting issues of 
fundamental rights - human trafficking, statelessness, and domestic violence – could be more 
effectively handled through appeals than judicial review. 
 
Based on our detailed evidence base and discussions with those involved in the immigration 
judicial review system, our key recommendations are as follows:  
1. Representatives that make use of standard, formulaic grounds of challenge need to 




2. There are a variety of mechanisms to deal with vexatious claims: the Upper Tribunal’s 
internal reporting system; deeming claims to be Totally Without Merit; Hamid hearings; 
and referrals to regulatory bodies. The recent reduction in the number of judicial review 
claims may be in part attributable to greater use of these mechanisms. The most effective 
way of seeking to reduce the number of hopeless judicial review claims is to reduce the 
levels of poor quality representation by pulling up those firms that lodge abusive and 
vexatious claims. 
3. Most judicial review challenges are refused permission. We encountered many robust 
Home Office decisions. At the same time, there were also cases in which the Home Office 
decision was not robust and sustainable. Better initial decision-making requires that the 
Home Office learns lessons highlighted through the judicial review process. Better 
feedback mechanisms could be put in place to achieve this. 
4. More involvement of legally trained staff, such as tribunal caseworkers, at the Pre-Action 
Protocol stage could increase the efficiency of the process if it leads to fewer cases being 
conceded at later stages of the judicial review process.  
5. The process of settling claims through a consent order could operate more efficiently if 
there was improved communication between the parties throughout the process. 
6. Repeat judicial reviews can be unnecessary, inefficient, costly, and likely to cause anxiety 
to claimants. To reduce the risk of this, the Home Office needs to exercise greater care 
when re-taking a decision so as to prevent further litigation. Fresh Home Office decision 
letters following a successful or conceded judicial review should be checked, if necessary 
by senior case-workers, to ensure compliance with the consent order or a ruling from the 
Upper Tribunal. Furthermore, when a consent order is agreed, then both parties need to 
fulfil their obligations. Further judicial reviews against the Home Office to ensure 
compliance with consent orders are wasteful and should be unnecessary. 
7. HMCTS should routinely collect data on the types and categories of immigration judicial 
reviews, including on costs. 
8. The Home Office’s power to certify cases as clearly unfounded should be exercised 
carefully and only when appropriate. There may be a need for further guidance for 
decision-makers on this point. 
9. Parliament and the Government ought to consider whether to re-introduce appeal rights 




violence cases. Arguably, such cases could be better handled through the appeals system 
than judicial review. 
10. Litigants in person need more support throughout the judicial review process. This could 
be provided through a combination of leaflets, online guidance, videos, and digital 
assistance. 
11. The process for applying for Exceptional Case Funding needs to be more accessible and 
proportionate. Further improvements are required beyond those already implemented. 
12. There is a need for a detailed review of how costs operate in practice drawing upon data 
from the Home Office and the Government Legal Department. This review could examine 
more detailed information as to costs with a view to reaching a better understanding of 
costs in this area and how costs influence behaviours. 
13. Consideration should be given as to whether other types of immigration judicial review 
work could be usefully transferred from the Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal, 
such as nationality cases. 
14. Given that tribunal caseworkers are now exercising some powers and roles previously 
undertaken by judges, it is necessary to ensure that there is appropriate monitoring and 
oversight. 
15. The Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service should disclose more 
information about the digitalisation project, the principles informing its design, the 
broader direction of travel, and the timeline for implementation. It needs to be clarified 
whether litigants in person will be provided with digital assistance and the scope of this 
assistance. 
16. Rather than introducing an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism, it would be 
more effective to enhance the quality and efficiency of existing processes. This could 
include: improving the Pre-Action Protocol process and encouraging better 







2. The research project 
Immigrants and asylum claimants often use judicial review to challenge immigration decisions 
made by the Home Office. Immigration is the single largest area of judicial review. In 2013, 
most immigration judicial reviews were transferred from the Administrative Court to the 
Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (UTIAC).1 The purpose was to reduce the 
pressure on the Administrative Court and to enable expert and experienced immigration 
judges to determine such claims. The immigration judicial review caseload in both the Upper 
Tribunal and the Administrative Court accounts for around 85 per cent of all judicial reviews. 
There has been a significant growth over recent years. In 2014-15 and 2015-16, there were 
around 15,000 immigration judicial reviews lodged with the Upper Tribunal–an 
unprecedented number, making it the fifth largest tribunal jurisdiction overall. By contrast, 
the number of non-immigration civil judicial reviews has remained static at around 2,000 to 
2,400 claims per year since the year 2000.2 
 
Concerns have been raised over both the volume and cost of the caseload. Judicial review is 
a costly, lengthy, and legalistic process. A large caseload can mean delays in both the 
administration of justice by the courts and the administration of immigration policy by the 
Home Office. There is an equally important need to consider how effectively the system works 
from the perspective of the users involved, people who submit judicial review claims. Given 
recent restrictions on tribunal appeal rights,3 judicial review is often the only means of legal 
challenge. The need for a better understanding of the system is likely to grow as we look 
towards the future. The caseload could increase if, for instance, the Home Office makes 
greater use of out of country appeals. Brexit also presents a very real possibility of challenges 
relating to, for instance, the three million EU citizens in the UK at present.4 
 
The Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals, as the government bodies responsible 
for the administration of the judicial review process, wanted a better understanding of the 
types of challenges lodged and the motivation of litigants. The official judicial review database 
                                                          
1 The Tribunal Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules SI 2012/2067. 
2 R. Thomas, ‘Mapping immigration judicial review litigation: an empirical legal analysis’ [2015] Public Law 652. 
3 Immigration Act 2014, s.15; Immigration Rules, Appendix AR; Crime and Courts Act 2013, s.52 
4 The Migration Observatory, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? The Status of EU citizens Already Living in the UK 




provides only limited data on the types and the topics of claims lodged.5 This database 
categorises most immigration claims under two broad types – ‘Immigration Not Asylum’ and 
‘Immigration Asylum Only.’ This coding system was carried over with the transfer to the Upper 
Tribunal. In practice, the categories are used as generic categories for a wide range of cases.6 
Accordingly, we undertook this research project to provide a more informed understanding 
of the underlying trends in immigration judicial reviews, such as the reasons for the growth 
in the caseload, the types of challenges lodged, and the experiences of users. 
 
There are different perspectives on the immigration judicial review system. From one 
perspective, delay and administrative problems within the Home Office frequently prompt 
claimants to seek judicial reviews which could usually have been avoided.7 By contrast, the 
Home Office has often perceived judicial review as a means by which claimants can tactically 
delay the enforcement of unwelcome negative decisions. 
 
The policy issue here is, at its core, the choice of appropriate redress mechanism.8 Without 
clear evidence, it is difficult to know what proportion of immigration-related grievances are 
suited to judicial review because they raise issues of legality or if the underlying claims could 
be better handled through an alternative complaint handling procedure because they 
concern administrative error rather than illegality. These are all complex questions and better 
answers can be offered when based on detailed data. 
 
To understand how the system of immigration judicial reviews is working in practice, we 
sought to collect data on the following areas: 
 How the system of immigration judicial reviews is working in practice, including the drivers 
of litigation as well as litigant motivation and behaviour; 
 the quality of immigration judicial review claims and of Home Office decisions; 
 the types of claims lodged and their outcomes; and 
                                                          
5 Ministry of Justice, Civil justice statistics quarterly, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/civil-justice-statistics-quarterly  
6 See S. Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 
7 R. Thomas, ‘Mapping immigration judicial review litigation: an empirical legal analysis’ [2015] Public Law 652. 









3. Research Methods 
The research project collected data on the types of immigration judicial review claims and the 
views and experiences of people involved in the system. Our approach to the research was to 
collect both quantitative and qualitative data. We then combined the data gathered through 
these methods to inform our analysis. 
 
To collect data on the immigration judicial reviews caseload of the Upper Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber), we undertook a case-file analysis which involved 
collecting a range of data from case-files. The purpose of the case-file analysis was to collect 
data from immigration judicial review case-files concerning the types and categories of 
immigration judicial review claims lodged. In particular, we collected data on the following 
fields: 
 Type of decision being challenged; 
 The claimant’s grounds of challenge; 
 Whether the claimant was represented; 
 The outcome of the paper permission and oral renewal permission decisions; 
 The amount of costs awarded and to whom; 
 Whether the claimant had brought previous immigration challenges; 
 Whether the claimant was in detention; 
 Whether the claimant was in receipt of legal aid; and 
 The nationality of the claimant. 
 
We undertook a pilot study in late 2017. The full study was undertaken in 2018 and involved 
collecting data from a sample of 342 case files. This sample was selected from a list of a total 
number of 9,640 judicial review claims lodged at the Upper Tribunal between November 2016 
and November 2017. This list of case files was provided to us by the Upper Tribunal. We used 
random probability sampling to select the sample of 342 case-files. These case files were then 
scanned by HMCTS administrative staff at the Upper Tribunal onto pdf files to facilitate data 
collection. After constructing a database, we also extracted case studies from the files which 





In the recording of data, various practical challenges arose. 
 First, immigration decisions are often long and complex. They often contain multiple 
claims. In recording the type of decision being challenged, we highlighted the main 
issue in the application being decided. 
 Second, grounds advanced by applicants are often not clearly defined. This was usually 
the case with litigants in person but also when lawyers were involved in the case. We 
sought to record grounds that were considered by the judge but, in relation to some 
files, this required a careful construction of various documents in order to establish 
what the core grounds/legal issues actually were. 
 Third, many of those applicants who were registered as unrepresented appeared to 
have some level of legal help or access to legal materials. This means we had to 
distinguish between those who were represented, those who were not, and those 
who were not represented but has some form of legal assistance. 
 Fourth, some files provided no information on costs awards and some explicitly 
contained judicial orders for “no costs.” These were placed in the same category in 
our data: “no order as to costs.” 
 Fifth, it was not always clear whether applicants had legal aid. The best source of 
establishing whether applicants had legal aid was by examining the judicial review 
claim form. However, in many cases it is likely that if legal aid is granted it is after this 
stage. Where it was unclear whether the claimant was in receipt of legal aid, we 
recorded the case as not having legal aid. 
 Sixth, it is not always clear from the files if an applicant is in detention and, if so, for 
how long. Where there was evidence that an applicant was in detention at any stage 
during the litigation, we recorded them as “detained.” 
 Seven, some of the scanned files were incomplete. For instance, the relevant 
documents had not been scanned or the outcome of the case could not be known 
because it had not proceeded to the permission stage before being scanned. 
 
To supplement data collected from the case-file analysis, we conducted interviews and 
observations. These included: 




 Semi-structured interviews with Tribunal Case-Workers and tribunal lawyers; 
 Semi-structured interviews with legal representatives advising claimants; 
 Semi-structured interviews with claimants; and 
 Observations of oral renewal permission hearings at the Upper Tribunal in Field House, 
London. 
 
As regards the selection of interviewees, we contacted law firms specialising in immigration 
law and with experience of immigration judicial review litigation for interviews. As regards 
the interviews with claimants, we were assisted by lawyers that asked previous clients to be 
interviewed for the research. The interviews with judges were conducted in person at the 
Upper Tribunal. Interviews with representatives were conducted on the telephone and in 
person. Interviews with claimants were conducted on the telephone. All interviewees were 
given full information about the research and completed a consent form. 
 
Data collected Total 
Case-files 342 case-files 
Observation of oral renewal hearings 20 hearings 
Interviews with Judges 5 
Interviews with representatives 20 
Interviews with claimants 4 
 
The research was assisted by an advisory group. This was comprised of the following: 
representatives from the Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service; a Judge 
from the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber); and legal representatives. The 






4. Immigration judicial reviews 
The overall purpose of the research project was to examine how the system of immigration 
judicial reviews in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) is working in 
practice. This section places the research in context by considering general features of the 
immigration judicial review system including: the wider immigration system in which it 
operates; the distinction between appeal rights and judicial review; the immigration judicial 
review caseload; key actors in the system; and the features of immigration judicial review 
process. 
 
The wider context 
Immigration decisions are taken by the Home Office to decide whether or not an individual 
fulfils the requirements of the Immigration Rules and other legislation to enter or remain in 
the UK. There is a large number of such decisions per year. Some types of refusal decisions 
can be appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. Refusal decisions that do not attract a right of 
appeal can only be challenged by way of judicial review. Since 2013, most, but not all, of such 
challenges are handled by the Upper Tribunal. Judicial review enables individuals affected by 
a government decision to challenge the legality of that decision. There are various contextual 
factors that need to be borne in mind throughout. 
 
First, many immigration applicants are granted some form of immigration status by the Home 
Office but some are not. Many, though not all, applicants who have been refused will seek to 
challenge their refusal decisions by way of judicial review. Second, the immigration system is 
based on a notoriously complex set of rules.9 One upshot of this is that the Home Office makes 
a range of different decisions on a variety of bases, which, in the context of the immigration 
judicial review system, become the subject of the cases. While there is a wide range of 
immigration decisions that are challenged via judicial review, certain types of case occur very 
frequently. People we interviewed, particularly representatives and judges, noted the 
complexity of the legal framework and Immigration Rules and that this complexity is itself 
often a driver of judicial review litigation. Given the nature of immigration decision-making, 
there are incentives for claimants to resort to formal judicial proceedings. Claimants and 
                                                          




representatives often lack trust and confidence in the Home Office. There is often a 
perception that the Home Office will seek to reject applications. However, in reality, many 
immigration applications are granted initially by the Home Office. Further, is a concern that 
some judicial review challenges are lodged by people merely seeking to prolong their stay in 
the country. 
 
Third, the immigration judicial review jurisdiction is large, complex, and diverse. Immigration 
judicial reviews account for the vast majority of all judicial reviews in England and Wales. 
There is a high number of different law firms and representatives who take cases on. There is 
also a high degree of variety in the types of such providers. The jurisdiction’s caseload is also 
dynamic. The caseload has increased and then decreased, but it could increase again in the 
coming years. There is always a fundamental degree of uncertainty as to future caseloads. 
This is influenced by a wide range of matters wholly outside the control of any single actor in 
the system. These include: the number of immigration applications and Home Office refusals; 
the content of the Immigration Rules; immigration and population movements; the 
willingness of claimants to challenge decisions; and the availability of legal advice. The nature 
of the caseload is often driven by short-term trends in the case-law and changes in 
immigration policy. For instance, a lead case is decided by the higher courts. Many 
subsequent challenges will then be lodged on the back of this seeking to challenge the 
application of the law in individual cases or seeking to extend the scope of the lead ruling or 
to exploit any ambiguities. Particular topics and issues come and go. 
 
It is also a high pressure jurisdiction in which there is considerable focus upon the efficient 
and timely consideration of cases. Judges, representatives, and the Home Office are all under 
pressure to make the system work as effectively as possible. The pressures of high volumes 
and workloads affects all who work within the system. The Upper Tribunal, the Home Office, 
the Government Legal Department, and legal representatives all handle a high workload of 
immigration judicial reviews in addition to other types of work, such as statutory appeals.  
 
Finally, the vast majority of judicial review cases are fact-specific. Some judicial reviews do 




relatively few in number. Overwhelmingly, immigration judicial review challenges turn on the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case rather than issues of law. 
 
Appeal rights and judicial review 
A central issue of both administrative law in general and immigration law in particular 
concerns the appropriate remedy for challenging initial administrative decisions. There are a 
range of different remedies: 
 
• Administrative review. The applicant can request that the Home Office review its 
earlier decision on the basis that it contains a case-working error. The Home Office 
can either affirm or reverse its decision. An administrative review decision can itself 
be challenged by way of judicial review. 
• Tribunal appeals. The applicant can appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to have his or her 
appeal heard and determined. A First-tier Tribunal Judge will hear the evidence and 
submissions, make findings of fact and apply the relevant legal rules. The Tribunal can 
substitute its own decision for that of the Home Office. 
• Judicial review. The applicant can challenge the legality of the Home Office decision. 
Judicial review is limited to reviewing the lawfulness of the challenged decision. The 
Judge does not generally have a fact-finding role, but is limited to reviewing whether 
the challenged decision is unlawful, irrational, or procedurally unfair. Judicial review 
is a more limited remedy than having a right of appeal on issues of both fact and law. 
• Complaints. The applicant can complain against the Home Office on the basis that 
there was some administrative error or problem. Complaints can also be pursued to 
the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. 
 
Both tribunal appeals and judicial review are judicial remedies. The Tribunal or the court is an 
independent and judicial body involved in reviewing or re-taking an administrative decision. 
By contrast, both administrative review and complaints are non-judicial remedies. 
Administrative review is an internal Home Office process. Such reviews are considered and 
decided by Home Office case-workers. By contrast, complaints are handled initially by the 





A key issue concerns the respective roles of tribunal appeals and judicial review. These 
processes share some characteristics. As noted above, both are judicial procedures. In both 
appeals and judicial review, the case will be heard and the decision taken by a judge, whether 
of the First-tier or Upper Tribunal. Procedures must be fair and are informed by the overriding 
objective in the tribunal procedure rules to deal with cases fairly and justly. Another common 
feature is that an applicant and the Home Office can be represented before both appeals and 
judicial review, though an applicant’s entitlement to legal aid varies. 
 
However, there are important differences between tribunal appeals and judicial review. In 
statutory appeals, the jurisdiction of the tribunal extends to issues of both fact and law. In an 
appeal, the appellant can submit evidence and will often give oral evidence at an appeal 
hearing. The task of the tribunal is to hear and assess the evidence, make findings of fact, and 
then apply the relevant rules to make a decision. In statutory appeals, the tribunal can decide 
for itself whether or not the applicant qualifies to enter or remain under the Immigration 
Rules and the European Convention on Human Rights. By contrast, in judicial review 
proceedings, the jurisdiction is limited to a review of the legality of the challenged decision. 
The judicial review court or tribunal will not typically hear the evidence to make findings of 
fact. Instead, it will consider whether there is an arguable public law error in the challenged 
decision. In judicial review, the court or tribunal will at most strike down the Home Office’s 
decision. The case will then be sent back to the initial decision-maker for a new decision. 
While any subsequent decision must be made lawfully, the substance of the new decision 
may be the same as that of the challenged decision. Another difference is that while tribunal 
systems that deal with particular types of cases (e.g. immigration, social security, tax) each 
have their own set of procedural rules, judicial review does not. The procedure rules for 
judicial review are the same irrespective of subject-matter, thought there are some particular 
differences as regards time-limits (e.g. for planning cases and Cart judicial reviews). 
 
On the basis of the differences explained above, a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal is 
often seen as a more effective remedy than judicial review from the perspective of an 
individual seeking to challenge an administrative decision. In an appeal, the individual can 




the relevant rules and can substitute its own decision for that of the Home Office. If an appeal 
is allowed, then the Home Office will be bound by this decision unless it can be challenged 
successfully before the Upper Tribunal. Appellants tend to experience higher rates of success 
through appeals than judicial review. At the same time, appeal rights are always statutory. 
They can be granted and withdrawn by Parliament. By contrast, it is generally accepted that 
judicial review cannot be abolished, absent extreme constitutional tensions between the 
government and the judiciary. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort; it can only be used 
once alternative remedies have been exhausted. It operates as a catch-all mechanism by 
which all decisions that do not attract a right of appeal can be challenged. 
 
It is one thing to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different remedies in the 
abstract, but in practice, each system develops in its own particular context and within its 
own history. There are wider political and economic forces that bear down upon the overall 
organisation of redress systems and the choice of appropriate remedies. In practice, the 
choice over the most appropriate redress mechanism against immigration decisions–appeals, 
judicial review, and/or administrative review, is not a solely legal issue, but also a political and 
operational one. 
 
Over recent years, the routes of legal challenges against negative immigration decisions have 
changed frequently. First, the Immigration Act 2014 reduced the statutory rights of appeal 
because of their perceived costs, delays, and complexity. Previously, many types of 
immigration decisions could be appealed to tribunals. The 2014 Act restricted appeals to 
asylum and human rights cases.10 Second, the 2014 Act introduced a different approach 
toward which immigration decisions could be appealed. Previously, legislation had specified 
which particular immigration decisions attracted a right of appeal. By contrast, the 2014 Act 
specifies the grounds upon which appeals may be brought. Depending on the type of appeal 
involved, an applicant can have their appeal heard either within or outside the UK. Third, the 
reduction in appeal rights has gone hand in hand with wider use of administrative review as 
a substitute redress mechanism. In the absence of a right of appeal, applicants can seek 
                                                          





judicial review. Fourth, it is no longer possible for the First-tier and Upper Tribunals to allow 
an appeal on the ground that a decision was not in accordance with the law. 
 
The limitation of appeal rights has been controversial. Immigration practitioners generally 
opposed the withdrawal of appeals and their replacement with administrative review and 
then judicial review on the ground that it weakened the legal remedies available to 
individuals. The question in judicial review is not whether the challenged decision is one that 
the Upper Tribunal would itself make, but whether that is unlawful, procedurally unfair, or 
unreasonable. In some cases, it is quite possible that an individual who is unsuccessful in 
judicial review proceedings might have been successful in an appeal. Accordingly, it has been 
argued that in many cases a right of appeal would be a better course of action than judicial 
review. Many of the representatives interviewed highlighted the limitations of judicial review 
compared with appeals: 
 
“It would be better if far more Home Office decisions attracted a proper merits-based 
appeal. With the reduction in appeal rights, there are so many more cases now that 
don’t have a proper right of appeal to the First-tier tribunal. The disadvantage of 
judicial review is obviously that it is a review process. It is not a merits-based appeal. 
The claimant is not giving evidence. You are not hearing witnesses. It is still a review 
rather than an appeal and that in many cases can have a significant disadvantage to 
the individual.”11 
 
Parliamentary select committees have raised concerns about the withdrawal of appeal rights. 
Following the Windrush crisis, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
recommended the re-introduction of immigration appeal rights and legal aid.12 On the other 
hand, the Government’s rationale for reducing appeals was to limit the costs and delays of 
appeals and to simplify the system. 
 
The immigration judicial review caseload 
                                                          
11 Representative interview. 




Caseload is an important issue for various reasons. The Upper Tribunal is required to handle 
a large judicial review caseload in a timely manner in addition to its statutory appeals work. 
The volume of immigration judicial reviews fluctuates over time. The caseload is influenced 
by a range of different factors, including: the number of refusal decisions made by the Home 
Office; the willingness of affected people to challenge those decisions; whether 
representatives are willing to take on such cases; the availability of other remedies; and other 
factors. It had been anticipated that the reduction in tribunal appeal rights would prompt an 
increase in judicial reviews. If so, then another issue would be how the judicial system would 
cope, bearing in mind that appeals are handled initially by the First-tier Tribunal whereas 
judicial reviews are lodged with the Upper Tribunal. 
 
In 2013, the immigration judicial review caseload increased significantly. In September 2013, 
the Home Office reported to the High Court in Singh that there has been a rapid and 
unprecedented rise in challenges to asylum and immigration decisions made by the Secretary 
of State.13 The number of judicial reviews received was 69% higher in July 2013 than July 2012. 
The number of pre-action protocol letters had more than doubled. Over 2,500 claims were 
received in July 2013 alone.14 As a consequence of this, the Home Office was unable to stay 
on top of the caseload. There were significant delays in the Home Office and Government 
Legal Department filing Acknowledgements of Service with the Upper Tribunal and claimants. 
On 1 November 2013, the vast majority of immigration judicial reviews were transferred from 
the Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal.15 By 2016, the increased caseload had 
significant implications as regards the Upper Tribunal and its working practices. The increased 
number of judicial reviews had roughly doubled the Upper Tribunal’s overall workload 
without an increase in salaried judicial resource.16 The judicial review workload is in addition 
the Upper Tribunal’s other main area of work, namely statutory appeals. Since then, a number 
of developments occurred. First, there has been the appointment of new Upper Tribunal 
judges. Second, in 2015, the relevant provisions of the Immigration Act 2014 were 
implemented which reduced the number of appealable decisions. Third, the caseload reduced 
                                                          
13 R (Singh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 2873 (Admin). 
14 R (Singh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 2873 (Admin), [14]. 
15 Lord Chief Justice’s Practice Direction on Judicial Review in the UTIAC (2013). 




significantly. Figure 1 presents all receipts, disposals, and outstanding cases. Figure 2 shows 
receipts of immigration judicial review claims at the Upper Tribunal. The number of receipts 







It had been anticipated that the removal of most appeal rights under the Immigration Act 
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Figure 1: UTIAC immigration judicial reviews: receipts, 
disposals and outstanding cases, 2013-2018


















increase did not materialise. On the contrary, the number of judicial review claims declined. 
To some extent, this may be attributable to changes in migration patterns. Another 
explanation concerns the types of immigration judicial review claims lodged. A major finding 
from our research is that the bulk of the caseload concerns challenges against certification 
and fresh claim decisions, types of decisions that either do not attract a right of appeal at all 
or do not attract an in-country right of appeal. 
 
One way of determining whether the reduction in appeal rights has led to an increase in 
judicial review claims is to investigate whether previously appealable decisions were being 
challenged by way of judicial review. The case-file analysis did include some such claims. For 
instance, there were a substantial number of family visitor appeals until the abolition of that 
appeal right in 2013. By contrast, in the case-file sample, there were three judicial reviews 
challenging the refusal of a visitor visa. The volume of such judicial reviews is significantly 
lower than the volume of appeals. Another explanatory factor is that, with the withdrawal of 
appeal rights, it may well be that many appeals can be lodged on human rights grounds. 
According to an Upper Tribunal Judge: 
 
“Entry clearance cases. I think we probably expected to have more judicial reviews 
and no appeals, but I think in practice, what has happened to those is that they have 
just been run as human rights appeals, where the argument is, ‘I’ve met the 
requirements of the rules, and that must weigh heavily as a proportionality factor.’”17 
 
Similarly, one representative noted: 
 
“I cannot say there has been a huge increase in judicial reviews because of the 
abolition of many appeal rights. In a lot of cases it is still quite easy to get into the 
tribunal following a recent Upper Tribunal decision about what constitutes a human 
rights claim. A lot of applications are deemed to be human rights claims by the Home 
Office and the Upper Tribunal has adopted a pretty liberal interpretation of what 
constitutes a human rights claim and so a lot of cases are still in the tribunal.”18 
                                                          
17 Upper Tribunal Judge interview. 





Figure 3 shows the number of receipts of human rights appeals in the First-tier Tribunal. 
 
 
Returning the general reduction in the number of judicial review claims lodged, there is only 
a limited understanding as to why the number of cases has fallen as it is usually difficult to 
measure and isolate the importance of any one specific factor. It may be that there are fewer 
individuals seeking to challenge decisions or that individuals are making use of alternative 
courses of action, such as lodging a fresh application if an entry clearance application has 
been refused or applying for an administrative review. 
 
There may also have been an “Hamid effect” on the volume of immigration judicial reviews. 
Hamid hearings are held by the higher courts and Upper Tribunal to ensure that lawyers 
conduct themselves according to proper standards of behaviour and do not bring hopeless or 
abusive claims for judicial review.19 There has also been related action by the Office of the 
Immigration Services Commissioner, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, and the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal. What is apparent also is that, while the judicial review caseload has 
declined at present, it could increase in the future. As noted above, the caseload is driven by 
short-term trends in the case-law. As one Judge commented: 
 
“There are particular topics that come and go.  You’ll get a bunch of cases together 
across the system on various topics.  So, recently on EEA durable relationships, where 
                                                          
















there was an Upper Tribunal decision that said there’s no right of appeal so there was 
a flood of them that came in as JRs; they were all staged for a high court decision and 
now they’re all working their way back into the appeal system instead of judicial 
review. There are also topics that come up like certification and whether an out of 
country right of appeal is appropriate, and there is often a leading case working its 
way through the court system at the time.”20 
 
Actors in the process 
Claimants 
Claimants who lodge judicial review claims are a highly diverse body of people. Claimants 
challenge decisions refusing entry to or leave to remain in the UK. There is a wide variety of 
such decisions. Someone may seek to enter or remain to seek asylum, for family life purposes, 
to visit a relative, for work or study, and other reasons. 
 
One thing claimants do have in common is that they are universally non-UK nationals who are 
challenging a refusal decision made by the Home Office that affects their immigration status. 
There are also certain classes of claimant who share particular characteristics. Some claimants 
are living overseas and challenging an entry clearance refusal decision. However, from the 
sample of case-files, it was apparent that a significant proportion of claimants were currently 
in the UK and many had been for some years, though their immigration status may have 
changed several times. In fresh claim and certification cases, claimants have typically been 
through either or both of the asylum process and various other immigration decision 
processes and are toward the end of those procedures. Having lived in the UK for some time 
and often having built up some family relationships, there is naturally a desire to remain 
within the UK. Accordingly, individuals desperate to remain in the UK will use judicial review 
to challenge decisions, often relying on Article 8 claims. 
 
Some claimants will have lodged a judicial review claim as the latest in a line of successive 
challenges. The immigration history of some claimants can be lengthy and complex. An 
individual can build up a complex immigration history over many years. An individual’s 
                                                          




immigration status can change as one form of leave is extended, curtailed, cancelled, and 
another form of leave is applied for. Immigration judicial reviews are often either part or the 
culmination of a whole series of decisions about an individual’s immigration status which are 
often made over a period of many years as someone has changed from one immigration 
status to another. Such decisions include various Home Office decisions on immigration 
applications, tribunal appeal determinations, decisions of the higher courts, and previous 
judicial review claims. The Immigration Rules also change frequently and this can affect an 
individual’s immigration status. 
 
The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 
In 2013, most immigration judicial reviews were transferred from the Administrative Court to 
the Upper Tribunal to be heard and decided by salaried Upper Tribunal judges. Under the 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the presiding judge hearing judicial reviews 
transferred to the Upper Tribunal must be either a High Court judge or such other persons as 
agreed between the senior judiciary concerned.21 When the transfer of immigration judicial 
reviews took place, the Upper Tribunal was decided that immigration judicial reviews would 
be heard by salaried Upper Tribunal judges. Part of the rationale for the transfer of judicial 
reviews claims is that of having an expert and experienced immigration judge. Such judges 
are drawn from the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), though for a period 
of time, judges from the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) were assigned to 
do immigration judicial review work. 
 
The principal Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) hearing centre is at Field 
House, London, which is where the bulk of the work is concentrated. Upper Tribunal judges 
are based at Field House, but can and do travel to regional centres. The regional 
Administrative Court centres in Manchester, Leeds, Cardiff/Bristol, and Birmingham handle 
much smaller volumes of Immigration judicial reviews. The operation of regional centres is 
notable in the following respects. First, cases can be heard more quickly at a regional centre 
than at Field House, London. For this reason, claimants and representatives are actively 
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encouraged to issue cases regionally. Second, case at regional centres are often heard by a 
High Court Judge and/or Circuit Judges sitting as Upper Tribunal Judges. Third, it is possible 
that claims lodged in London can then be heard in a regional centre. Cases can be transferred 
to regional centres if legally qualified court staff make a “Minded to Transfer Order” where 
appropriate. The effect of such orders is to reduce the pressure on London and bring the  
Upper Tribunal nearer to the claimant. 
 
Home Office and the Government Legal Department 
Home Office immigration decisions are made by case-workers located within one of the Home 
Office’s decision-making units. A claimant seeking judicial review should send a Pre-Action 
Protocol letter to the Home Office before lodging a claim with the Upper Tribunal. Once 
judicial review proceedings are lodged, grounds of defence are drafted by lawyers within the 
Government Legal Department. The Home Office is represented at oral renewal and 
substantive hearings by Treasury Counsel who are barristers. Some counsel are now in-house 
at the Government Legal Department. This is in contrast to the practice in the context of 
statutory appeals in which the Home Office is represented by a Presenting Officer. A view 
widely shared by both judges and representatives interviewed was that it is absolutely 
imperative to retain the highest quality representation for the Home Office. 
 
Representatives 
The provision of immigration advice and representation is regulated. It can only be provided 
by designated categories of person. These categories include: advisors registered with the 
Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner; and those authorised to provide advice and 
representation by a designated qualifying regulator, such as the Law Society and the Bar 
Council. 
 
Many claimants receive immigration advice and representation. From our sample of 342 case-
files, in 232 case-files there was a named law firm providing legal assistance. In 106 case-files 
no law firm or representative was explicitly mentioned. However, in a number of cases, it was 
quite clear that the claimant had received some form of legal advice and assistance even 
though a law firm or representative was not explicitly named on the judicial review claim 




assistance. Claimants often have some form of help even if they are not formally represented. 
For instance, there were many cases in which there was no adviser or representative recorded 
on the judicial review claim form, but the claim has been accompanied by grounds of 
challenge, which it is highly unlikely that a litigant in person could have drafted. Such 
assistance can include standard copies of grounds of challenge that are passed around in 
detention centres or poorly constructed grounds of challenge provided by low-quality 
advisers. 
 
From both the case-file analysis and interviews, it was clear that the central issue is not solely 
whether a claimant is represented, but also the quality of such representation. There were 
examples of cases in which formulated and precise grounds were advanced and, in some 
instances, judges expressly recognised the work lawyers had put into the case. At the same 
time, there was evidence of standard grounds of challenge and of poor quality representation. 
 
The quality of immigration advice and representation is a long-standing issue. From the 
sample of case-files, interviews, and observation of hearings, it is clear that the quality of 
immigration advice and representation exerts a major influence over the strength, 
preparation, and presentation of judicial review challenges. Both judges and representatives 
noted that a major problem and challenge are the poor quality representatives who take on 
cases that have little or no merit and who do not properly advise their clients that they have 
limited chances of success. Good, reputable law firms may be unwilling to take on clients with 
weak cases because of the non-existent or low chances of success. The basis for this is just 
standard good practice. However, some poor quality providers do take on claimants with very 
poor cases. There is a tension here as the principle of access to justice means that everyone 
should be able to access a court or tribunal. 
 
There is a distinction to be drawn between lawyers who are poor quality and those who are 
deliberately exploitative, though the effects of both can often be comparable in many 
respects. Problems caused by poor representation include: claimants going unrepresented 
when they expected to be represented; delayed hearings; claimants being poorly advised; 
and generic and template grounds of challenge being used which do little, if anything, to not 




have been refused by better providers may then seek advice from less reputable providers 
who will take their cases on. The risk here is that such people may be exploited by 
unscrupulous providers who will take such cases on in return for a fee and the hopes of the 
individuals concerned may be falsely raised. 
 
Litigants in person 
With reductions in legal aid provision, there has been an increase in the number of litigants 
in person appearing before courts and tribunals. It is difficult to know precisely how many 
litigants in person there are in immigration judicial review proceedings. From the case-file 
analysis, it is clear that most claimants had received some form of legal advice and 
representation either throughout or at some stage. There were also many cases in which 
although there was no representative mentioned in the judicial review claim form, 
nevertheless, the grounds of challenge submitted strongly indicated that the applicant has 
received some form of assistance. However, we found wide-ranging concerns about the 
quality of some types of representation. A further complication is that a claimant in receipt 
of initial advice and representation may become unrepresented at a later stage of the process. 
 
The Judicial review process 
Initial stages 
There are various stages to the judicial review process. The first is the Pre-Action Protocol 
(PAP) stage. The claimant will send a PAP letter to the Home Office to notify it that a judicial 
review claim is to be lodged. The intention is that this stage can enable the dispute to be 
resolved before formal proceedings are commenced. At this stage, cases are dealt with by 
Home Office staff in its Litigation Operations unit. Lawyers from the Government Legal 
Department are not normally involved until a judicial review claim is formally lodged and 
issued by a claimant. 
 
The next stage is for claimants to lodge a judicial review claim at the Upper Tribunal 
accompanied by the grounds of challenge. The claimant will also send the claim and grounds 
of challenge to the respondent. The purpose of exchanging the grounds of challenge is to 
ensure that at the permission stage, the court or tribunal is placed in a properly informed 




proceed. The purpose of the grounds of the claimant’s challenge is to identify precisely why 
the challenged decision is arguably unlawful. Grounds of challenge take certain forms. First, 
they might identify the background facts of the applicant, such as: date of birth, nationality, 
immigration history. Second, there will be the grounds of challenge themselves. Third, there 
might be a heading covering the remedy or the type of relief sought. 
 
The Government Legal Department will then issue an Acknowledgement of Service and 
summary grounds of defence. The purpose of the summary of grounds is not to provide the 
basis for full argument of the substantive merits, but to assist the judge in deciding whether 
or not to grant permission, and, if so, on what terms. The Acknowledgement of Service will 
also include a full chronology, setting out the applicant's immigration history as it appears to 
the Secretary of State, including details of the outcome of any appeal or previous judicial 
review. This is considered by the Upper Tribunal to be extremely important and that it should 
continue to feature in the summary grounds.22 In Singh, Hickinbottom J noted that “[w]ith the 
retreat of legal aid, an increasing proportion of public law claimants are acting in person. 
Through no fault of their own, the immigration history that they are able to portray in their 
claim, and the issues to which that history has given rise, are often inaccurate. That of course 
may also apply to cases where the claimant relates that history to a legal representative who 
prepares the procedural documents, but generally to a much lesser extent.”23 In general, the 
claimant’s immigration history will detail when the claimant entered the UK, what forms of 
leave to remain he or she has had, what type of immigration applications have been made 
and their outcome, whether the claimant has exercised an appeal right or previously sought 
judicial review and the outcome of those challenges. Given that immigration judicial reviews 
largely turn on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, a detailed immigration 
history will be an extremely important part of the wider background. For instance, a frequent 
issue concerns whether, for the purposes of an application to remain on the grounds of 
private life, someone has accumulated 20 years continuous residence in the UK.24 
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The substantial increase in the volume of immigration judicial reviews during the period 2012-
14 placed the Home Office, the Government Legal Department and the Upper Tribunal under 
pressure. The Home Office was unable to file Acknowledgements of Service in immigration 
judicial review proceedings within the 21-day time limit. In Kumar, the Upper Tribunal held 
that it would not generally consider "on the papers" an application for permission to bring 
immigration judicial review proceedings until after six weeks from the filing of that 
application. As a result, it was not considered necessary for the Secretary of State to file an 
application for an extension of the 21 day time limit for filing an acknowledgment of service.25 
This decision attracted criticism from some practitioners on the ground that the Tribunal was 
extending the time limits for the Home Office whereas applicants and representatives had to 
comply with the ordinary time limits. In the case-file analysis, we encountered some instances 
in which the Home Office had not filed an Acknowledgement of Service within time. 
 
In 2018, the Upper Tribunal in KA re-assessed the situation and decided that the Kumar 
arrangements would not have effect in respect of judicial reviews filed after 1 January 2019.26 
The Home Office also indicated that it intended to move away from its traditional approach 
of filing full summary grounds in most cases that it contests on the ground that the Upper 
Tribunal is an expert tribunal and will benefit less from summary grounds that set out settled 
law and case-law. In KA the Upper Tribunal made the following points. First, a full chronology, 
setting out the applicant's immigration history as it appears to the Secretary of State, 
including details of the outcome of any appeal or previous judicial review, is extremely 
important and should continue to feature in the summary grounds. Second, the grounds 
should set out what the Secretary of State considers to be the nature of the applicant's 
complaint. In some cases, this may not be readily apparent. It is for the judge to decide this 
issue, but the Home Office’s understanding will be helpful. Third, recitation of well-
established case law on matters such as certification under section 94 or consideration of 
Article 8 within and outside the Immigration Rules is unnecessary. Fourth, in all cases, the 
summary grounds should identify the Home Office’s response to the applicant’s grounds of 
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challenge and whether and, if so, why the Secretary of State thinks the applicant's challenge 
is unarguable. Fifth, where the challenge concerns a decision under the Immigration Rules, 
the relevant rule (including the version which the Secretary of State considers was in force at 
the date of the decision) should be set out, along with the succinct reason or reasons why (if 
it be the case) the Secretary of State takes the view that the requirements of the rule or rules 
have unarguably not been satisfied. 
 
Paper permission 
All judicial review claims are initially considered on the papers by an Upper Tribunal judge. 
The purpose of the permission stage, both paper and oral renewal, is for the judge to decide 
whether the decision under challenge is arguably unlawful and therefore requires a full 
hearing. 
 
The bulk of the judicial review workload takes the form of deciding paper permission 
applications. A day’s list of paper permission applications typically contains some 8-12 judicial 
review claims. It is for the claimant to demonstrate that the claim is arguable. The judge will 
consider the Government Legal Department’s Acknowledgement of Service and summary 
grounds of defence—these grounds typically arguing that permission be refused. 
Alternatively, the Government Legal Department may offer to settle the case through a 
consent order. Decision notices are typically one-page long. The judge will give brief reasons 
























The majority of claims are refused permission on the papers. Refusal rates almost consistently 
exceed 90 per cent. However, when interpreting this data, it is important to bear in mind the 
following points. First, claimants refused on the papers can renew their application at a 
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Figure 4: Paper permission decisions 
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Figure 5: Paper permission outcomes (%) 




Second, some claims are settled before the paper permission stage by the Government Legal 
Department on behalf of the Home Office. Third, when a claim has been settled by the parties 
and then reaches the permission stage, it will be refused by the judge on the ground that 
because the challenge has been settled, it now raises an academic issue and should therefore 
be refused. Such “academic” refusals are categorised as a refusal of permission. For these 
reasons, it is difficult to measure precisely the actual overall success rate. Nonetheless, it is 
the case that a substantial proportion of the paper permission caseload, and certainly well 
over half of it, is refused permission on the papers. 
 
Some claimant representatives interviewed noted that the paper permission stage can seem 
to be lacking in transparency. A judge considers the case solely on the papers in her or his 
private office. There is no opportunity for any oral argument. By contrast, in a hearing, the 
representative can draw the judge’s attention to specific key points. The same procedure is 
used in non-immigration judicial reviews and other types of judicial work, such as permission 
to appeal applications. 
 
The timeliness of the paper permission stage is an important consideration. We acquired data 
from the Upper Tribunal concerning the average number of days taken for a decision on the 
papers. It is important to note this data is subject to inaccuracies inherent in any large-scale 
case management system but it is the best data available. Figure 6 shows the average number 
of days from the lodgement of claims to a permission decision on the papers in the Upper 
Tribunal in Field House, London. This figure shows that, overall, it takes around 100 days from 







Figure 7 shows the average number of days from the lodgement of claims to a permission 
decision on the papers in the regional centres in Birmingham, Manchester, Cardiff, and Leeds. 
The figure show the trendlines, that is, the prevailing direction of the data. It is appropriate 
to consider the regional centres separately from London because the volumes of claims are 
much lower. This figures show an overall increase in timeliness at both Manchester and 
Birmingham from 100 to 150 days. By contrast, overall, Cardiff is around 60 days (with 






















Oral renewal hearings 
A claimant refused permission on the papers can renew his or her permission application 
orally at a hearing (unless it has been certified at the paper permission stage as Totally 
Without Merit). The claimant will be able to submit further grounds of challenge and appear 
represented or in person at the oral renewal hearing. A list of oral renewal applications will 
typically contain six to seven cases. Each case will take approximately half an hour to an hour 
to be heard. The principal benefit of an oral renewal hearing is that the judge will hear oral 
argument as to whether or not the grounds merit the grant of permission. From our 
observation of oral permission hearings, it is quite apparent that the hearing often involves a 
detailed examination of the underlying strengths of a claim. 
 












Figure 7: Average days from lodgement to paper 
permission in regional centres
Linear (Birmingham) Linear (Cardiff)













The overall success rate for applicants at oral renewal hearings is higher than at the paper 
permission stage. The proportion of oral renewals granted permission is around 20%. This 


















Figure 8: Oral renewal decisions



















Figure 9: Oral renewal outcomes (%)  




explained by following factors. First, it is in the nature of the jurisdiction that the content of 
cases and the grounds of challenge can evolve and change. For instance, many applicants 
change their representative. Proceeding to an oral renewal will typically involve instructing 
counsel. In oral renewal hearings, the grounds of challenge may be modified and changed. 
Second, oral argument by counsel may be of greater weight in persuading the Judge that a 
claim previously refused permission on the papers is in fact arguable. 
 
As regards timeliness, figure 10 shows the average number of days from the lodgement of 
claims to oral renewal permission decisions in Field House, London. The figure shows that, 
overall and taking account of some sharp fluctuations, it takes around 220 days from the 




Judges noted that in a typical oral renewal list, two or so cases will fall out of the list or not 
turn up at the hearing. The judge will give an ex tempore decision. One judge noted that when 
granting permission at oral renewal stage, she would on occasion give an indication to the 


















“There are some cases that just clearly shouldn’t bother proceeding to a substantive 
hearing, either by the applicant or by the respondent so there are some that may be 
granted permission but ultimately they may not get anything out of it and there’s 
probably a better avenue for them to proceed, so I try and give them a hint of that if 
possible because it saves our resources and it saves significant costs being incurred by 
everyone for doing that.”27 
 
If a case is granted permission at an oral renewal, then it is likely to be conceded by the Home 
Office, unless the parties continue to dispute the issue. In other words, the paper and oral 
permission stages will provide both of the parties with a clear indication of the likely prospects 
of success. This will be an important factor informing their decisions to proceed with the 
litigation or to settle or withdraw the case. 
 
Substantive hearings 
A judicial review claim granted permission–either on the papers or at oral renewal–can 
proceed to a substantive hearing to determine whether or not the decision under challenge 
is unlawful. In theory, the substantive hearing is the principal event in which the legal 
challenge against the impugned decision is either granted or refused and in which the 
challenged decision is assessed against established principles of administrative law. However, 
as Figure 11 indicates, in practice there are relatively few substantive hearings. Judges 
interviewed noted that they expected most cases to settle before a substantive hearing. 
Indeed, from the sample of case-files, only one case proceeded to a substantive hearing. 
Many cases listed for substantive hearings often settle just before the substantive hearing. 
Such cases may be settled to reduce costs or if the parties have agreed the matter between 
themselves or because the Home Office has decided to withdraw its decision and to 
reconsider the case. 
 
 
                                                          






Figure 12 shows the average number of days from lodgement to a substantive decision. 
Overall and taking account of fluctuations, the average amount of time taken from lodgement 
to a substantive decision has increased from 390 days to 480 days. The total overall average 




Figure 13 shows the average number of days from lodgement to a substantive decision for 




















Figure 11: Substantive hearings


































Figure 13: Average days from lodgement to substantive 





5. Quality of judicial review claims and of Home Office decision-
making 
This section and the following sections present some of the research data and findings. This 
section considers issues concerning the quality of judicial review claims and of Home Office 
decisions. A general theme is the variation in the quality of both the grounds of challenge 
advanced by claimants and representatives and of Home Office decisions. There are examples 
of both high and low standards. We will examine the impacts of this variable quality and the 
measures taken to address them. 
 
Cases lodged by claimants 
The research considered the quality of cases lodged by claimants. We wanted to examine how 
the judicial review process is used and the degree to which strong challenges are brought. A 
key issue here is the quality of the claimants’ grounds of challenge. The purpose of these 
grounds is to identify precisely why the challenged decision is arguably unlawful. Grounds of 
challenge take certain forms. First, they might identify the backgrounds facts of the applicant, 
such as: date of birth, nationality, immigration history. Second, there will be the grounds of 
challenge themselves. Third, there might be a heading covering the remedy or the type of 
relief sought. 
 
Textbook accounts of judicial review tend to present a relatively clear set of legal grounds 
upon which an individual can challenge the legality of an administrative decision: illegality; 
procedural unfairness; and irrationality. However, in practice, the grounds of challenge tend 
to be much more fluid. Claimant representatives often set out their grounds in a variety of 
ways. At one end of the spectrum, there are focused grounds of challenge carefully tailored 
to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are formulaic, standard grounds of challenge that only broadly, if at all, relate to the facts of 
the case. Between these two ends of the spectrum are those representatives who identify 
relevant grounds in generic terms but do not develop them, or tie them to the particular case. 
 
From both the examination of the case-files and interviews, it was apparent that the quality 




facts and circumstances of the particular case and prepared with care and skill. Such attention 
does not guarantee success, but if the grounds have been properly formulated, then the 
prospects of success are likely to be increased. It was notable that in one case, the strong 
grounds of challenge clearly focused on the circumstances of the specific case lead to the case 
being conceded by the Home Office before the paper permission stage – a strong indication 
that the challenge had merit with the consequence that the Home Office and Government 
Legal Department will not contest the claim. 
 
By contrast, it is apparent that in many cases the grounds of challenge were generic and pro-
forma. Such grounds comprise long recitals of the relevant law and quotations from case-law. 
Some grounds of challenge often appear to draw upon standard templates or otherwise 
appear to have been simply cut and paste and transposed from one case to another with little, 
if any, tailoring to the specific facts and circumstances if the case. The following examples 
come from the case-file analysis: 
 
Case 247. In a judicial review of a certification decision, the judge had refused permission on 
the papers because the Home Office had fully considered all matters and given cogent reasons 
for concluding that there would not be a breach of human rights on return. The Judge 
concluded that the asylum and human rights claims were hopeless, could not succeed, and 
were bound to fail. Accordingly, the certification of the claims as clearly unfounded was 
unarguably lawful. The applicant had a right of appeal from outside the UK and this was an 
adequate alternative remedy to judicial review. The judge noted that the grounds of 
challenged were poorly drafted. Following an oral renewal hearing, the Judge refused 
permission as follows: 
 
“The paper grounds are in standard form. In my oral renewal list today there have been 3 sets 
of such grounds, all on applications in which … [the same law firm] … are the applicant’s 
representatives. They are as follows: 
 
1.The Judge should have considered the appellants claim both individually and collectively and this if 




2.The appellant should have been given an opportunity to advance oral evidence before a Judge given 
the ONUS is on the appellant to approve [sic] their case. 
3.The appellant should not be removed whilst this judicial review application is outstanding. 
4.It is important that the appellant should be here in the United Kingdom as we may need further 
instructions from him before the hearing. 
Again, the grounds are unsigned. They are no more than a bare joinder of issue, if that, and 
do not disclose any arguable public law error by the respondent in her refusal decision. … The 
renewal grounds are without merit.” 
 
Case 92. Tthe applicant, had entered the UK in 2015 and had his asylum and Article 8 claims 
refused and certified as clearly unfounded. The applicant was represented. The grounds of 
challenge focused upon two points: the Home Office’s failure to give independent 
consideration to Article 8; and “Article 8 considerations and Discretionary Leave”. The 
grounds of challenge largely comprised long quotations from the Home Office’s 2012 family 
migration publication and from case-law such as Nagre and Razgar. The claim was refused 
permission on the papers by a Judge as follows: "The grounds are hopeless. They give all the 
appearance of being a pro-forma with no proper attempt to engage with the respondent’s 
decision, or to identify in any proper way why the decision was unlawful. It is of particular 
note that the grounds simply fail to challenge any aspect of the respondent's decision that 
the applicant's protection claim is without merit, even taking it at its highest". The Judge 
concluded that the specific grounds of challenge were without foundation. The submission 
that the Home Office had not given independent consideration to the Article 8 claim was 
unjustifiable given the discussion in specific paragraphs of the Home Office refusal letter. The 
Judge held that the second ground of challenge was equally devoid of merit as it was also 
apparent from the refusal letter that the Home Office had considered whether removal would 
be proportionate under the Razgar test. The claimant was also refused permission following 
an oral renewal. 
 
Case 52. The applicant had sought to remain on Article 8 grounds. An appeal was heard and 
dismissed in 2015. A 2016 decision to remove the applicant was subject to judicial review. 




and the applicant sought judicial review of this. The Government Legal Department argued 
that the applicant's grounds of challenge were identical to those pleaded in his previous 
application for permission to apply for judicial review save that they have been re-paginated. 
The Upper Tribunal refused permission for judicial review and deemed the claim to be Totally 
Without Merit: “[t]he nub of the respondent’s decision is that the applicant has added 
nothing of significance to his previously exhausted claims. The grounds of challenge are vague 
and irrelevant. … The proceedings are only dilatory." 
 
There were many other cases in which judges highlighted the use of standard grounds of 
challenge. In case 133, the only substantive ground of legal challenge was as follows: “The 
Defendant failed to set out a structured approach to the issue of proportionately when 
refusing their application under Art 8 of the ECHR. … It is averred that there is sufficient 
evidence to form a legitimate view that the Claimants have established a private and family 
life in the UK”. Permission was refused. 
 
In an oral renewal decision (case 232), the Judge wrote: 
 
“The renewal grounds are sparse and generic, adding nothing to the earlier grounds 
and with no reference to the refusal letter therein. They are also received out of time. 
The applicant did not attend or arrange representation today, and has proferred no 
explanation for his failure to prosecute this application. The respondent has arranged 
Counsel, which would not have been necessary had she been aware that the applicant 
would not attend today.” 
 
In a para 353 fresh claim judicial review, the Judge held that: “[i]nsofar as the grounds refer 
to certification, they are misconceived. This is because the respondent has not certified this 
claim.” (case 45). The Judge then noted: 
 
“I have concluded that it is unarguable that the respondent’s decision, that the 
applicants’ further representations were not significantly different, was unlawful. The 
grounds do not explain precisely what evidence was significantly different. It is wholly 




that the further representations were not significantly different, was irrational or 
Wednesbury unreasonable. The remaining grounds amount to no more than an 
attempt to re-argue the case.” 
 
In another case (case 50), the grounds focused upon a challenge to a certification decision. 
However, the impugned decision was not a certification decision, but a fresh claim para 353 
decision. In a fresh claim judicial review, the Judge stated: 
 
“The grounds of challenge are in general terms. They reiterate the appellant’s 
assertion that he is at risk. They raise Article 8 in passing. Overall, they simply fail to 
engage with the respondent’s reasoning” (Case 263). 
 
In a challenge against the certification of an asylum claim as clearly unfounded (case 17), the 
Judge, refusing permission, held that the “the grounds of challenge are confusing and difficult 
to follow”. In a previous judicial review by the same claimant, a different judge had held that 
the: “The grounds are generic, mainly rehearsing case-law, without any real engagement with 
the decision.” 
 
In another case (case 108), the Upper Tribunal noted that the claimant’s grounds of challenge 
“largely comprise of an extended chronology and submissions consisting of three 
paragraphs”. Permission was refused: “[t]he grounds of application are, in essence, little more 
than a disagreement with conclusions which the respondent had been plainly entitled to 
reach on the material before her.” 
 
Concerns about generic grounds of challenge are not limited to the cases in our sample. In its 
reported decisions, the Upper Tribunal has given guidance concerning the main standards and 
principles to be observed in the presentation of claims. Grounds of challenge should be 
“formulated with appropriate clarity and particularity. The pleading should be such that it is 
possible to identify on a relatively quick perusal the target of the Applicant’s challenge, the 




elements of the latter and the remedy claimed.”28 Similarly, the Court of Appeal has also 
criticised the use of standard grounds of challenge in Article 8 cases. In Parveen, Underhill LJ 
stated that “this Court sees too many cases in which applicants for leave or their advisers – 
particularly in cases depending on article 8 outside the Rules – devote their energies to setting 
out extracts from the case-law rather than to demonstrating a compelling case based on the 
details of the applicant's particular circumstances. The latter exercise may require more work, 
but it is what the Secretary of State, and if necessary the Tribunal, will be more concerned 
with. Cases of this kind generally turn on their facts, and the applicable law does not require 
elaborate exposition.”29 
 
The low-quality preparation of many immigration judicial reviews is evident from the frequent 
use of template or standard grounds of challenge that have been recycled (cut and paste) 
from other immigration judicial reviews. Such grounds of challenge typically contain standard 
paragraphs concerning the law on fresh asylum claims, certification, the application of Article 
8 ECHR and relevant case-law. However, they typically provide very little, if any, detail on the 
specific facts and circumstances of the individual claimant’s personal situation and why the 
challenged decision was arguably unlawful, unreasonable, or procedurally unfair. Other 
grounds of challenge are often discursive and repetitious. They repeat the same case-law, but 
do little to relate this law to the specific facts and circumstances of the individual case. The 
following statement frequently occurred in a number of Acknowledgements of Service by the 
Government Legal Department: 
 
“The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s grounds of challenge are not very well 
particularised and merely quote extensively from the case-law without applying it to 
the facts of her case. The Respondent submits that this amounts to no more than a 
disagreement with the challenged decision. The President of the Upper Tribunal in R 
(on the application of SN) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (striking out 
– principles) IJR [2015] UKUT 00227 (IAC) held at [32] that ‘[a] bare pleading that the 
impugned decision is unlawful, unreasonable and irrational, or one framed in 
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comparable terms, is never acceptable. The judge should not have to forage, dig and 
mine in order to identify the essentials of the Applicant’s case’. The Respondent 
submits that the Applicant has not come close to identifying a public law error, and 
the claim should be dismissed for this reason.” (Case 92) 
 
In one case (case 135), the Government Legal Department argued that the applicant had 
failed to particularise the human rights grounds in the claim: 
 
“The applicant’s grounds are generic and do not, in the Respondent’s submission, 
amount to any sort of coherent pleading against his asylum claim. The claim is wholly 
deficient of any supporting evidence. The grounds are considered to be pro forma 
grounds that are typically found with Applicants in detention centres. There appears 
to be a cut and paste exercise at Section 9 of the claim form with paragraph 7 
repeating paragraphs 5 and incomplete sentences throughout the claim form.” 
 
The claim was refused permission. In many cases, the summary grounds of defence stated: 
“The grounds of application are, in essence, little more than a disagreement with conclusions 
which the respondent had been plainly entitled to reach on the material before her.” 
 
Judges interviewed made the following points. First, many judicial review claims are an 
attempt to re-argue the underlying merits of a decision rather than focused upon arguing that 
the decision was unlawful. According to judges: 
 
“Representation is a big problem. Cases are often not pleaded like a public law error. 
They end up like an appeal by another name.”30 
 
“I think the biggest improvement could be with representatives; better regulation of 
representatives, better compliance with directions, better information available to 
individuals or better legal advice available to individuals. There are many claims which 
are utterly hopeless. There are many claims by solicitors where they just don’t 
                                                          




understand judicial review at all. It looks like a statutory appeal because they don’t 
understand the difference. There are lots of cases where there is just attempts at re-
arguing a claim which is not what judicial review is about but people don’t understand 
that.” 
 
“Poor quality standard grounds are often used. The grounds of challenge used by 
claimants can be very poor. The Acknowledgement of Service is often just as bad.”31 
 
Second, there is extensive, though far from universal, use of standard template grounds of 
challenge that do not address the specific circumstances of the particular challenge. Third, 
judges noted that in many cases, the grounds of challenge are of the “kitchen sink” variety 
and representatives lack the confidence to focus upon their best ground of challenge. In other 
words, many representatives seek to spread the net as widely as possible and throw in all 
possible grounds of challenge rather than focus precisely upon their best point or points. 
Fourth, judges noted that many good quality practitioners do care about professional 
standards and want to provide the best service to clients and the Tribunal. Discussions 
between judges and practitioners in the Upper Tribunal practitioner liaison group provided 
evidence of this. 
 
Judges also mentioned that a standard set of grounds of challenge and skeleton argument 
had been widely circulated within immigration detention centres and was frequently used in 
judicial review claims against removal directions: 
 
“Someone always has a copy of these grounds in each detention centre so it’s normally 
the cases which are challenges to removal or detained cases where it’s really the last 
chance for an individual.  I know the particular set that’s been in use for about the last 
year, you can tell them from the first page because it has the same typos in it. And 
then you go onto the next page and you see the same block of text in exactly the same 
format, sometimes with blanks filled in, sometimes not. But since I’ve done 
immigration there’s always been a version of the template in circulation.”32 
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“Repetitive grounds, I think, probably tend to come up as often as not in certification 
cases, where you see these grounds that you know must be going around essentially, 
either from representative to representative or between applicants and detention 
centres. Very often, the grounds are the same word for word in a number of cases. It 
isn’t focussed on a particular case at all, and it’s unlikely really to get any further.”33 
 
Given the largely repetitive nature of the types of cases that arise, Judges do not necessarily 
need long recitals of the relevant legislation and case-law. In many cases, what is required is 
the claimant’s immigration history and for the grounds of challenge to focus specifically on 
the legal arguments why the challenged decision contains a public law error or why the law 
has been incorrectly applied in the claimant’s specific circumstances. 
 
The use of repetitive grounds is closely linked to the frequent attempt by claimants and 
representatives to use judicial review as a surrogate appeals process. Immigration judicial 
review challenges are often, though very far from always, lodged in order to overturn a 
negative immigration decision so as to procure a reconsideration by the Home Office, a 
positive decision, or to achieve delay. Yet, judicial review is a limited remedy. Many claims are 
in practice an attempt to re-argue the merits of the challenged Home Office decision. 
However, if the grounds of challenge do not demonstrate that the Home Office’s refusal 
decision is arguably unlawful, procedurally unfair, or irrational, then permission for judicial 
review is highly likely to be refused. The following, similar phrases occur frequently when 
judges refuse permission: 
 
“The grounds are in essence little more than a disagreement by the Applicant with the 
Respondent’s decision and an attempt to re-argue and expand upon his claim.” (Case 
169) 
 
                                                          




“The grounds disclose no arguable basis to challenge this decision. The claim now 
advanced is effectively the same one that was examined but rejected at appeal.” (Case 
320) 
 
“The Respondent unarguably applied the appropriate immigration rules and legal 
principles relating to article 8 applications. … The grounds amount to no more than a 
disagreement with a decision the Respondent was entitled to reach. Any appeal would 
be bound to fail on the basis advanced by the Applicant and the Respondent was fully 
entitled to certify the claim as clearly unfounded.” (Case 83). 
 
“This was plainly a completely hopeless article 8 claim and it is impossible to see what 
outcome was rationally possible than for the claim to be certified as clearly 
unfounded. The first of the grounds assert otherwise but there is no legitimate basis 
upon which this claim could succeed.” (Case 61). 
 
Law firms that use standard and template grounds of challenge often fail to serve their clients 
well. It may also be an exploitative practice of vulnerable clients in some instances. Standard 
grounds of challenge may underplay the strongest points that could be taken on behalf of an 
individual. Alternatively, if there are no such good points that can be taken, then the law firm 
is providing very poor value for money on behalf of their clients and raising false hopes that 
template grounds of challenge would be accepted as an arguable claim for judicial review. 
The use of such standard grounds of challenge can undermine the effectiveness of the judicial 
review process. It represents a failure of representatives to comply with the overriding 
objective to assist both their client and the court. 
 
It is important to emphasise the wide variety in the quality of grounds of challenge. We found 
many cases in which the grounds of challenge had been prepared with care and attention and 
had been carefully tailored to the circumstances of the specific case. Such cases tended to 
have much higher chance of success than those in which standard grounds were used. It is 
also important to recognise that there is a subtle distinction between those cases that are just 






Litigants in person present different issues in this respect. Their grounds fall into three main 
categories. First, those unrepresented claimants who have sought to draft grounds unaided. 
As would be expected, such grounds often contained little or no law. When the grounds of 
challenge did contain some law and legal principles, it was broadly stated and often irrelevant. 
Second, those unrepresented claimants who—usually while in detention—have managed to 
get hold of a “stock” grounds template. Often the exact same phrasing and structure 
appeared in the grounds, but the substance of the grounds did little to advance the case. 
Judges were aware of this practice and could, in some instances, immediately identify where 
stock grounds had been used. Third, some unrepresented claimants appear to be have bought 
“unbundled” legal services, in which they get a template ground document as part of a cheap 
legal package, but in which the claimant is not formally advised or represented. Where this 
appeared to be the case, grounds were of poor quality. 
 
The official line is that judges do not hunt around to discover grounds within the claim. In 
practice, some judges may on occasion do this. When unrepresented claimants are involved, 
judges may adopt more of an “enabling” approach of a tribunal appeal judge than what is 
conventional in a judicial review. In some cases, the presence of poorly drafted grounds 
hampers the efficiency and effectiveness of proceedings, and sometimes damage the chances 
of success for claimants. Grounds of challenge often change as cases proceed through the 
various stages of the process, sometimes for the better if a claimant changes his or her 
representative. In many instances, judges claimed it would be easier for claimants to simply 
set out the facts of their case than bury them in complex but unhelpful legal claims. 
 
Recommendation: 
Representatives that use of standard, formulaic grounds of challenge need to undertake 
better preparation of judicial review claims. 
 
Totally without merit claims 
In judicial review proceedings, the court or tribunal can certify a case as being Totally Without 




are “bound to fail”.34 Claims certified as TWM cannot be renewed at an oral hearing. 
However, the applicant can apply to the Court of Appeal to challenge the case having been 
deemed TWM. 
 
The rationale for the power to certify claims as TWM is that hopeless judicial review claims 
increase the cost and delay to public authorities and place an unjustified burden on judicial 
resources. Cases certified as TWM cannot then proceed to the oral renewal stage as there 
would be no value in oral argument. There are two safeguards. A claim can only be deemed 
TWM if the judge, after careful consideration, concludes that the case is truly bound to fail. 
Second, the claimant still has access to a Court of Appeal judge who, with even greater 
experience and seniority, will approach the application independently and with the same 
care. 
 
One concern with the TWM mechanism is that it precludes oral argument before a judge in 
person. Given the value placed by the common law tradition on oral argument, it is possible 
that using oral argument may on occasion persuade a judge that a claim that has previously 
been refused permission on the papers is in fact arguable and have a realistic chance of 
success. 
 
In Wasif the Court of Appeal emphasised the following points. First, judges should not 
automatically certify applications as TWM when refusing permission. Second, Judges 
considering permission applications will quite commonly encounter cases, particularly where 
the claimant is unrepresented, in which the claim form/grounds and/or the supporting 
materials are too confused or inadequate to disclose a claim which justifies the grant of 
permission but where the judge nevertheless suspects that proper presentation might 
disclose an arguable case. In such cases, the judge should not certify the application as TWM. 
The right course will usually be to refuse permission, with reasons which identify the nature 
of the problem, giving the claimant the opportunity to address it at an oral renewal hearing if 
they can; but there may sometimes be cases where the better course is to adjourn the 
permission application to an oral hearing, perhaps on an inter partes basis. Third, the Judge 
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must give separate reasons for both refusing permission and for certifying the case as TWM.35 
Underhill LJ noted that since the difference between the two thresholds – arguability and 
TWM – “is one of degree it may be that all that can be said in many or most cases is something 
to the effect of ‘I consider the application is totally without merit: my reasons are those 
already given above.’”36 
 
What does the data indicate about TWM? First, both the number and proportion of TWM 
cases varies over time. Figure 14 shows the number of claims refused permission on the 
papers and the number deemed TWM. Figure 15 shows that the proportion of claims refused 
permission on the papers deemed TWM has increased and then declined. The increase in the 
proportion of TWM claims coincided with the overall increase in the number of claims 
submitted over the period 2015-16. The number and proportion of TWM cases has since 
declined. Judges interviewed noted that the lower number of TWM might perhaps be linked 
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Second, the number of cases from our sample deemed TWM was relatively small. There were 
24 cases deemed TWM and 317 were not. The following are examples of cases deemed TWM. 
 
Case 8. The claimant had delayed for two years in seeking judicial review against a 
decision that had already been appealed against and was therefore not judicially 
reviewable. The claimant had sought to judicial review a 2016 pre-action protocol letter. 
However, the actual Home Office decision was made in 2014. The 2016 letter was a 
letter defending the previous refusal decision. The Judge held that there had been a 
significant breach of the time limit for seeking judicial review and no good explanation 
for the delay. The Judge held that “giving weight to the need for litigation to be 
conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and the need to enforce compliance 
with the Rules I find it is inappropriate to extend time, particularly given the lack of 
merit in the application”. The Judge held that the grounds of challenge did not properly 
particularise the claim: “The grounds are unarguable as they do not identify any 
arguable illegality in the decision and because they are an abuse of process. The 
applicant has had a statutory right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, which was 
unsuccessful.” There was an abuse of process because the applicant had appealed 
without success. If he had wished to take his case further, the proper route would have 
been a Cart judicial review against the refusal of permission to appeal by the Upper 
Tribunal, not a judicial review of the original Home Office decision. The judge certified 


























Case 125. The applicant had entered as a visitor in 2002 and overstayed. Her 
dependent partner and children remained in her home country. A private life claim 
was refused and certified as clearly unfounded. The Home Office had decided that the 
applicant could not satisfy the Immigration Rules and there were no exceptional 
circumstances that would render her removal disproportionate. The Judge concluded 
that the claim had no realistic prospects of success and was bound to fail. The 
certificate was neither unlawful nor irrational. The applicant had an out of country 
right of appeal. The case was deemed TWM. 
 
Different Judges may adopt different approaches to certifying cases as TWM. Some might 
certify more cases as TWMs. Nonetheless, there is a rationale for having the ability to certify 
claims as Totally Without Merit when appropriate on a case by case basis. 
 
Abusive and vexatious claims 
The higher courts and the Upper Tribunal have, over recent years, made use of tougher 
measures to deal with abusive and vexatious judicial review claims. Judges can impose costs 
sanctions for breaches and non-compliance with the procedural rules and the Administrative 
Court Guide. In Hamid, the High Court focused on last-minute applications, often made out of 
hours, to restrain challenge removals.37 That judgment strongly criticised “late, meritless 
applications by people who face removal or deportation” as an abuse of court process and 
warned that future abuses would be referred to the Solicitors Regulation Authority for 
professional misconduct. The purpose of the Hamid jurisdiction is to ensure that lawyers 
conduct themselves according to proper standards of behaviour. There have also been 
instances in which law firms have been struck off and appealed without success to the 
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.38 
 
In Shrestha, the Upper Tribunal explained that the bringing of hopeless applications wastes 
judicial time and risks delaying the prompt examination of other cases, which may have merit. 
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The fact that a person with no entitlement to remain in the United Kingdom may, in practice, 
be able to remain in the country a little longer, as a result of bringing a meritless application, 
serves to reinforce the view that the procedure is being abused. In any event, it is doubtful 
whether such an applicant will gain a material advantage by making the application. In many 
cases, the only tangible result is that the applicant (or the applicant’s friends or family) incurs 
significant professional fees, as well as the fees payable to the Tribunal. In such cases, the 
only real beneficiary is the solicitor.39 
 
In Sathivel, the High Court stated that “the conduct of practitioners in the field of immigration 
and asylum poses a particular problem for the courts and tribunals.  It is for this reason that 
the Courts have been forced to exercise their inherent jurisdiction to govern proceedings 
before them to hold to account the behaviour of lawyers whose conduct of litigation falls 
below the minimum professional and ethical standards which must be demanded of all 
lawyers appearing before the Courts.”40 The court noted that “there are of course many highly 
professional practitioners in this complex and difficult field who successfully reconcile the 
need to act in their client’s interests with their duties to the Court. However, there is also a 
substantial cohort of lawyers who consider that litigation is a tactic or strategy that can be 
used to delay and deter removal proceedings.” 
 
The court explained that many practitioners do not have legal aid contracts. Clients are 
privately funded, and frequently vulnerable and desperate. Fees can often run into several 
thousands of pounds. To raise the necessary funds, individuals will often seek support from 
family and friends. The solicitors will not generally act unless they are placed in funds 
beforehand. “Some lawyers promise the highest quality of representation and we have no 
doubt that there are solicitors and other representatives who do provide excellent services. 
But there are other solicitors who having promised high quality specialist services then 
instruct paralegals and unqualified persons to draft what would ordinarily be viewed as 
complex and specialised pleadings and court documents (often prepared by counsel). The 
cases that are then advanced may be wholly lacking in merit. Judges are presented with 
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lengthy pleadings much of which is irrelevant and has been cut and paste from template 
documents, often available on the internet.”41 The court also stated: 
“the incentive of some practitioners in initiating court or tribunal proceedings is simply 
to delay the immigration process.  They do this by exhausting every judicial or tribunal 
opportunity, irrespective of the merits of the case. Buying time is valuable. Even a 
hopeless application or appeal takes time to determine and whilst that is ongoing 
there is the possibility of lodging repeat “fresh material” applications to the Home 
Office with a view to generating new Home Office decisions (rejecting the contention 
that there is fresh material relevant to the applicants case) which then generates even 
more (unmeritorious) appeals which take up even more time to resolve and allowing 
(yet again) yet more fresh material applications, and so on.  It is commonplace for such 
cases to continue for many years, and in extreme cases decades. And the longer the 
case goes on the more scope there is for an applicant to begin to develop an Article 8 
“private life” claim, for example by getting married (sometimes through a sham 
process) or having (or claiming to have) children. Where an applicant is detained 
pending removal the longer that detention persists (which may be a consequence of 
the applications and appeals being pursued on the individual’s behalf) the greater the 
scope for the detained person to then argue on well-known “Hardial Singh” grounds 
that it is no longer lawful to maintain detention. If a bail application succeeds the 
applicant might abscond. Sometimes the applicant re-appears years later, and the 
process then starts again.”42 
“… when the Home Office sets a date and arrangements for removal a different 
dynamic sets in. Last minute applications to restrain removal are made to the High 
Court, and often to the “out of hours” duty Judge literally hours or even minutes 
before the removal flight departs the runway.  Frequently the day before, or even the 
day of, removal lawyers serve a new “fresh material” claim upon the Home Office and 
then argue before the duty Judge that removal is unlawful pending determination by 
the Home Office of that new application and/or an appeal therefrom.  It is of the 
nature of these cases that the applicant may have been engaged in a Home Office 
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and/or appeal process for some years.  There is often a lengthy history.  However, 
what happens is that at the last moment the applicant changes solicitors.  The new 
solicitors draft the last-minute application seeking the restraining of removal and they 
explain to the Judge that they have been instructed late on and that they have had no 
time to obtain instructions (the client will be in detention).  Frequently, the new 
lawyers do not have access to the prior documentation and they have not (because of 
lack of time they argue) sought or obtained the documentation from previous 
solicitors or the Operational Support and Certification Unit (“OSCU”) of the Home 
Office. For this reason, arguments advanced to the Judge are based on details 
provided by the client who being in detention can give only the barest of instructions 
over the phone.  Judges complain that all too often the version of events provided to 
them is materially inaccurate and/or incomplete.  It is almost unheard of for the 
Defendant to be notified of the application or to have a chance to advance 
submissions, even in writing.”43 
The case-file analysis contained instances of unmeritorious challenges. There is a spectrum 
here in the degree of the lack of merit involved in a case and the degree of abuse. The 
following provides an extreme, but not isolated, example. 
 
Case 133. The applicant had entered the UK as a visitor in 2005 and overstayed and 
subsequently followed by his wife and children who also then overstayed. A human rights 
claim in 2015 was refused because the applicant had failed to submit a passport. A judicial 
review of this decision was refused in 2015 and deemed TWM. The Judge stated that “the 
grounds appear to be templated as they contain incorrect facts about the nature of the refusal 
and also jump from paragraph 14 to 36.” An application for permission to appeal this decision 
to the Court of Appeal was refused in 2016 as being out of time and “having regard to the 
templated and irrelevant grounds submitted.” A subsequent judicial review against the 
refusal and certification of a human rights claim was refused permission and deemed TWM. 
The Judge wrote: “The applicant has an out of country right of appeal. The application is 
merely an attempt to frustrate removal.” The applicant then sought permission to appeal this 
decision to the Court of Appeal. This was refused by the Upper Tribunal: “The application for 
                                                          




permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is essentially a recitation of the law relating to 
Article 8 and unparticularised as to any error made in the decision.” The Home Office then 
wrote to the applicant stating that the applicant’s claim had previously been refused and 
certified. The applicant sought judicial review of this letter. The Government Legal 
Department argued that this letter was not an immigration decision and so could not be 
challenged through judicial review and the challenge was therefore an abuse of process. The 
Judge rejected the judicial review as being out of time. The judicial review claim was also 
refused on the merits and deemed TWM. The Judge stated: “The grounds recite case law but 
disclose no public law error on the part of the Respondent. Given the lack of merit in the 
grounds, I refuse to extend time.” The Judge held the applicant could not satisfy the 
Immigration Rules and removal was proportionate. The claim was also certified as TWM. In 
2017, the applicant had submitted an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal that was deemed to be 
invalid. 
 
Monitoring poor quality representation 
The Upper Tribunal is fully aware of poor quality representation and how it adversely affects 
both vulnerable claimants and judicial resources. The key issue is what can be done to reduce 
such behaviour. As one judge explained: 
 
“You could simply deal with these cases by certifying them as TWM, but I think it’s 
important to go further than that if you’ve got a pattern emerging. For us, it’s more a 
matter of just, ‘this is a very bad case, which should never have been run and certainly 
should never have been renewed’. If a picture emerges of a repeated pattern of wholly 
unmeritorious cases, then there is a possibility of getting the law firm in front of a 
presidential panel or another panel to explain or the possibility of cost sanctions or 
reference to the disciplinary bodies.”44 
 
The Upper Tribunal has developed an internal system by which judges can report instances of 
poor, abusive, and exploitative representation. This mechanism enables the Upper Tribunal 
to identify and collect examples of bad practice in order to identify patterns and trends, with 
                                                          




a view to convening Hamid hearings or passing the material to the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority. The system is overseen by a designated Upper Tribunal Judge. Other Judges and 
Tribunal Case-Workers can refer cases and examples of abusive claims representation. This 




There is a variety of mechanisms to deal with vexatious claims: the Upper Tribunal’s internal 
reporting system; deeming claims to be Totally Without Merit; Hamid hearings; and 
references to regulatory bodies. Anecdotally, the reduction in the number of judicial review 
claims may be in part attributable to use of these mechanisms. The most effective way of 
seeking to reduce the number of hopeless judicial review claims is to reduce the levels of 




An important part of the research involved understanding the perspectives of representatives 
and their experiences of the judicial review process. The representatives we interviewed 
acknowledged the issues involved and the behaviours of poor quality representatives. At the 
same time, representatives highlighted the difficulties of legal practice caused by a lack of 
early legal advice for claimants and the difficulties involved in securing legal aid funding: 
 
“The funding side of judicial review is really tricky. We have to get it urgently and 
getting it urgently enough when it’s a removal or detention case, which can be really, 
really hard. So, that is very stressful and that’s the difficult part of it. It is really hard to 
navigate to apply for funding and then somebody in the Legal Aid Agency will make a 
decision as to whether they think there is merit, so fifty percent or greater chance of 
success. Quite often they will say ‘no’ and we will say ‘well, we think there is, you 
know, the barrister thinks there is. Why do you think there isn’t?’ And we have to go 
through this whole process.”45 
                                                          





“One thing that I’ve been finding at the moment is a bit of a nightmare, is the legal aid 
situation where you do not get paid unless you get permission. This discourages 
responsible claimant lawyers from sorting their cases out. So, say you’re putting in an 
urgent judicial review, which account for a lot of cases. The substantive case is not 
where it should be in an ideal world. And it stops you sorting out the substantive case 
because if you do that, your judicial reviews often become academic which is 
depressing.”46 
 
“A key problem is legal aid, particularly in urgent removal cases. There is such little 
time for claimants to act in urgent removal cases, particularly where the claimant has 
been previously unrepresented and then newly instructing solicitors take it on at the 
last minute. Previously there used to be devolved powers so it was possible for the 
solicitor to make an assessment of the merits to determine legal aid eligibility to get 
on with the urgent work that needed to be done. But the time is very much 
compressed; there is very little time anyway because of Home Office removal policies. 
This creates difficulties for claimants in terms of perhaps getting all the information 
that they need in order to assess merit and to assess whether the claim is weak.”47 
 
“Legal aid funding causes difficulties for representatives in terms of the time they then 
have to put forward a well-argued, well-presented claim which then assists the judge 
in making their decision.  And also even for a strong case, the legal aid regime can act 
as a disincentive because unless you get permission, then there will be no legal aid. 
So, if it’s difficult for the representative to work out whether or not there is sufficient 
merit and if there’s not time to do that, then they’re unlikely to take the case on.  So 
that can lead to more claimants being unrepresented.”48 
 
Representatives also highlighted the difficulties of assisting clients in immigration detention: 
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“Often the problem for detainees is that the original evidence in their case wasn’t 
there because they did not have a lawyer when they made their application. So, 
however reasonably thought out their grounds for judicial review are, they are still too 
generic to win anything. If you don’t have a lawyer prepare your case individually and 
setting you apart from the crowd, then everything is likely to be too generic to 
succeed.”49 
 
“A real disadvantage is that you have got people who are in detention or who don’t 
have many documents. They have to somehow prove their income and that is really 
tricky.  We have to get evidence of their means and that is really hard for people that 
don’t have that.” 
 
Our interviews found different approaches between different types of representatives. Better 
quality representatives are more likely to advise potential clients that there have very limited 
or no prospects of success. Some representatives also emphasised the importance of ensuring 
clients and solicitors both understand that if the chances of success are low, then the client 
risks being exposed to costs: 
 
 “Solicitors are almost relieved when I say there is nothing in a case because they can go 
back to the client and say, ‘Counsel says no.’ I say, ‘You're lighting your cigarettes with 
ten pound notes. Why do it? Your client is burning his money. If he chooses to do that…’ 
It is often not so bad that you would actually be misleading the court, but I'm saying, 
‘does your client understand that they are likely to end up with their costs and the 
Secretary of State's costs?’ Particularly when you get someone who's, say, haggling 
about your fees as counsel, I say: ‘Well, I'm really worried because you're telling me this 
client is really poor, they've got a really weak case and they're going to pick up the 
Secretary of State's costs. So what have you told them about the risk they're exposing 
themselves to?’  And I'm not sure these solicitors have always understood the risks 
themselves.”50 
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A barrister explained: 
 
“Quite often, I'm instructed by solicitors to draft grounds, often at the last minute, 
often on a removal, and I ring them and say, ‘There's nothing here in this case’. And 
they're not necessarily venal representatives I'm talking about. They are 
representatives who really don't seem to have understood, faced with a living, 
breathing person with a sad story, that there's no area of law in sight here, that the 
rules do say that some people don't have a good case. On the law, they've reached 
the end of the road.”51 
 
Some representatives also highlighted their perception of a lack of equal treatment between 
them and poor litigation conduct by the Home Office: 
 
“Some Upper Tribunal judges elaborate their reasons to why they have granted or 
refused permission, and some do not really explain, but just simply rely on the 
Acknowledgement of Service, where I would expect, and my client would expect, that 
if permission gets refused that the Upper Tribunal Judge does not simply regurgitate 
from the Acknowledgement of Service, but actually gives a reason in a short form 
summary for the refusal so the client will understand which factors the judge took into 
account and why permission was refused.”52 
 
“I think the feeling that we have as claimant solicitors is that a lot of the judicial 
decisions are very quick to slap claimant solicitors down, but very slow to criticise the 
Home Office and the Government Legal Department when they act badly. They expect 
us to get everything perfectly right. I don’t think they appreciate the pressures that 
we are working under, where we’ve got detained clients and a group of clients that 
are imminently removable and potentially being removed to countries where they 
fear torture or ill treatment and where we unfortunately don’t have perfect 
information and it’s a very difficult call to make. We are doing our best and most 
solicitors are acting in accordance with our professional duties and we are conscious 
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of them. But we really get the sense that we are damned if we do and we are damned 
if we don’t. And the same standards are not applied to our opponents.”53 
 
“There's a whole line of sanctioning, the sanctions against reps who misbehave, and I 
have no problem with the vast majority of the judgments. They seem to me to be 
lawyers who have totally lost sight of their ethical obligations. There was judgment in 
a case the other day which was horrendous. The law firm was just ripping off the 
clients. But, the tribunal and the courts don't take a tough line with poor litigation 
conduct by the Home Office.”54 
 
Home Office decision-making 
Issues concerning quality equally arise in relation to the Home Office and its decision-making. 
The issue of the quality of initial decisions has been raised in various reports by the 
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. The overall goal of an effective 
administrative justice system should be to achieve robust and good quality decisions first time 
round. If such decisions contain errors, then the person concerned will often have to use 
costly and lengthy remedies, such as tribunal appeals and judicial review. It is therefore 
important that government learns from errors to prevent their repetition wherever 
possible.55 
 
Achieving this virtuous circle across the entire range of primary immigration decision-making 
has proved elusive. The long-standing concern is that mistakes, errors, and poor quality 
decision-making can arise from various political, cultural, and organisational factors. These 
have been said to include: the so-called culture of disbelief; having decisions taken by 
inexperienced and junior caseworkers who have to cope with high workloads without 
sufficient oversight by more senior staff; and a move away from discretion and face-to-face 
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interviews toward a checklist approach and making more decisions solely on the basis of 
information provided.56 
 
These arguments are the general points that are often raised. The reality can be more 
complex and difficult. Both the interviews and the case-file analysis shed some light on the 
quality of Home Office decisions. Representatives highlighted general concerns that Home 
Office decisions sometimes follow a standard template and use copied and pasted 
paragraphs: 
 
“The issue with the quality of Home Office decision-making is that it is made by case-
workers who are obviously copying the standard format they give for other decisions 
of the same type, to the same country, making mistakes, drawing conclusions that to 
us seem to be completely wrong and we think, ‘Oh, there’s good grounds to appeal 
this decision.’  If those are certified and they have no in-country right of appeal then 
we have no choice but to go to judicial review.”57 
 
“It comes back round to the quality of the original decision-making because if there 
were not so many problems with some of the original decisions, then we would not 
have to go to judicial review.”58 
 
“Home Office decision making can be poor. There are really bad examples, but they’re 
not the majority. The really bad cases are where, for example, the person is being sent 
back to Tanzania, but they are from India. That’s the exception. Home Office decisions 
are not normally that bad, but it’s just how generic they mostly are. Asylum decisions 
are slightly better, slightly more detailed. But I think the problem with all the decision 
making is that the Home Office as a whole is so enforcement-focused. The obsession 
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with credibility in the asylum jurisdiction makes it feel like the Home Office is looking 
to trip people up.”59 
 
“One of the issues with the Home Office decisions is that they are not taken by 
lawyers. So, when they are looking at deportation, for example, which might raise 
issues about the burden of proof and allegations of deception, case workers just do 
not quite seem to understand.”60 
 
“What is it like dealing with the Home Office? Sometimes, they are just wholly illogical. 
I often think: why is the Home Office forcing us to litigate matters when there’s no 
need to? Why can’t they take a sensible position? It is very frustrating that sometimes 
you have to go through more and more procedures just so that someone sensible can 
look at a case. You get a really poor decision. You do a letter before claim so that it 
goes before someone in the Home Office litigation unit. They might be a bit more 
sensible. Sometimes they are; often they’re not. If not, then you issue a JR and then it 
goes to someone at the Government Legal Department. This will be an actual lawyer 
who might look at this. So, you’re hoping then that someone will do something 
sensible with it. It is, often, but not always, frustrating.” 
Home Office case-workers, like representatives, often have a difficult job to do in handling 
often complex evidence and applying complicated rules, and there is extensive evidence that 
the quality of decisions can be variable. As with the quality of claimants’ grounds of challenge, 
Home Office decisions can be of variable quality. Many decision letters from the sample of 
case-files were lengthy, detailed and reasoned. Further, most judicial review claims are 
unsuccessful—meaning the quality of the decision is defensible to, at very least, a certain 
extent. Asylum decision letters are often very detailed and contain a lengthy assessment of a 
case, though length alone is not necessarily an indication of quality. By contrast, entry 
clearance refusal notices tend to be briefer.  
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At the same time, there were some instances of poor decision-making.The following examples 
drawn from the case-file analysis provide instances of successful challenges against Home 
Office decisions. Such challenges were either granted permission or settled out of court. 
Examples of problematic decision-making by the Home Office included the following errors: 
failing to exercise discretion or not exercising discretion properly; not applying the relevant 
immigration rules properly; non-compliance with an earlier judicial review ruling; failing to 
follow and apply country guidance; not considering relevant evidence; and not giving the 
claimant a fair opportunity to clarify concerns. A common theme in all of the examples of 
problematic Home Office decision-making is the failure to undertake the proper type of 
detailed consideration required to make a robust and defensible decision, especially when 
the case has complex factual, legal, and country guidance issues. 
 
Failure to properly consider the evidence 
Case 38. The claimant had been refused indefinite leave to remain. He had previously been 
granted three years leave to remain under the European Community Association Agreement. 
The claimant had applied for indefinite leave to remain using the same employment details 
and evidence, but was refused. This decision was upheld following an administrative review. 
There had been no change in the applicant’s circumstances following his last grant of leave to 
remain. The refusal letter and administrative review stated that “the Secretary of State is not 
satisfied that your part in business does not amount to the disguised employment.” The 
administrative review letter noted that the applicant’s submission that there had been no 
change in his circumstances, but then proceeded to reject the application without any 
consideration of the evidence submitted. The claimant argued that the Home Office had failed 
properly to consider the evidence. The Government Legal Department argued that the 
challenge ought to be dismissed and should have been deemed TWM. The Judge held that 
the decision was arguably irrational to refuse to favourably review its earlier decision to 
refuse leave remain given that the Home Office had previously given the claimant three years 
leave to remain on the same facts. The case was then settled by consent order to be 
reconsidered by the Home Office within three months. 
 




Case 118. The claimant had applied for leave to remain as a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Migrant. 
The application was refused on the basis that the applicant had not provided specified 
documents to establish funds available to the applicant from third parties. Such documents 
had to be original documents and authorised and comply with other requirements. Under 
paragraph 245AA(d) of the Immigration Rules, if the applicant has submitted a specified 
document in the wrong format; or which is a copy and not an original document; or which 
does not contain all of the specified information, but the missing information is verifiable from 
other documents submitted with the application, then the Home Office decision maker may 
grant the application despite the error or omission, if satisfied that the specified documents 
are genuine and the applicant meets all the other requirements of the Rules. The claimant 
argued that the missing information was verifiable from a number of other verified 
documents that had been submitted with the application. The initial decision was upheld 
through administrative review. The claimant then sought judicial review arguing that the 
Home Office had failed to exercise its discretion under paragraph 245AA(d) to consider 
whether the additional documents submitted were sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the Immigration Rules to qualify for leave to remain. It was also argued that the evidential 
flexibility policy applied. In short, the Home Office had applied the mandatory terms of the 
Immigration Rules and failed to exercise its discretion that it possessed under the rules. The 
case was settled before reaching a permission decision on the basis that the applicant would 
withdraw the judicial review and that the Home Office would make a new decision. In short, 
the Home Office had failed properly to exercise the discretion given to it by the Immigration 
Rules. 
 
Failure to exercise discretion 
Case 131. The dependent child of an ex-Gurkha veteran had been refused indefinite leave to 
remain in the UK. A previous human rights appeal had been allowed and the claimant had 
been granted limited leave to remain. The applicant sought judicial review of the refusal of 
indefinite leave to remain. Previous case-law had held there to be historic injustice in Gurkha 
cases. But for this historic injustice, the claimant could have been able to settle permanently 
in the UK. Having been granted only limited leave to enter the UK, the claimant challenged 




before proceeding to the permission stage to be reconsidered by the Home Office. In short, 
the Home Office had failed to take account of the historic injustice in Gurkha cases and failed 
to exercise discretion accordingly. 
 
Failure to consider fresh evidence in para 353 claim 
Case 311. The Home Office had rejected the claimant’s further submissions as a fresh claim. 
Having entered the UK as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child, the claimant had been 
refused asylum but been granted discretionary leave. An asylum appeal was later dismissed. 
Some years later, the claimant made further submissions concerning the asylum claim and 
the changed country conditions. The claimant had made contact with a relative who could 
support the applicant’s claim. Further, the relative had been granted asylum in France having 
been found to be credible. The Home Office rejected the further submissions. In the judicial 
review, the claimant argued that he had relied on new evidence – that of the relative who 
had corroborated his claim. The Home Office had rejected the relative’s evidence and refused 
to consider the further submissions as a fresh claim. It was argued that this rejection was 
incorrect because the accepted credibility of the relative who had been given refugee status 
in France showed that the claim was not bound to fail. The Home Office, it was argued, had 
not given good and adequate reasons why there was no realistic prospect of success before 
a hypothetical tribunal. The claim was conceded by the Home Office to reconsider its decision. 
 
Seeking to repudiate Upper Tribunal country guidance 
Case 136. The applicant from a city in Iraq had been refused asylum on the ground that he 
could relocate internally to Baghdad. The Upper Tribunal had previously held that there was 
a state of internal armed conflict in certain parts of Iraq. The applicant was seeking a second 
judicial review against the refusal to consider his further submissions as a fresh claim. In the 
first judicial review in 2016, the Judge had granted permission finding the Home Office’s 
decision to be arguably unlawful because it had failed to engage with the facts of the case 
and whether it would be unduly harsh to expect the applicant to relocate internally to 
Baghdad. The Judge also noted that the Home Office had failed to engage with the facts of 
the case in particular that the applicants had arrived without documentation to show that 





The second Home Office refusal letter stated that an Upper Tribunal country guidance 
decision on Iraq and Article 15(c) of the Refugee Qualifications Directive had lost its currency 
and could no longer be properly relied upon; the country situation had changed since then. It 
is well-established that country guidance decisions by the Upper Tribunal are to be followed 
unless they have been expressly superseded or replaced by any later country guidance 
determination. Further, the Upper Tribunal had affirmed its country guidance on Iraq in 
another country guidance decisions issued two weeks before the Home Office’s decision.61 
 
The Home Office had, nonetheless, sought to depart from country guidance relying upon 
country information that was older than that relied upon by the Upper Tribunal in its affirmed 
country guidance. The applicant argued that the Home Office had failed to discharge its 
burden of demonstrating that recently affirmed country guidance had been rendered 
unreliable. Further, the Home Office had sought to do so by relying solely on the Home 
Office’s own selectively referenced country material and had not considered other available 
country reports. Accordingly, the Home Office’s rejection of the fresh claim in reliance on the 
rejection of the country guidance was unsustainable. The judicial review claim was settled by 
consent order. 
 
Failure to apply country guidance and properly consider evidence submitted 
Case 68. In 2012, a Pakistani national claimed asylum on the basis of his religious faith. His 
appeal was dismissed before the promulgation of a relevant country guidance decision by the 
Upper Tribunal, which superseded previous country guidance cases.62 In 2014, the applicant 
made further submissions to the Home Office and sent further evidence including relevant 
letters concerning from a faith group association and information concerning the grant of 
asylum to his brother. Over a three year period, the applicant sent various ‘chase-up’ letters 
to the Home Office to get a decision. The Home Office refused the fresh asylum claim in 2017. 
In the judicial review, the applicant argued that the Home Office had failed properly to analyse 
and consider the further information and evidence and failed to appreciate the change in 
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country conditions and Upper Tribunal country guidance, that the Home Office had made 
errors of fact and had failed to follow binding case-law. New country guidance had been 
issued which superseded previous country guidance cases.63 Further, as regards the letters 
from the faith group association, the Upper Tribunal had decided that where credibility is in 
issue, the more such letters contain specific information as to the claimant’s activities in the 
United Kingdom, the more likely the letter they are to carry weight.64 In its refusal decision, 
the Home Office had not considered these letters in detail, but had rejected them as self-
serving. Instead, the Home Office had relied on the 2012 tribunal decision despite the fact 
that the Upper Tribunal had subsequently issued new country guidance and other guidance 
which indicated that the further evidence submitted could allay the adverse credibility 
concerns in the 2012 tribunal decision. In light of this, it was argued that the Home Office had 
not given good reasons for rejecting the letters submitted. In a very similar case decided in 
2015, two years before the refusal decision in this case, the Upper Tribunal had granted 
judicial review for failing to give anxious scrutiny to all the evidence including from the faith 
group association. The Judge in that case had concluded that the applicants’ claims based 
upon the country guidance had not been fully and properly considered yet and that this had 
resulted from the “shifting sands” of the country guidance.65 In the Acknowledgement of 
Service, the Government Legal Department offered to withdraw the decision and to make a 
fresh decision within three months. In summary, despite having had the case for some three 
years and receiving new evidence, the Home Office had not applied relevant and up to date 
country guidance. It had also not made a proper assessment of the evidence submitted by 
the applicant. 
 
Procedural unfairness: not affording the claimant the opportunity to clarify concerns 
Case 318. The applicant had been refused entry clearance as a student. The claimant’s birth 
certificate had not been accepted by the entry clearance officer; the claimant’s birth had been 
registered some 11 years after his date of birth. The entry clearance officer did not seek to 
clarify this with the claimant. The refusal decision was upheld through administrative review. 
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The claimant’s judicial review grounds argued that the process had been unfair and not taken 
into account the fact that the registration of births in the relevant country did not become 
mandatory until 2006 and that this explained the long delay in the registration of his birth. 
The claimant argued that the process had been unfair because the entry clearance officer had 
not sought to clarify the point or to give him an opportunity to explain. Furthermore, many 
other applicants from the same country had previously had their birth certificates accepted 
by the Home Office in similar circumstances. The Government Legal Department withdrew 
the refusal before the permission stage decision. 
 
Recommendation 
Most judicial review challenges are refused permission. We encountered many robust Home 
Office decisions. At the same time, there were also cases in which the Home Office decision 
was not robust and sustainable. Better initial decision-making requires that the Home Office 
learns lessons highlighted through the judicial review process. 
 
Settlement 
Judicial review claims can be settled out of court if the parties agree. Typically, the Home 
Office will review its decision and then offer to withdraw the decision and reconsider within 
three months. Settlement can occur at both the pre-action protocol stage and following the 
lodging of a claim with the Upper Tribunal. 
 
Pre-Action Protocol stage 
At this stage, cases are dealt with by Home Office staff in its Litigation Operations unit. Such 
staff are not usually legally trained. Lawyers from the Government Legal Department will not 
be involved until a judicial review claim is formally lodged and issued by the claimant at the 
Upper Tribunal. 
 
A specific point of concern for claimant representatives was the lack of responsiveness and 
engagement by the Home Office at the Pre-action Protocol (PAP) stage. Representatives 
widely reported that this subverted the purpose of the Protocol itself. Some reported that the 




Some representatives noted that, for this reason, the PAP stage often does not work 
effectively: 
 
“A key problem is that the Home Office does not seem to fully engage with detailed 
letters before a JR claim, or fails to properly or adequately engage with those – or does 
not engage at all. So, the whole purpose of the pre-action protocol is to avoid litigation 
and if litigation cannot be avoided, to at least narrow or reduce the issues in dispute 
or for the party to properly understand their position and to exchange information.  
And that just doesn’t seem to happen at those earlier stages of the JR process.”66 
 
“Before we get even to the formal judicial review process, the whole PAP process is a 
joke. I did once have a concession on a PAP but generally, no matter how lawless a 
decision, they maintain it at the PAP stage. We have got to the point where we think, 
actually, the Home Office internal complaints procedure is more effective than judicial 
review. We send a PAP and we get a nonsensical response. We send something to the 
complaints procedure and we often get a more reasonable response and a remedy.”67 
 
The handling of claims at the PAP stage could become more efficient if Home Office received 
assistance from the Government Legal Department. The Independent Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration has recommended that the Home Office trial (with a manageable 
cohort of claims) the involvement of Government Legal Department in the preparation of 
responses to Pre-Action Protocol letters to test whether this can reduce the percentage of 
cases that proceed to formal judicial review claims.68 The Home Office Litigation Operations 
team has worked more closely with the Government Legal Department in drafting PAP 
responses with a view to reducing the number of cases that proceed to bring a judicial review 
and are then granted permission to proceed.69 If successful, this approach could be extended 
to a wider cohort of case types. 
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More broadly, in terms of the Home Office’s litigation conduct, many representatives 
interviewed noted the Home Office’s adversarial approach to litigation had become more 
pronounced in recent years. Claimant representatives characterised this in a variety of ways, 
including “bloody mindedness” and being “enforcement focused”.70 Some interviewees 
reported the Government Legal Department was able to manage claims more responsively 
than the Home Office, yet others reported that changes to the Government Legal 
Department’s structure had meant it was more difficult to engage with. In addition to 
highlighting a lack of responsiveness and engagement by the Home Office at the Pre-action 
Protocol stage, representatives also noted that the involvement of counsel in a case often is 
the point that serious engagement takes place. 
 
Recommendation 
More involvement of legally trained staff at the Pre-Action Protocol stage could increase 
the efficiency of the process if it leads to earlier resolution of justified claims. This option 
should be explored. 
 
Settlement after a claim has been lodged 
Claims are also settled after having been lodged at both the pre- and post-permission stages. 
The typical concession is that the Home Office agrees to withdraw its decision and to 
reconsider it within three months. This is arranged by way of a consent order. The Upper 
Tribunal may, at the request of the parties but only if it considers it appropriate, make a 
consent order disposing of the proceedings and making such other appropriate provision as 
the parties have agreed.71 The procedure for conceding a claim therefore requires the parties 
to agree a consent order and submit this to the Tribunal to be approved. According to the 
Upper Tribunal, “the consent order is a mechanism of fundamental importance and utility in 
public law litigation.”72 Consent orders promote the overriding objective of ensuring that 
cases are dealt with fairly and justly.73 The Upper Tribunal has stated that all consent orders 
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must “be couched in terms which respect and promote the essential values of transparency, 
clarity and certainty.”74 
 
Judges interviewed noted that settling judicial review claims through consent orders is 
common: 
 
“A lot of these cases do settle. Certainly, substantive hearings very often settle, and 
that is received wisdom. I had three in a list last week, and two of those went out in 
advance. That is not untypical. I think the problem is, it happens very late in the day, 
four o’clock, or after I’ve done all the reading which I don’t object to, because you 
always learn something from reading these things, even if you never get to make a 
decision on it. But I think it’s just in the nature of litigation across the board, isn’t it? 
People talk at the door of court, but they don’t talk two weeks in advance because 
they have things to do, talking at the door of the court in another case probably.”75 
 
“Cases settle shortly before a hearing or there’s a late adjournment request because 
the parties aren’t ready. And I think realistically that’s a workload problem for the 
Home Office and the Government Legal Department rather than anything else, but 
some solicitor firms on behalf of applicants do try and engage and try and deal with 
things or narrow things down beforehand. I’m not sure how much of a positive 
response that often gets. But if things can be narrowed down before they get to us 
then it saves time and money for everyone.”76 
 
“Quite a few claims settle. Certainly when I look at the cases, if I grant permission I 
may try and give an indication to the parties as to what I think the relative strengths 
are because there are some that just clearly shouldn’t bother proceeding to a 
substantive hearing.”77 
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According to representatives: 
 
“A very small minority of judicial reviews proceed to a full hearing. On the whole, if 
we get permission, then we would expect to settle not long thereafter.”78 
 
“There are frivolous judicial review applications and there’s a lot of them, there has 
been reports of there being this big backlog and this big increase in the number of 
judicial review cases coming forward to tribunal and, you know, if that’s happening, 
that might explain why the Home Office is giving out consent orders in order to sort 
of fight off the number of cases they’re having to reconsider or the numbers that will 
go to a hearing because they just don’t have the time or resources to go through all of 
it. So, I think there are definite problems with practitioners as well, not just the Home 
Office.”79 
 
“During the JR process, we can’t just be spending all this money. We need to try and 
settle it out of court. So you can’t be really unreasonable during a judicial review, the 
Home Office can’t be really unreasonable and so, they should be trying to settle it and 
negotiating it. That is good because it obviously saves time and money and stops one 
party being really unreasonable - if they do, then there are cost consequences and I 
think that’s a real advantage. We often get a good result because of that.”80 
 
“Nearly everything settles post-permission which is good in that you don’t have to 
then go on and fight it at a full hearing. But we would like the Home Office to engage 
with the process earlier than that. Often it takes weeks and weeks and weeks to get 
an acknowledgement of service on summary grounds from the Government Legal 
Department. And often they do not really engage, but just regurgitate what is in the 
sort of original decision letter. More often, the GLD will argue that a claim is totally 
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without merit and they want costs and you think – well, again, they have not engaged 
with it.”81 
 
The case-file analysis contained cases in which claims had been settled both before and after 
consideration by a judge on the papers. From the case-file analysis, 67 of the 342 were settled 
by consent and/or withdrawn following a consent order. This amounts to just under 20% of 
the entire sample. In such cases, the claims are settled through a standard consent order for 
the underlying decision to be reconsidered by the Home Office within three months. 
 
Figure 16 shows data from the Upper Tribunal concerning the overall number of judicial 
reviews withdrawn. This data includes those claims both withdrawn through settlement and 




When offering a consent order, the Government Legal Department will notify the Tribunal 
and applicant that the Home Office will withdraw its decision and provide a new decision 
within a particular timeframe, which is usually three months but can be six months. The 
Government Legal Department will typically submit that the Upper Tribunal should refuse 
permission on the ground that the judicial review claim has been rendered entirely academic. 
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Only in exceptional circumstances could the court rule on academic disputes and if there is a 
good public interest reason for doing so, e.g. the case raises a wider point of law and a large 
number of similar cases exist or are anticipated.83 The Government Legal Department will 
then note that the present case plainly does not satisfy the test of exceptional circumstances. 
There is no live issue remaining, no evidence that large numbers of similar cases exist or are 
anticipated, and the case turns on its own facts. Having withdrawn the decision, the Home 
Office will often, but not always, pay the claimant’s reasonable costs. 
 
Representatives acknowledged the advantages of settling cases out of court: 
 
“If the Home Office is offering a consent order, it doesn’t make logical sense to refuse 
it and proceed with a full hearing before a judge who is then going to ask the Home 
Office to reconsider the decision just like they’re offering to in the consent order.”84 
 
“One advantage of judicial review when you are dealing with the Home Office is that 
it gives you a chance to get someone in the Home Office or Government Legal 
Department who is more senior, expert, probably better paid to take a considered 
look and of course you often get the Government Legal Department backing down on 
a ridiculous decision that someone in the Home Office has made.”85 
 
Why does the Home Office concede? In practice, an offer by the Government Legal 
Department to settle a case will not identify or explain the reasons for the offer of settlement. 
In general, there are two reasons why cases are settled. First, cases are frequently settled for 
pragmatic reasons. It is both quicker and cheaper to withdraw a decision and reconsider than 
to defend a judicial review challenge at a substantive hearing. Consider, for instance, the 
situation if a claimant is granted permission in a certification or fresh claim judicial review. 
Even if the claimant is ultimately successful, the most that he or she is likely to achieve 
through judicial review is a reconsideration by the Home Office. If the case is arguable, then 
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it will typically be disproportionately costly for the Home Office to defend a judicial review to 
a substantive hearing. Proceeding with the litigation will only increase the costs and delay 
involved. For instance, the cost to the Home Office of reconsidering a decision is in the region 
of hundreds of pounds. By contrast, the cost to the Home Office of defending a judicial review 
in a substantive hearing can amount to something in the region of £80,000 to £100,000. As a 
result, it makes more much sense for the Home Office to settle cases frequently, even cases 
that could ultimately be defended, than pursue litigation and thereby risk higher costs, which 
are unlikely to be paid by the claimant if the Home Office is successful. 
 
In such circumstances, the Government Legal Department will not concede that the challenge 
decision is flawed. Instead, it will offer to concede and for the Home Office to reconsider for 
pragmatic reasons. The grant of permission will have identified which grounds of challenge 
are arguable and these could be addressed more quickly and efficiently than by having to 
argue and defend a substantive hearing. In some offers of settlement, the Government Legal 
Department’s view is that it considers the impugned decision to be defensible, to avoid the 
unnecessary costs and wasting the Tribunal’s time, the Home Office is willing to offer the 
applicant a reconsideration. The approach typically taken by the Government Legal 
Department is that the agreement of a consent order is not to be taken as a concession that 
the challenged decision is unlawful. 
 
A second reason for settling out of court, and despite claims to the contrary, is that the Home 
Office and/or the Government Legal Department recognise that the challenged decision is 
not legally sustainable. In other words, the challenged decision is likely to be legally flawed. 
Based on our reading of the files, this situation is more noticeable when the Government 
Legal Department concedes a claim at the pre-permission stage. In this way, the process by 
which judicial reviews are settled out of court operates as a de facto additional administrative-
legal review process by which challenged Home Office decisions are reviewed by a 
government lawyer. The principal difference between this and standard administrative 
review procedures is that the reconsideration is not undertaken not by an administrative 
reviewer within the Home Office, but by a lawyer within the Government Legal Department 





Settling out of court has various consequences. It represents a de facto victory for the 
claimant, who will then have their case reconsidered. But it does not by any means follow 
that the claimant will ultimately obtain a positive substantive decision on her immigration 
status. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of a decision indicates that the challenged decision is no 
longer valid and that the Home Office will have to reconsider the case. Settlement will also 
reduce the financial and time costs as the parties will not proceed to a substantive hearing. 
Settlement also has consequences for the Upper Tribunal as it reduces the demand on judicial 
resources. 
 
There are other possible consequences of settlement. One issue is whether or not the Home 
Office will in fact take a new decision within the agreed timeframe, which is usually three 
months. Representatives highlighted that timeframes in consent orders are sometimes not 
met. The Upper Tribunal has ruled that in such circumstances, the Home Office cannot be 
subject to possible contempt action or other sanction. Instead, the remedy for non-
compliance with a consent order will normally be to lodge another judicial review claim.86 As 
the Upper Tribunal noted, “this discrete field of activity involves a highly regrettable, frankly 
deplorable, waste of scarce judicial and administrative resources”.87 As one representative 
noted, “so, the client, even though he was successful at first stage has to risk further costs in 
order to get the Home Office to make a decision, which is a futile exercise in my view, and 
costly for the client as well.”88 
 
Settling a case out of court will also mean that there will be no formal tribunal decision. 
Accordingly, if there has been any illegality, then the settlement of a case between the parties 
will not be reported by the Tribunal and will not be publicly highlighted or have any value as 
precedent in other cases.89 In other words, settlement has the effect of reducing transparency 
and keeping the matter away from public attention. Word might get around between lawyers 
through word of mouth or social media, but there is no formality to this process. 
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This issue was highlighted in 2018 in relation to the use of paragraph 322(5) of the 
Immigration Rules, which refers to “the undesirability of permitting the person concerned to 
remain in the United Kingdom in the light of his conduct (including convictions which do not 
fall within paragraph 322(1C), character or associations or the fact that he represents a threat 
to national security”. The issue became controversial following reports that highly skilled 
migrants had been threatened with removal from the UK for making minor and legal 
amendments to their taxes. The Home Secretary had promised that such cases would be 
paused.90 During a Parliamentary debate, the Immigration Minister stated that no 
applications to overturn such decisions had been successful at judicial review.91 However, it 
subsequently came to light that while no such judicial reviews had been successful before the 
tribunal, the Home Office had been settling judicial reviews of that type out of court just 
before the final hearing.92 A barrister was quoted as stating that “the significance of this tactic 
… is that any unlawfulness that is evident in an impugned decision would not be reported in 
a published court judgment … [i]n this way, the public often does not hear about these 
cases.”93 
 
Courts do not decide academic or hypothetical issues. However, in Salem, it was recognised 
that the courts have a discretion to hear and decide a case even if there is no longer a dispute 
between the parties which will directly affect their legal rights and obligations.94 Such a 
discretion must be exercised with caution. Cases that are academic between the parties 
should not be heard unless there is a good reason in the public interest for doing so. For 
example, when a discrete point of statutory construction arises which does not involve 
detailed consideration of facts and where a large number of similar cases exist or are 
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anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future.95 There 
have been instances in which the Upper Tribunal has exercised this jurisdiction.96 
 
Recommendation 
The process of settling claims through a consent order could operate more efficiently if there 
were greater communication between the parties throughout the process. 
 
Repeat judicial reviews 
What happens after a judicial review claim is decided or settled by a consent order? Typically, 
the matter will return to the Home Office for a decision. There is no data available on the 
number and proportion of claimants who receive a positive or negative decision following a 
judicial review.97 
 
We did, though, hear from representatives about “repeat judicial reviews”. This refers to the 
following situation. A claimant successfully challenges a refusal decision through judicial 
review. The Upper Tribunal finds the initial decision to be legally defective or the parties agree 
to settle the case and for the Home Office to reconsider its decision. The Home Office then 
takes a new decision. Yet, this second decision is materially the same as the initial refusal 
decision. This then prompts a second or repeat judicial review. 
 
It can be entirely lawful, following a successful judicial review or settlement of a case, for the 
Home Office to reach a further refusal decision. In the absence of an appeal, the final decision 
rests on an individual’s eligibility to enter or remain in the UK remains with the Home Office. 
However, some of the data collected highlighted the situation in which the subsequent Home 
Office refusal decision either does not take into account the first judicial review or results in 
a second refusal decision for essentially the same reasons as those for which the claim was 
refused initially. For the Home Office to produce a second refusal decision which is largely the 
same as the first refusal decision is likely to prompt a second “repeat judicial review”. In such 
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instances, the overall effect is to add further and unnecessary delay and expense to the 
proper resolution of the applicant’s case. If the same legally flawed reasons are repeated, 
then this clearly indicates that the Home Office has not complied with the initial judicial 
review decision.98  
 
Representatives interviewed commented as follows: 
 
“A big problem in judicial review, in my experience, is that the Home Office say they’re 
going to reconsider and then just make the same decision again. Exactly the same. It’s 
sometimes bordering on an abuse of process. In the second refusal letter they will 
change a couple of paragraphs, sometimes they won’t even change a couple of 
paragraphs, but they will just change the date. So, that’s a disadvantage of the wider 
judicial review process.”99 
 
“Sometimes with judicial review, you get the right decision at the end. But sometimes 
you just get another refusal from the Home Office on more or less the same grounds 
and you have to start over again.”100 
 
Another representative noted that they had taken a first judicial review. The law firm had 
engaged counsel to draft grounds of challenge, costing some £2,500. The Home Office then 
offered a consent order including an agreement to pay the client’s costs. The Home Office 
took some time to reconsider its position causing a further delay and then issued a decision 
that was in essence the same as the initial decision that was challenged. The law firm then 
took out another judicial review: “we just ended up going in a circle with that one.” Other 
representatives noted: 
 
“One of my section 94B cases was a very compelling case, a very vulnerable family. 
The Home Office settled it. They withdrew their decision and then six months later, 
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made pretty much the same decision, so that was a waste of everybody's time.  It went 
on for another year and then we got permission and they withdrew it again and then 
finally made an appealable decision. The Home Office has been known to make 
decisions that are very similar, slightly better drafted, but not always. A colleague in 
this firm has had cases in which the Home Office has settled a judicial review two or 
three times and every time the Home Office make a new decision, they certify it 
again.”101 
 
“I had a client with further submissions who was detained with seventy-hour removal 
directions in 2013. We JR'd that. We got very good language in the prohibiting order 
about the strength of the further submissions. It then went off to other solicitors for 
financial reasons and we could not get them to settle it with a consent order accepting 
the further submissions, even though we had very strong language from the Judge 
who had issued the prohibiting order, saying how the person's profile had changed. It 
was finally settled. Given how strong that language was, the Home Office said they 
were not going to do it again. They then issued the same refusal decision with the 
same language on the same facts a second time and served it on him while he was in 
detention. We went all the way through the grant of permission, and then they finally 
settled it and they did accept this time that it was a fresh claim because we got 
permission.  And then they refused a third time, but with the right of appeal, using 
exactly the same language from 2013. In June 2017, when we finally got to the appeal 
hearing, they withdrew the refusal decision two days before the hearing, granted him 
refugee status, on the same evidence that had been in front of them for four years. In 
the second judicial review, I remember very clearly getting £10,000 off the Home 
Office for that and I thought, this is just absurd. Not only have they detained him twice 
on the same facts and the same law and then all the cost of detention, but the second 
time around he gets £10,000 of public money that they've given to me for a decision 
they knew, because they'd already made it once before and withdrawn it once before, 
they knew it was unlawful from the beginning.  It's just a shameless waste of public 
money.”102 
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It is not possible to know how frequently repeat judicial reviews occur in practice. 
Nevertheless, they do occur. We encountered the following example from the case-file 
analysis. 
 
Case 130 concerned a repeat judicial review in which the Home Office did not comply with a 
substantive judicial review ruling by the Upper Tribunal. An asylum appeal by an Iraqi national 
had been dismissed in 2008 by an Immigration Judge. In 2012, the Home Office rejected the 
applicant’s further submissions as a fresh asylum claim. Subsequent submissions made in 
2013 and 2015 were made on the basis that updated country materials concerning conditions 
in Iraq highlighted the worsening conditions there which would put him at risk on return. The 
Home Office’s 2015 refusal decision only referred to submissions made in the applicant’s 2013 
letter and not the subsequent submission made in his 2015 letter. 
 
The claimant sought judicial review. In 2016, the Upper Tribunal quashed the 2015 decision 
to refuse to treat the claimant’s further submissions as a fresh asylum claim. The basis for this 
decision was that the Upper Tribunal in the case of AA had recently issued country guidance 
to the effect that there was at the relevant time an internal armed conflict within the scope 
of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive taking place in various parts of Iraq, largely but 
not entirely as a result of the activities of the Islamist group, ISIL.103 The Upper Tribunal Judge 
held that the situation in Iraqi had changed markedly over the intervening eight year period 
following the dismissal of the claimant’s initial appeal. Fighting in the contested areas may 
well have disrupted means of communication, such that even if the claimant might in the past 
have been in touch with family members who were in a position to help him, this could by no 
means be assumed still to be the position. Accordingly, the Upper Tribunal Judge stated that 
the adverse credibility findings of the kind made by the Immigration Judge in 2008 should 
clearly “be looked at with considerable circumspection” and that the Home Office had not 
done this.104 The Judge also found that the letter before action, or “pre-action protocol” 
letter, written by the applicant’s solicitors after the country guidance case of AA echoed many 
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of the points made at the hearing. The Home Office had “failed properly to consider the 
significance of that case, in rejecting the claimant’s submissions”.105 The Judge quashed the 
decision, but declined to issue a mandatory order because “[o]ne must assume that the 
respondent will reconsider the matter, in the light of what is said in this judgment, and then 
decide how to proceed.”106 
 
The case was then reconsidered by the Home Office. In 2017, two and a half months after the 
Upper Tribunal’s decision, the Home Office issued a second fresh claim decision rejecting the 
claimant’s case. However, this new decision did not take full account of the 2016 Upper 
Tribunal decision. 
 
The claimant then sought judicial review again arguing that this second fresh claim decision 
was materially the same as the previous Home Office decision that had been quashed by the 
Upper Tribunal and also that the Home Office had not properly considered the terms of that 
earlier Upper Tribunal decision. It was argued that the Home Office had placed too much 
reliance on previous adverse credibility findings and had not applied the latest country 
guidance properly. The claimant was awarded legal aid. The judicial review claim was refused 
permission on the papers by an Upper Tribunal judge for the reason that the Home Office had 
considered and applied country guidance and was entitled to consider that there was an 
insufficient degree of the risk of violence. On oral renewal, the Upper Tribunal granted 
permission on the basis that the Home Office had not complied with the 2016 judicial review 
decision noting that “the respondent may wish to consider avoiding further loss of time and 
expense in these proceedings by making a fresh decision, appealable or not.” The applicant’s 
representatives and the Government Legal Department then agreed a consent order to the 
effect that the applicant would have six weeks to provide further evidence and that the Home 
Office would issue a new decision within three months. 
 
In short, the underlying purpose of the litigation was to get the case back into the First-tier 
Tribunal to hear and decide an appeal. The Home Office had failed to comply with the earlier 
Upper Tribunal ruling to reconsider the claimant’s credibility afresh and to consider country 
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conditions in detail. Overall, there had been two judicial review challenges considered by four 
Upper Tribunal judges, a number of Home Office decisions, the involvement of the 
Government Legal Department, a law firm, and Counsel for the applicant. Yet, the purpose 
was to obtain a right of appeal on the merits by a First-tier Tribunal judge to re-decide 
credibility and country guidance issues. The Home Office’s failure to reconsider the case 
properly had the effect of unnecessarily increasing costs and delaying further the resolution 
of an asylum case. 
 
Recommendation 
Repeat judicial reviews can be unnecessary, inefficient, costly, and likely to cause anxiety to 
claimants. To reduce the risk of this, the Home Office needs to exercise care when re-taking 
a decision so as to prevent further litigation. Fresh Home Office decision letters following a 
successful or conceded judicial review should be checked, if necessary by senior case-
workers, to ensure compliance with the consent order or the decision of the Upper Tribunal. 
Furthermore, when a consent order is agreed, then both parties need to fulfil their 
obligations. Further judicial reviews against the Home Office to ensure compliance with 






6. The types and categories of immigration judicial reviews 
This section considers the types and categories of immigration judicial review claims. There 
are many different types of immigration decisions challenged by way of judicial review. From 
the case-file analysis, the principal types of immigration judicial reviews were as follows: 
 
 Certification decisions. These claims challenge a Home Office decision to refuse an asylum 
and/or human rights claim and also certify that claim as clearly unfounded. The 
consequence of this certification is that the individual can appeal the decision, but only 
from outside the UK. The decision to certify the claim as clearly unfounded is then 
challenged through judicial review. 
 Fresh claim para 353 decisions. These claims challenge the refusal by the Home Office to 
consider further submissions as amounting to a fresh asylum and/or human rights claim. 
As there is no right of appeal, the refusal to consider the further submissions can only be 
challenged through judicial review. 
 Removal directions. These claims involve a challenge against the making of removal 
directions to remove the claimant from the UK. One issue that arises is whether or not the 
individual has any outstanding applications with the Home Office. 
 Points-based scheme decisions. These claims challenge Home Office refusal decisions 
that the claimant does not qualify under the points-based scheme in the Immigration 
Rules. 
 Entry clearance decisions. These claims challenge the refusal of entry clearance, such as 
a visitor visa. 
 Refusal of EEA Residence Card to an extended family member. 
 
Judicial review and appeal rights 
The types and categories of judicial reviews lodged is closely connected to the availability of 
appeal rights. The availability of a right of appeal will normally preclude applying for judicial 
review. However, an important feature of this area of litigation is that many judicial reviews 
are lodged by claimants either to get a right of appeal before the First-tier Tribunal or to have 




review is often, though not always, to acquire a right of appeal against the underlying 
decision, such as refusal of leave to remain on asylum or human rights grounds. 
 
The use of judicial review for these purposes is apparent from the two largest types of 
immigration judicial reviews: certification and fresh claim para 353 judicial reviews. In 
certification cases, the claimant had been refused to remain in the UK and then certified that 
the claimant’s application as clearly unfounded, with the consequence that there is an out of 
country right of appeal. In such cases, the claimant can appeal, but only from outside from 
the country. By seeking judicial review of the certification decision, the claimant is seeking to 
secure an in-country right of appeal. An in-country right of appeal is more advantageous 
remedy than an out of country appeal. In fresh claim para 353 judicial reviews, the Home 
Office has refused to consider the claimant’s further submissions as a fresh asylum or human 
rights, claim with the consequence that the Home Office does not need to make a new 
decision, which would attract a right of appeal. The claimant then seeks judicial review of that 
decision. In such cases, the claimant is ultimately seeking to secure a right of appeal before 
the First-tier Tribunal. Both certification and fresh claim judicial reviews have existed for many 
years and long predate the withdrawal of appeal rights by the Immigration Act 2014. 
 
The issue of whether or not an appeal or judicial review is the appropriate remedy is often 
complicated by the following: complex legislative provisions that have been repeatedly 
amended; complex transitional provisions; conflicting judicial decisions interpreting the 
relevant legislation; and broader legal uncertainty as to precisely which decisions attract a 
right of appeal and which do not. For instance, there has been much litigation concerning 
which “ETS” cases attract a right of appeal and whether there is a right of appeal in EEA cases 
concerning extended family members.107 In both instances, the matter has been resolved only 
by the Court of Appeal because of the complexity of the legal framework and the uncertainty 
as to whether or not there is a right of appeal. 
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Certification and para 353 cases comprise the bulk of the immigration judicial review 
caseload. The Home Office decisions in such cases are in the nature of summary or filter 
decisions. Such decisions can either only be appealed from outside the UK (certification 
decisions) or cannot be appealed (para 353 decisions). In such cases, the individual claimants 
have, in many instances, already been in the UK for some time, often years, under different 
types of immigration status, been refused or had their leave curtailed, and then seek to 
remain or renew a claim on asylum and/or human rights grounds. The power to certify and 
consider whether fresh submissions amount to a fresh claim is a means of filtering out 
hopeless claims from those with some merit that require more thorough consideration. 
However, the Home Office refusal decision is challengeable by way of judicial review. 
 
An underlying issue in many certification and fresh claim cases is the right to family and 
private life under Article 8 ECHR. The general nature of such claims is that, during the period 
of staying in the UK under a temporary visa, the claimant has developed rights under Article 
8.108 Sometimes, similar circumstances are pleaded on the basis of something other than 
Article 8, such as the Article 2 right to life. The clear majority of these claims fail. There are 
also a large number of Article 8 claims under para 353 of the Immigration Rules. In these 
cases, the Home Office refuses to treat the new representations of the claimant as amounting 
to a fresh claim for asylum. The refusal is then challenged by way of judicial review. 
 
There are many other types of immigration judicial reviews. Once the main types of decision 
discussed above are taken out of the data, there is a very diverse range of decisions that are 
subject to judicial review. It is important to note that our sample of case-files is representative 
of a certain period of time. What was clear from the case files and interviews is that there is 
a complex number of trends in the caseload. In addition, a leading case will often be working 
its way through a system on a particular issue. This can create backlogs. When a judgment is 
handed down by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, representatives can seek to rely 
broadly on the principles set out and see how far they can advance new arguments at first 
instance. Many of the cases that are directly cited in submissions—even those submissions 
which are poorly formatted—are of relatively recent origin. 
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Immigration judicial review case-types 
Table 1 shows the types and number of claims from the sample of 342 case-files. 
Asylum or Human rights claim certified as clearly unfounded 110 
Para 353 asylum or human rights claim 67 
Removal directions  55 
Refusal of European Economic Area (EEA) residence permit Extended Family Member 21 
Refusal of visit visa 14 
Refusal of Tier 1 visa 11 
Delay  9 
Tier 4 student 9 
Tier 2 8 
Refusal of permission to marry 2 
Domestic violence decisions   2 
Leave to remain outside of the rule  3 
Refusal of limited leave to remain via 10 year partner route  1 
EEA residence – non Extended Family Member  1 
Certification under 94B – criminal deportation out of country appeals 2 
Statelessness  5 
Dublin asylum removal  2 
Refusal to recognise as trafficking victim  2 
Refused indefinite leave to remain entry clearance  1 
Domestic violence  1 
Deportation 1 
Passport facilities  1 
Entry central refusal of domestic worker  1 
European Community Association Agreement decisions  1 
Refusal to accept a take charge request by Syrian unaccompanied minor in Greece  1 
Indefinite leave to remain revoked on the basis of deception  2 
Refusal of visitor visa for medical treatment 1 
Invalid application for Leave to Remain as no fees paid or ID documents  2 
Home Office letter advising to leave  1 
Tier 5 religious worker  2 
Asylum age assessment  2 
Fee waiver  2 
Leave to remain on compassionate grounds  1 
Tier 4 general visa  2 
Refusal of naturalisation  1 
Request for reconsideration refusal  1 






Figure 18 shows the percentage of the largest case-types from the sample of case-files. 
 
 
This research collected data on the types and categories of immigration judicial review during 
the time period from which the cases in the sample were selected. However, it would be 
profitable to all concerned if in future this data was collected routinely. 
 
Recommendation 
HMCTS should routinely collect data on the types and categories of immigration judicial 
reviews. 
 
We now consider the principal types of judicial review in more detail. 
 
Certification of asylum and human rights claims 
The Home Office has statutory powers to certify asylum and human rights claims as clearly 
unfounded.110 Claims can be certified on either a case by case basis or a class basis. For 
instance, asylum or human rights claims lodged by nationals entitled to reside in designated 
                                                          
109 The total number is slightly higher than the number of case-files (342). This is because some cases fell under 
more than one case-type. 
110 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 94. 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Certification
Para 353 fresh asylum/human rights claim
Removal directions
Refusal of EEA residence
Refusal of visit visa









countries are to be certified unless the Home Office is satisfied that the claim is not clearly 
unfounded.111 
 
The consequence of a claim being certified as clearly unfounded is that the applicant can only 
appeal from outside the UK. An out of country appeal is typically seen to be disadvantageous 
in various respects. The applicant cannot attend in person to give oral evidence or to be cross-
examined. The rationale for the power to certify claims is that to permit clearly unfounded 
asylum and human rights claims to progress through the in-country appeals system would 
adversely impact upon the limited resources of the tribunal appeal process by delaying the 
hearing of the many other appeals which are considered to be properly arguable. Further, 
permitting clearly unfounded claims to proceed in-country can provide further scope for 
applicants to delay the final conclusion of their case so as to evade immigration controls. In 
essence, the certification power gives the Home Office a “gate-keeping” or “screening” 
function so as prevent those individuals with clearly unfounded cases from pursuing their 
appeals in-country. 
 
From one perspective, the ability of the Home Office to certify a claim as clearly unfounded 
may seem to be somewhat anomalous: the Home Office both makes the initial decision and 
also decides whether or not the claim is clearly unfounded, with the consequence that it is 
the Home Office that decides the location from which the claimant can appeal against the 
decision (i.e. from within or outside the UK). In such cases, the claimant retains a right of 
appeal, but it can only be exercised out of country. The decision to certify a claim as clearly 
unfounded is susceptible to judicial review. 
 
The legal test for certification is that an asylum or human rights claim can only be certified as 
clearly unfounded if it is so wholly lacking in substance that the appeal would be bound to 
fail.112 In ZL and VL, the Court of Appeal held that Home Office decision-makers must: (i) 
consider the factual substance and detail of the claim; (ii) consider how it stands with the 
known background data; (iii) consider whether in the round it is capable of belief; (iv) if not, 
consider whether some part of it is capable of belief; and (v) consider whether, if eventually 
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believed in whole or in part, it is capable of coming within the Convention. If the answers are 
such that the claim cannot on any legitimate view succeed, then the claim is clearly 
unfounded and can be certified as such.113 The question on judicial review is whether the 
Home Office was right to certify the case as clearly unfounded. In ZT (Kosovo), Lord Philips 
noted that: 
 
“a challenge to the Secretary of State's conclusion that a claim is clearly unfounded is 
a rationality challenge. There is no way that a court can consider whether her 
conclusion was rational other than by asking itself the same question that she has 
considered. If the court concludes that a claim has a realistic prospect of success when 
the Secretary of State has reached a contrary view, the court will necessarily conclude 
that the Secretary of State's view was irrational.”114 
 
The Upper Tribunal must examine whether the Home Office has adequately considered and 
decided whether the applicant’s claim is clearly unfounded. The reviewing court needs to bear 
in mind that the onus rests on the applicant to demonstrate his or her asylum or human rights 
claim. The intensity of review in a certification case is at the more, and possibly most, 
intensive end of the spectrum. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction remains a supervisory and 
reviewing one.115 If an asylum or human rights claim has been lawfully certified to be clearly 
unfounded, then an out of country appeal is considered to be an effective and adequate 
remedy. 
 
From the case-file analysis, there were 110 certification judicial review claims. Figure 19 
shows the outcomes of these judicial reviews. The majority of such claims are then refused. 
Such cases are refused permission for judicial review on the basis that the challenged decision 
is not arguably unlawful or unreasonable. 
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Our study of the case-files highlighted some issues concerning the use of the Home Office’s 
certification powers. One issue concerns the application of the legal test to certify a claim. In 
legal terms, there are two decisions being made by the Home Office in such cases: first, the 
substantive decision to refuse the asylum or human rights claim; and, second, the decision to 
certify the claim as clearly unfounded. The Court of Appeal in FR (Albania) emphasised that it 
is impermissible for the Home Office case-worker to conflate the substantive asylum or 
human rights decision with the certification decision. As the court emphasised, there is a two-
stage reasoning process in play here: the substantive decision and certification decision and 
the two are to be given separate consideration. In other words, it does not follow that an 
asylum or human rights claim is clearly unfounded simply because it has been rejected.116 
There are different legal tests in play which must be applied properly. For instance, a claim 
may be refused, but it does not automatically follow from this that the claim is clearly 
unfounded. It is possible for a claim to be refused, but for there to be an argument that the 
claim would have a possibility of success on appeal. However, we encountered instances in 
which this analytical separation did not happen in practice. 
 
Case 330. The applicant’s human rights claim had been refused and certified by the Home 
Office as clearly unfounded. The Home Office decision considered in detail the substance of 
the applicant’s human rights claim. As regards certification, the decision letter stated: “After 
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considering all the evidence available it has been decided that your human rights claim is 
clearly unfounded as it has been certified under section 94(1) of the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002. This is because you fail to meet Appendix FM and Paragraph 276ADE of 
the Immigration Rules and there are no grounds to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside 
the Immigration Rules. This means that you may not appeal while you are in the United 
Kingdom.” The applicant argued that the Home Office had failed to apply the proper legal test 
when certifying the claim because the decision to certify was entirely predicated on the basis 
that the application had been refused. Further, it was argued that there had been a failure to 
adequate reasons why certification was appropriate in this case and why the claim was bound 
to fail before the First-tier Tribunal. It was also argued that the Home Office had failed to take 
any account of the legal test for certification. It was not enough for the Home Office to certify 
on the basis that the substantive application had been refused; if this was correct then all 
refused applications could be certified, but such an approach would be unlawful. The case 
was settled through a consent order. In summary, the Home Office had failed to apply the 
correct legal test to the certification decision and it had conflated the substantive decision to 
refuse the claim with the decision to certify the claim as clearly unfounded. 
 
The interviews with Judges highlighted important points. One Judge noted that there was a 
perception that the Home Office was certifying too many cases. Another judge explained: 
 
“I have probably granted permission on more certification cases than others, largely 
because I think the Home Office are stretching their use of that power a bit at the 
moment. They have got a standard paragraph in those cases which says: ‘you have not 
satisfied the rules, you have not identified anything exceptional. Therefore we are also 
certifying your claim as clearly unfounded’. Now, there is a different test. There is a 
gap between satisfying the rules and meeting the threshold that says on no legitimate 
view can your claim succeed. So, in many of those cases, I have granted permission 
because the Home Office have not really applied their minds to the difference in those 
two things and they have not given proper reasons as to why it goes that stage further 
as to not being able to get anywhere ever.”117 
                                                          





A third judge commented: 
 
“I think I would agree to an extent with the view that the Home Office are a bit more 
‘gung ho’ about certifying than they were when I started doing this work.  Whether 
that reflects a change in policy or just some sort of drift I don’t know. I suspect the 
latter. ‘If we, the Home Office, don’t think it’s a good claim, then it is unlikely a first 
tier judge would think it is a good claim’ and so on and so forth. But I think we have to 
be alert to the possibility that it really has got to be completely hopeless for a 
certification decision to be a lawful one, and if you can see some room there, even if 
you would not agree with it yourself, if it is something that has some possibility to it, 
then I think one has to look at the certification decision in that light.”118 
 
The risk with excessive certification is that, in some cases, it does not necessarily result in the 
quicker handling of cases, but tends to increase both timescales and costs. One judge noted 
that in some cases, a certification decision challenged by way of judicial review saves neither 
time nor money, but can actually increase them. 
 
Representatives also highlighted the risk that refusal letters conflated the merits of a claim 
with the clearly unfounded test. One representative noted, “to say something is bound to fail 
is a very stringent test. There’s probably a very good chance that a case might fail, but that is 
not the test. The test is whether the case is bound to fail. And there are not many protection 
claims that you can really say that about. Some will be bound to fail, but not many.” Another 
representative explained: 
 
“A lot of judicial reviews are about certification. It was much better when there was a 
right of appeal because then somebody could look at the substantive case and the 
evidence in the case. It’s clumsy. Judicial reviews is a clumsy way of looking at 
certification decisions because Judges cannot really engage fully with the substantive 
merit of the case but then they have to kind of crystal ball gaze about what a judge 
                                                          




would do. So it’s very unsatisfactory. To win in a certification case, if you’ve got 
something very robust, such as a new expert report. You are likely to lose if what you 
have got is just more detailed witness statements and things, but actually that’s not 
necessarily what would win or lose in an appeal.  So it’s not very realistic.”119 
 
The overall picture of certification decisions is mixed. The case-files also contained cases in 
which the decision to certify did contain separate detailed reasons for why the case was 
considered to be clearly unfounded. The case-file analysis also contained other instances in 
which the Home Office had made legal errors when certifying asylum and human rights 
claims. 
 
The following cases include those both refused permission and settled in favour the claimant. 
 
Case 37. The applicant had entered in 2012 and remained after the expiry of her leave. The 
applicant could not satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules to remain on private 
and family life grounds. There were no exceptional circumstances, which would result in 
unjustifiably harsh consequences. The Home Office had applied the correct test in certifying 
the claim and considered all relevant matters. The claim, taken at its highest, had no realistic 
prospect of success and was bound to fail. The Judge refused permission as the decision to 
certify was not arguably unlawful or irrational. 
 
Case 306. An applicant with a long immigration history had re-entered the UK and later 
arrested and convicted of drugs offences. He was served with a deportation notice, but did 
not lodge any representations. Removal directions were set. The applicant then sought 
asylum. The Home Office refused the asylum claim on the basis that there was a sufficiency 
of protection and internal relocation. The Home Office considered that there was no 
reasonable explanation for the delay in claiming asylum and therefore certified the asylum 
claim as clearly unfounded under section 96 of the 2002 Act. The applicant had been issued 
with notices reminding him of the need to supply particulars to support any claim. The 
applicant had not sent those particulars to the Home Office. The Judge concluded that it was 
                                                          




the claim had been lawfully certified as being clearly unfounded. “Certification itself provides 
an out of country appeal which in the circumstances of this case provides an adequate 
remedy.” 
 
Case 25. The applicant had entered the UK in 2010, which later expired. In 2016, he claimed 
asylum, which was refused and certified. Judicial review was refused permission because the 
asylum claim was, taken at its highest, bound to fail as the applicant could relocate internally 
within his home country. An article 8 claim was also bound to fail because the applicant and 
his partner could re-establish family life in India without encountering even arguably 
insurmountable obstacles. 
 
Case 273 The applicant from Pakistan had married his wife, a national from a third country, 
in the UK. An asylum claim by the applicant and his wide as a dependant was refused and 
certified by the Home Office. The Home Office accepted that the applicant’s wife would be at 
risk in Pakistan. However, the refusal letter only assessed the husband’s claim on the basis of 
the risk on return to wife’s country of nationality, not Pakistan. There was no evidence to 
indicate that the applicant was removable to the wife’s country of nationality or entitled to 
reside there. However, the Home Office had proceeded on the basis that the applicant could 
reside in the wife’s country when in fact no such entitlement had ever been claimed. The 
applicant argued through judicial review that his asylum claim had not been properly 
examined by the Home Office and the refusal decision and certification was fundamentally 
flawed and that the whole basis of the decision was misconceived from the outset. Further, 
the Home Office had certified the claim under section 94(3) on the basis that the claim 
concerns nationals from designated countries. However, neither Pakistan nor the other 
country were designated for this purpose. The claim was settled by a consent order. 
 
Case 120 The applicant’s human rights claim under Article 3 had been certified as clearly 
unfounded. The applicant had raised the issue of risk to health on return. However, the Home 
Office had not applied the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Paposchvili 
which held that the authorities in the returning state must verify on a case-by-case basis 




appropriate in practice for the treatment of the applicant’s illness so as to prevent him or her 
being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3.120 Accordingly, it was argued that it could 
not be said that any appeal would be clearly unfounded. The case was conceded. In short, 
there was a failure to apply relevant case-law thereby rendering the decision legally defective. 
 
Recommendation 
The Home Office’s power to certify cases as clearly unfounded should be exercised carefully and only 
when appropriate. 
 
Certification under section 94B 
A related, though different, power to certify arises in section 94B cases. This power enables 
the Home Office to certify a human rights claim made by an individual subject to a deportation 
order so that any appeal can only be brought from outside the UK. Section 94B provides that 
the Home Office can certify in a deportation case if removal would not be unlawful by being 
contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The grounds upon which the Home Office 
State may certify a claim include (in particular) that the applicant would not, before the 
appeals process is exhausted, face a real risk of serious irreversible harm if removed to the 
country or territory to which he or she is proposed to be removed. The power has been 
amended by section 63 of the Immigration Act 2016 which enables the Home Office to certify 
any human rights claim irrespective of whether the claimant is liable to deportation. 
 
A key difference between section 94B and other certification powers is that the section 94B 
power does not require the claim to be considered to be clearly unfounded. The section 94B 
power can be used to certify any claims irrespective of whether it is well-founded or clearly 
unfounded. Indeed, the Home Office will use the 94B power if it is unable to certify the claim 
as clearly unfounded. Accordingly, the fairness of the out of country appeals process in such 
cases assumes greater importance than in ordinary certified-as-clearly-unfounded decisions. 
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In Kiaire and Byndloss the Supreme Court held that there were significant practical obstacles 
that weakened the effectiveness of out of country appeals in such cases.121 This ruling has 
been subsequently used to challenge the fairness of out of country appeal procedures in 
deportation cases. In one case, an Upper Tribunal judge granted permission on the basis that 
“the grounds are arguable in the light of Kiarie and Byndloss” (Case 122). 
 
The application of Kiarie and Byndloss is, though, limited to section 94B cases. It does not 
extend to ordinary non-deportation certification cases because there is a different test for 
certification. For instance, in a case concerning a human rights certified as clearly unfounded, 
the claimant had sought to argue, following Kiarie and Byndloss, that an out of country appeal 
was an ineffective remedy. This argument was rejected on the basis that Kiaire and Byndloss 
concerned the exercise of section 94B, which is certification of a human rights challenge 
against a deportation decision. The section 94B certification power can be used irrespective 
of whether or not the claim is clearly unfounded (Case 61). 
 
The difference between “ordinary” certification cases and section 94B cases is likely to affect 
the handling of appeals. The First-tier Tribunal has been developing a system of video-link 
hearings for appellants with section 94B appeals returned overseas. However, such a system 
will not, so it seems, be used in cases certified as being clearly unfounded, principally because 
such appeals have been so certified. 
 
Fresh asylum/human rights claims - paragraph 353 judicial reviews 
Under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules, when an asylum or human rights claim has 
previously been refused, the claimant may then make further submissions. The Home Office 
will then decide consider the further submissions and whether they are amount to a fresh 
claim. The submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different from the 
material that has previously been considered. The submissions will only be significantly 
different if the content: (i) has not already been considered; and (ii) taken together with the 
previously considered material, they create a realistic prospect of success, notwithstanding 
its rejection. The consideration of further submissions under paragraph 353 therefore 
                                                          




involves a two-part test. First, the Home Office must assess whether leave should be granted 
on the basis of the further submissions; and, second, if leave is not granted, the Home Office 
must then consider whether the further submissions amount to a fresh claim in accordance 
with the test in paragraph 353. The essential issue for the Home Office to decide is whether 
the claimant would have a reasonable prospect of success before a hypothetical First-tier 
Tribunal judge. 
 
All applicants who receive a paragraph 353 decision have already been refused on asylum or 
human rights grounds. However, neither asylum nor human rights decision-making is static 
and fixed. New evidence and facts may come to light. In asylum claims, country conditions 
can improve or deteriorate. The claimant may present further evidence that might enhance 
his or her credibility. In a human rights claim, facts can also change, such as the amount of 
time that a person has spent in the country or their family relationships. Such factual changes 
and developments may mean that the individual could lodge a fresh asylum or human rights 
claim. 
 
The purpose of paragraph 353 is, like certification, to operate as a filter mechanism. On the 
one hand, there must be a process by which fresh asylum and human rights claims can be 
identified and considered. On the other hand, there is the risk of frivolous or abusive attempts 
to make repeated claims to re-open cases without sufficient new cause. The summary nature 
of the para 353 decision affects the ability of an individual to access the appeals process. If 
the Home Office accepts the applicant’s further submissions as a fresh claim, but refuses it on 
its substantive merits, then the applicant can appeal that decision in-country to the First-tier 
Tribunal. As there is no appeal against the Home Office’s refusal to accept the applicant’s 
further submissions as a fresh claim, judicial review is the only remedy. Only a small 
percentage of further submissions are treated as fresh claims by the Home Office. Around 
86% of further submissions are refused outright.122 
 
In AK, the Court of Appeal stated: 
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“Rule 353 is aimed at the mischief of an unsuccessful claimant seeking, after he has 
exhausted the appellate process, to begin the whole process all over again by making 
a supposedly fresh claim without sufficient cause. If an unsuccessful applicant is 
allowed to remain for a long time after the failure of his initial application, that is liable 
to magnify both the risk of abuse of process by the making of further supposed fresh 
claims when there is no substantial basis for them, and also the possibility of genuine 
fresh material of sufficient weight to justify a fresh claim. Rule 353 provides a test for 
determining what should be regarded as a fresh claim. The mechanism provided is 
that the Home Secretary determines whether the test is passed. The court has a power 
and responsibility through judicial review to see that the system is properly applied, 
but the role of the court is limited to that of review. To allow the same appeal process 
as applies to the original application would defeat the purpose of the exercise. It 
follows from the nature and structure of the rule 353 scheme that a decision by a 
Home Office official whether further representations pass the rule 353 threshold 
amounting to a fresh claim is a decision of a different nature, and requires a different 
mind set, from a decision whether to accept an asylum or human rights claim. 
 
Precisely because there is no appeal from an adverse decision under rule 353, the 
decision maker has to decide whether an independent tribunal might realistically 
come down in favour of the applicant's asylum or human rights claim, on considering 
the new material together with the material previously considered. Only if the Home 
Secretary is able to exclude that as a realistic possibility can it safely be said that there 
is no mischief which will result from the denial of the opportunity of an independent 
tribunal to consider the material.”123 
 
Para 353 imposes a somewhat modest test for further submissions to be accepted as a fresh 
claim. The applicant only has to show that there is a realistic prospect of success. It is not 
necessary to demonstrate success is guaranteed. 
 
                                                          




In WM (DRC), Buxton LJ stated that the court must ask two questions.124 First, has the 
Secretary of State asked himself the correct question? The question is not whether the 
Secretary of State himself thinks that the new claim is a good one or should succeed, but 
whether there is a realistic prospect of a Judge, applying anxious scrutiny, thinking that the 
applicant will be exposed to a real risk of persecution on return. Second, in addressing that 
question, both in respect of the evaluation of the facts and in respect of the legal conclusions 
to be drawn from those facts, has the Secretary of State satisfied the requirement of anxious 
scrutiny? If the court cannot be satisfied that the answer to both of those questions is in the 
affirmative then it will have to grant an application for review of the Secretary of State's 
decision. In a judicial review case, the challenge is to the rationality of the Home Office’s 
decision, not as to its correctness or otherwise. From the case-file analysis, there were 67 




Many fresh claim judicial reviews are refused permission by the Upper Tribunal because the 
Home Office’s refusal to consider the further submissions as a fresh claim is not irrational. It 
is important to understand the process involved. In fresh claim judicial reviews, the Upper 
Tribunal is considering whether there is an arguable public law error in the Home Office’s 
refusal to consider further submissions as a fresh claim. This refusal is itself based upon the 
Home Office decision-maker’s assessment that there is not a realistic prospect of success that 
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a First-tier Tribunal Judge, applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, would think that the applicant 
would be exposed to a real risk of persecution on return. Cases refused permission are weak 
cases on their own facts. 
 
At the same time, both the interviews and examination of case-files highlighted a general risk 
with fresh claim decision-making. There is a risk that the Home Office may take the approach 
that because it has previously refused the applicant’s asylum or human rights claim on its 
merits, it is likely to be refused again. This may arise in relation to credibility issues. For 
instance, while country conditions may change, if an asylum applicant has previously been 
refused on grounds credibility grounds, then the approach might be taken that it is unlikely 
that further submissions would be significant different from those previously submitted and 
create a realistic prospect of success. 
 
One judge interviewed noted that there is often excessive reliance by the Home Office in fresh 
claim decisions on the findings in previous appeal determinations, sometimes beyond their 
reasonably permissible limits. In such cases, there will normally have been an earlier tribunal 
appeal determination on asylum and/or human rights grounds. In Devaseelan, it was held that 
the first determination by the Tribunal should always be the starting point.125 However, a 
previous decision is only a starting point and not an end point for the purposes of a fresh claim. 
The judge noted that there is sometimes a tendency by the Home Office to use Devaseelan 
beyond what it actually says. Rather than seeing the earlier determination as a starting point, 
there is a tendency to treat the earlier determination as set in stone and to refuse to recognise 
the factual basis for an asylum or human rights claim may move. Accordingly, there may be a 
need to move away from the initial determination when there is good reason for doing so. 
Devaseelan is not relevant to post-decision facts. Another Judge commented: 
 
“You can get a case where really nothing extra has been done or said since the first-
tier judge’s decision, where it was understandable that Home Office placed weight on 
the previous decision. Then in other cases, the Home Office will tend to focus quite 
extensively and quote from a decision, perhaps from eight or ten years ago, and also 
                                                          




possibly ignoring the fact that at the appeal the applicant may not have been 
represented, which has always seemed to me to be potentially quite a relevant factor 
to the weight you would give to a decision.”126 
 
One representative interviewed highlighted a perception that “the Home Office is very 
reluctant to accept something as a fresh claim when to most reasonable observers it clearly 
is. If it is something that has not been raised before and it raises realistic prospects of success 
before an immigration judge and it’s only a modest hurdle, then it is very frustrating that the 
Home Office doesn’t seem to be able to apply that test correctly.” 
 
A common theme in refused fresh judicial reviews refused permission is that, on examination, 
the applicant had not submitted fresh evidence that the applicant’s situation had changed. In 
one case (case 103), the Judge refused permission on the basis that the grounds of challenge 
failed to address the fact that the Home Office decision letter had stated that the applicant 
did not submit any evidence in support of his further representations. It was unarguable that 
the Home Office overlooked any evidence given that the representations made by the 
applicant’s representatives did not amount to evidence, but were unarguably assertions.  
 
Another theme is that the applicant has recently had an appeal dismissed and nothing had 
changed in the meantime. For instance, in one case (case 52), the applicant had sought to 
acquire an immigration status for 10 years. Two applications to remain as a dependant 
relative had been refused. An application for leave to remain on the basis of Article 8 was 
refused with a right of appeal. The appeal was dismissed. A year later, the applicant was 
issued with a notification of a decision to remove. He then made a fresh claim. This was 
refused. A judicial review of this was refused on the grounds and deemed TWM. The applicant 
then submitted a further application for leave to remain. This was rejected as a fresh claim 
and a judicial review was refused permission as follows: “The nub of the respondent’s decision 
is that the applicant had added nothing of significance to his previously exhausted claims. The 
grounds of challenge are vague and irrelevant. They do not show that non-recognition of a 
                                                          




fresh claim may have been unlawful. No other outcome should sensibly have been expected. 
The proceedings are only dilatory.” The case was certified as TWM. 
 
The following cases illustrate the types of issues that arise. 
 
Case 64. For two years, Home Office did not consider the claimant’s further submissions in its 
refusal decision. The case was then settled by consent. The claimant, a Sri Lankan national 
had sought asylum and then, sometime later in 2015, had submitted further submissions. The 
claimant then submitted a number of ‘chase up letters’ and a letter before action. The Home 
Office had not responded to this and did not acknowledge the fresh claim submitted in 2015. 
In 2017, the Home Office issued a refusal decision. However, the refusal decision did not 
engage with the fresh claim material submitted in 2015. The 2017 refusal decision referred to 
the applicant’s previous asylum refusal and did not refer to the 2015 further submissions. The 
applicant argued that the Home Office had appeared not to have specifically addressed the 
new evidence in its refusal decision. It was argued that the Home Office had, accordingly, 
unlawfully delayed, had failed to apply the para 353 test and had failed to have regard to the 
relevant evidence provided. The Government Legal Department responded that the fresh 
claim submissions were not before the decision-maker because they had been considered as 
invalid because they had been posted to the Home Office. Home Office policy requires that 
further submissions must be made in person at the Further Submissions Unit in Liverpool 
unless the applicant falls into one of the exceptions. The decision was withdrawn. 
 
Case 50. In 2015, the applicant’s application for leave to remain was refused by the Home 
Office. In 2016, the applicant to the First-tier Tribunal, which subsequently dismissed his claim 
that removal would breach his Article 8 rights. The First-tier Tribunal held that the applicant 
did not qualify to remain under 276ADE of the Immigration Rules. Also, as the applicant had 
been in the UK illegally, his private life attracted little weight. The First-tier Tribunal Judge 
concluded that there would not be significant obstacles to integration in India. Permission to 
appeal this decision was refused by a First-tier Tribunal judge and then by an Upper Tribunal 
judge. In 2017, the Home Office refused leave to remain on the basis of family and private life 




of this. The Upper Tribunal Judge held that the applicant had provided no evidence that the 
situation had changed at all let alone significantly since the previous appeal. The applicant 
had no basis of stay under the Rules and had provided no evidence to show that his family 
and private life were sufficiently strong to even arguably outweigh the public interest in 
removal, particularly where he had been in the UK unlawfully for most of the period of 
residence. For these reasons, the Home Office’s decision was unarguably lawful and rational. 
 
If the Upper Tribunal judge grants permission in a fresh claim judicial review, then the judge 
will have held that it is arguable that the refusal to consider further submissions as a fresh 
claim is unlawful. The claim may then proceed to a substantive hearing. However, in practice, 
very few para 353 judicial reviews reach a substantive hearing because the Home Office may, 
for pragmatic reasons, withdraw and reconsider its decision. An alternative to this could be 
to introduce better linking up between judicial reviews and appeals. When the Upper Tribunal 
grants permission in a fresh claim judicial review, the case will be returned to the Home Office 
to reconsider whether the further submissions amount to a fresh claim. The Upper Tribunal 
does not have the power to direct that, if the Home Office resists the case, then the case 
should be transferred directly to the First-tier Tribunal for an appeal. However, in such cases, 
the First-tier Tribunal will very frequently be the eventual destination for the case. If the 
Upper Tribunal could direct that the case be transferred there directly, then this would be 
more efficient and timely. The ability to make such a direction might be resisted on the ground 
that it blurs the division between legality and merits. On the other hand, such a power could 
be more efficient as it could reduce costs and the amount of time involved. 
 
Removal judicial reviews 
Foreign nationals without leave to remain and no outstanding immigration applications with 
the Home Office are liable to be removed. The Home Office can commence removal action 
by issuing removal directions. The decision to issue removal directions can be challenged by 
way of judicial review. Such individuals will often, but not necessarily always, be in 
immigration detention. The judicial review will challenge the decision to issue a notice of 
removal or removal directions. The grounds of challenge will often focus upon challenging 






“Technically, you cannot get legal aid for a challenge against removal directions. In 
fact, more often than not you would not be challenging the removal direction; it would 
be the underlying decision that led to the removal decision that is being challenged. 
Although, when one looks at a spate of recent decisions in the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal and elsewhere, it certainly seems there are a lot of solicitors out there who 
are challenging removal directions which as I say, often is not what you should be 
challenging. It should be the underlying decision that led to the detention and 
removal.” 
 
Such judicial reviews are also known as seeking a stay against removal. Home Office 
Immigration Enforcement will give the individual a removal window indicating that the 
individual will not be removed before a certain date and advising that legal advice be sought 
or to lodge a judicial review lodged before a specified date. Such judicial review claims 
typically require urgent consideration. In most circumstances removal will only be deferred if 
the individual lodges a judicial review or is granted an injunction. In some circumstances only 
an injunction will defer removal if, for instance, within the last three months a previous 
judicial review was concluded on the same or similar grounds or if a statutory appeal was 
concluded on the same or similar grounds. 
 
Three features of removal judicial reviews stand out. First, the speed with which they are 
lodged by claimants and representatives. It is common for the claimant’s representatives not 
to have complied with the Pre-Action Protocol because of the urgency involved. Removal 
judicial reviews are also considered with expedition by the Upper Tribunal. For instance, 
typically a judicial review claim is issued and decided by a Judge on the same day. 
 
Second, there is sometimes a changing factual basis of a claim in removal judicial reviews. For 
instance, a judicial review of a removal order on the basis that the applicant has an 
outstanding immigration application will be remedied if the Home Office makes a substantive 
decision on that application. Judicial review claims can also quickly become academic if the 
claimant has already been removed or for other reasons. Third, the courts have highlighted 




them, but they are lodged to disrupt the removal process and to buy more time in the UK for 
their clients.127 Claimants’ motives for seeking judicial review in such circumstances are quite 
clear. As one representative explained: 
 
“We have an exclusive contract to deal with detainees at an immigration detention 
centre and you’ll find that those that are detained and threatened with removal want 
to JR everything, anything that comes in from the Home Office. There’s obviously 
something circulating within the removal centres encouraging people to go for JR as 
it is the only thing that’s going to, as they say, cancel your ticket. And you’ll have clients 
on the phone saying, ‘Yeah. You’ve got to issue a judicial review, you’ve got to cancel 
my ticket.’  And, of course, it’s not as simple as that, but that service seems to be the 
prevailing experience of those who are detained and threatened with fairly imminent 
removal.”128 
 
From the case-file analysis, there were 55 judicial reviews challenging removal directions (and 
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From the sample, most judicial review orders against removal were refused on the ground 
that the claim lacked merit and has been previously considered and refused, that there were 
no outstanding applications with the Home Office, and no other obstacles to removal. Many 
such challenges may amount to a desperate and last-minute attempt to prevent removal. 
Representatives noted the difficulties: “it is really hard to get injunctions against removal.” 
 
The following cases illustrate the type of removal judicial reviews that arise. 
 
Case 180. The applicant sought judicial review of removal and judicial review that the Home 
Office consider his asylum claim. The Home Office had previously written to the applicant that 
it considered that his asylum application had been explicitly withdrawn. Refusing permission 
for judicial review, the Judge decided that: 
 
“If there any basis at all for the applicant’s claimed fear of return to Pakistan, it is reasonable 
to assume that he would not have waited 11 years to make his claim for asylum; would not 
have waited until after being detained for the first time in 2005 before making the claim; 
would not have absconded in 2016; would have cooperated with the asylum process, and 
would not have attempted to evade detection by UK authorities by attempting to enter the 
UK in 2017 by means of a false document. On his application notice in relation to the 
application for a stay, the applicant states that his intention is not to frustrate removal. It 
seems to me that that is precisely the applicant’s intention.” 
 
Case 89. The applicant, an overstayer, had exhausted his appeal rights in 2011. He challenged 
a removal decision. Further submissions had been made and rejected under para 353. The 
grounds complained that it would be unlawful to remove the applicant whilst he had 
submission spending. The Judge held that the submissions were a repetition of submissions 
made previously and which had already been addressed by the respondent and rejected. The 
Judge stated: "The respondent is not obliged to defer removal pending repeatedly made 
representations from an application, particularly when they raise the same issues already 




which disclosed any illegality in the respondent’s decision to remove him. The balance of 
convenience does not favour a stay on removal.” 
 
Case 82. The applicant, an overstayer, had exhausted his appeal rights. The Home Office 
sought to remove him. The applicant sought judicial review of the removal directions and the 
next day claimed asylum. The Government Legal Department argued that the applicant was 
using the judicial review process to raise new grounds (Article 8) and that this was an abuse 
of process. Insofar as the judicial review could be read as a challenge to the removal direction, 
then it was reasonable lawful. Given the asylum claim, the removal directions had been 
deferred by the Home Office. Refusing permission, the Judge concluded that this had been a 
hopeless judicial review that had been superseded and should have been withdrawn as it had 
become academic following the deferral of the removal directions. 
 
Case 128. The applicant sought a stay of removal. The applicant had previously made a human 
rights applications and his appeal had been dismissed. The applicant then made further 
submissions on human rights grounds, which were refused, and then sought and been refused 
judicial review of this fresh claim decision. In this second judicial review, the applicant argued 
that the Home Office had failed to consider further submissions relating to a human rights 
claim. The applicant had argued that her charitable work had not previously been considered 
as a part of a human rights claim. However, a copy of the appeal decision had not been 
included and so it was not possible to assess this point. Nonetheless, the Judge stated that 
charitable work was not likely to be given significant weight. Furthermore, submissions based 
on Agyarko did not make any material difference. The application for a stay was refused. 
 
Of the 55 removal judicial reviews in the sample, three were granted permission. In one case, 
a litigant in person argued that he had a right of appeal as the family member of an EEA 
national exercising Treaty rights in the UK. That right of appeal was not suspensive (it could 
be exercisable out of country), but the Judge held that, applying Kiarie and Byndloss, it may 
be arguable that an out of country appeal is not an adequate remedy (Case 48). In another 
case, the applicant had made an asylum claim on account of her sexuality that attracted an 




representatives had mistakenly faxed the appeal to the out of country appeals number. In the 
meantime, the Home Office had detained the applicant and served removal directions. 
Granting permission for judicial review, the Judge held that it was arguably contrary to the 
interests of justice that the applicant be removed until at least it was known whether the 
First-tier Tribunal had accepted the explanation and allowed the appeal out of time (Case 70). 
In an ETS/TOEIC alleged student deception case, the Upper Tribunal granted permission for 
judicial review against a removal notice because, following Ahsan,129 the applicant had an in-
country right of appeal (Case 73). 
 
Again, the overall picture is mixed. On the one hand, there have been instances in which 
people have been unlawfully removed from the UK and then the courts have ordered the 
Home Office to return the person.130 On the other hand, the higher courts have on various 
occasions stated that last minute representations to the Home Office and accompanying 
judicial reviews can be highly disruptive of attempts by the Home Office to remove individuals 
who do not have any right to remain in the UK. The courts have also emphasised that such 
challenges often lack merit and are an abuse of process to disrupt removals. The courts have 
accordingly issued guidance emphasising the professional obligations of legal advisers to 
make applications for interim relief to prevent removal promptly and with a maximum of 
notice.131 
 
A high profile case, SB (Afghanistan), was decided by the Court of Appeal in February 2018.132 
The High Court decision in the same case had earlier attracted attention as an instance of the 
Home Office unlawfully removing the claimant.133 However, the Court of Appeal took the 
claimant’s representatives to task and criticised them for their failures and shortcomings 
when seeking an interim injunction against removal. The Court of Appeal held that the High 
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Court judge who had previously granted the interim injunction had done so on the basis of a 
mistaken misrepresentation by the claimant’s representatives. The Court of Appeal noted 
that particular difficulties can arise when a new set of legal advisers come on the scene at the 
last minute: 
 
“The duty of candour is directed in the most part to ensuring that matters unfavourable to the 
applicant are drawn to the attention of the judge. There are many late applications for 
injunctive relief which are based on little more than an assertion that something may turn up 
if the new advisers are given time to investigate.  Such applications should get nowhere.  Yet 
there is a strong imperative for those instructed late in the day to make no representations or 
factual assertions which do not have a proper foundation in the materials available to 
them.”134 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, following the Court of Appeal’s ruling in SB (Afghanistan), 
the number of last minute judicial reviews for interim injunctions has declined significantly. 
 
Points-based scheme cases 
The points-based scheme concerns migration for work and study purposes. The whole 
rationale of the process is that decision-making focuses upon whether applicants score the 
necessary points. Applications are determined against objective rule-based criteria. Claimants 
must, for instance, submit specified documents. At the same time, the rules are very intricate 
and complex. Across almost all interviewees with experience of these cases, there was 
consensus that the particular complexity of the rules relevant to Tier 1 visas often gave rise 
to arguable points and a situation where Home Office officials appear not always to have 
properly understand the rules. 
 
The rule-based nature of the points-based scheme can affect the nature of judicial review. 
One judge explained that because judicial review is limited to looking at what was before the 
Secretary of State, if the claimant has not submitted mandatory documents, then the Home 
Office can reject the application: 
 
                                                          




“An individual might get before a first tier tribunal and be able to explain those 
documents or explain a gap or be asked questions on it, whereas they cannot do this 
in a judicial review. So, you are literally having a review of the decision that was made 
on the papers that was before the Home Office decision-maker. Was that a reasonable 
decision to have made? And it is a high threshold to say it is not a decision that no 
reasonable Secretary of State would have made. Have they taken into account all the 
documents? Have they followed the right process? Well, often yes and that makes it 
a lawful decision. It does not necessarily make it the right decision, and certainly not 
the right one for the applicant otherwise they would not be challenging it.”135 
 
Another judge noted two features of the points-based scheme. First, the highly complicated 
nature of the relevant rules, especially in Tier 1 points-based applications. Second, the judge 
noted that the traditional Wednesbury model of judicial review does not easily fit within the 
context of judicially reviewing points-based decisions. This is because such decisions are rule-
based rather than an exercise of administrative discretion. Wednesbury review of decisions is 
based upon the model of a decision-maker exercising discretion and the court can only 
intervene if relevant considerations have been ignored or if irrelevant considerations have 
been taken into account, or if the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-
maker could ever have arrived at it. By contrast, points-based scheme decisions are typically 
a box-ticking exercise and it can be difficult in practice to see how Wednesbury-style review 
operates in that context. A typical refusal of permission against a points-based scheme refusal 
is as follows: “The grounds express disagreement with the decision, but they do not identify 
arguable public law error. The decision is a reasonable response to the application and 
discloses no arguable irrationality” (Case 121). 
 
Home Office delay as a ground of challenge 
An applicant may seek judicial review of delay by the Home Office to make a decision. The 
failure to make an immigration decision within a reasonable timeframe may provide grounds 
for judicial review. Judges interviewed noted that claims challenging delay by the Home Office 
in considering immigration applications was previously a larger category of case. It was 
                                                          




common to have judicial review challenges against administrative delay by the Home Office 
in making initial decisions. Similarly, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has previously identified 
delay as the most prominent concern in complaints upheld against the Home Office. Delay 
accounted for 48 per cent of complaints upheld in 2014-15 and 27 per cent in 2016-17.136 
Representatives interviewed made the following points:  
 
“One of my recent cases was delay. The Home Office was just taking too long to make 
an asylum decision. Years and years and years and lots of excuses. I have had cases 
where we have won an appeal and the Home Office won’t implement a decision, won’t 
issue the stamp in the passport and obviously you correspond with them or solicitors 
do and they basically, they look for excuses, you know, they don’t like the decision, 
they don’t think it was right and they obfuscate and delay implementation.”137 
 
“Delay is a really difficult one. We often threaten JR and do letters before claim. But 
then you wonder what would be the point of actually issuing a JR because more often 
than not it will take months and months. Most of them will settle because the Home 
Office will say, ‘We’ll make a decision within three or six months’ and most judges 
would say, ‘Well, the Home Office has got a lot to deal with and so it’s perfectly 
reasonable that they give you this time scale.’ I find the delay and the threat of delay 
JRs really problematic for clients because most clients just want to get a decision as 
soon as possible and it’s very frustrating that you have to threaten JR just to get any 
sort of response sometimes.”138 
 
Judges interviewed emphasised that the number of delay cases had declined significantly and 
it was no longer a large component of the judicial review caseload. As one judge explained, 
“delay used to be a system-wide issue at the Home Office, but the number of delay judicial 
reviews has reduced.”139 Another judge noted: 
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“You will get the odd case where the amount of time it has taken to make a decision 
surprises you, but it is nearly as bad as it was in past days and it is very context driven 
I think. So, a First-Tier Judge has allowed an appeal, but there is no decision by the 
Home Office implementing that decision for three or four months. You can see their 
frustration. But equally from the Home Office point of view, you can see they have got 
an awful lot of other priorities and it is really not been appropriate at that time scale 
to expect the Home Office to make a decision in ten days or something.” 
 
In many cases, delay can be resolved through the threat of judicial review and letters before 
claim. The case-file analysis contained three judicial reviews challenging administrative delay 
by the Home Office in reaching a decision. For instance, in one case (case 35), the applicant 
had made an asylum claim in 2015 and later provided the Home Office with additional 
information, including a medical report. The applicant had sent chase-up letters to the Home 
Office. By 2017, the Home Office had not made a decision on the asylum claim and had not 
responded to requests for updates. The applicant sought judicial review of the Home Office’s 
failure to make a decision on the ground that it amounted to unreasonable delay. The Home 
Office then made a decision on the asylum claim. The judicial review was refused on the 
ground that it had been rendered entirely academic. 
 
In another case (case 88), the applicant had been refused entry clearance to be granted 
indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of parents settled in the United 
Kingdom. The applicant’s appeal against this decision had been allowed by the First-tier 
Tribunal. The Entry Clearance Officer had then been refused permission to appeal. The 
applicant had then waited for nine months to be granted entry clearance and then challenged 
this through judicial review on the ground that there had been undue delay by the Entry 
Clearance Officer in implementing the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The issue of what 
type and length of delay is unlawful is far from clear from the case-law. In one case (case 291), 
the applicant had waited for some eight months for a decision from the Home Office before 
seeking judicial review. The Upper Tribunal Judge refused permission on this ground in the 




of maladministration but it is not of sufficient length to even arguably constitute 
unlawfulness.” 
 
Visitor visa judicial reviews 
Before 2013, individuals refused a visitor visa to visit family members in the UK had a right of 
appeal. This was withdrawn in 2013.140 Refusal decisions are frequently based on the 
conclusion of the Entry Clearance Officer that it is unlikely that the applicant would leave the 
UK at the end of his or her visit or that the applicant lacks sufficient funds to support himself 
during the visit. The nature of visit visa decision-making continues to attract controversy. 
According to representatives, the Home Office sometimes refuses applications for visit visas 
for trivial reasons.141 Previously, family visitor appeals used to experience relatively high 
success rates on appeal. In the absence of a right of appeal, an applicant can seek an 
administrative review or make a new application that meets the reasons why a previous 
application was refused. Refused applicants can also seek judicial review. In a 2014 inspection, 
the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that the removal of the 
full right of appeal from family visitor visa applicants had not led to a higher refusal rate, or 
to an overall reduction in decision quality.142 
 
From our sample, there were three judicial review claims against the refusal of a visitor visa. 
Such a low volume of judicial reviews compares with the previously high number of appeals. 
For instance, in 2012/13, there were over 20,000 family visitor appeals decided by the First-
tier Tribunal. The much lower number of judicial reviews is likely to be attributable to the 
more legalistic and limited nature of judicial review as a remedy compared with appeals and 
the costs involved. Individuals who could have succeeded through an appeal face lower 
prospects of success through judicial review. For instance, in one such case, the judge held 
that the reasons for refusing a visitor visa were neither arguably irrational nor otherwise 
unlawful. The grounds, while challenging the correctness of the decision, did not raise any 
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arguable basis upon which the decision could properly be said to be irrational (case 32). In 
another case (case 43), the applicants, who were refused visitor visas, used judicial review to 
obtain a statutory human rights appeal, but this was rejected by the Upper Tribunal. 
 
Human Trafficking 
Under the European Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (“ECAT”), the 
Home Office is the Competent Authority to make decisions on human trafficking. Potential 
victims of human trafficking are to be referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), 
the UK’s official framework for identifying victims of human trafficking. A decision whether or 
not to recognise someone as a victim of human trafficking is not a decision under the 
Immigration Rules. In certain circumstances, a victim of human trafficking could seek asylum. 
 
The legal position as regards challenges is somewhat complex and has evolved through case-
law. There has never been a full right of appeal against trafficking decisions. Decisions on 
claims by a person to be a victim of trafficking are not immigration decisions for the purposes 
of immigration legislation.143 Judicial review was the only means of challenge. However, an 
individual could also appeal on other grounds, such as asylum. The Court of Appeal has held 
that First Tier Tribunal judges could consider whether the Secretary of State has complied 
with her policy in relation to trafficking.144 In 2016, the Upper Tribunal held that an individual 
could mount an indirect challenge to a human trafficking decision by way of an appeal on 
perversity and other public law grounds. Where a tribunal is satisfied that a negative 
trafficking decision is perverse, then the tribunal will be empowered to make their own 
decision on whether an appellant was a victim of trafficking. The Upper Tribunal also held that 
tribunals may well be better equipped than the Competent Authority to make pertinent 
findings relating to trafficking.145 However, the Court of Appeal subsequently overturned the 
Upper Tribunal’s decision in 2018.146 The Court of Appeal held that as a negative trafficking 
decision is not an appealable immigration decision, the Tribunal cannot go behind the 
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decision unless its first finds it to be perverse or irrational. This approach restricts the Tribunal 
to considering only the evidence that was before the Competent Authority at the time of its 
decision. Following, changes to the appeals system in 2014, there is no right of appeal on the 
basis that a decision was not in accordance with the law - for instance, there was a failure 
properly to apply the National Referral Mechanism. Any such failure could only be challenged 
by way of judicial review.147 In summary, there is no full right appeal against trafficking 
decisions but judicial review remains available. 
 
From the case-file sample, there were two judicial reviews against trafficking decisions. In one 
case (Case 47), the applicant had been trafficked to the UK and subject to various forms of 
traumatic abuse for some 15 years. The Home Office accepted that the applicant was a victim 
of human trafficking, but refused leave to remain in the UK on the basis of exceptional 
circumstances under Article 8 ECHR. The applicant sought judicial review. The applicant 
argued that she was receiving counselling in the UK and removal would adversely affect her 
mental well-being. The case was settled with a commitment to reconsider within three 
months. 
 
The principal issue here is that trafficking cases will often be fact-sensitive. As judicial review 
is a limited remedy, an appeal would, in general terms, be a more effective remedy. Arguably, 
such cases could be better handled through the appeals system than judicial review. 
Accordingly, consideration should be given to the appropriate roles of appeals and judicial 
review in human trafficking cases.  
 
Recommendation: 
Consideration needs to be given to the appropriate roles of appeals and judicial review in 
human trafficking cases. Arguably, such cases could be better handled through the appeals 
system than judicial review. 
 
Statelessness 
                                                          





Under the Immigration Rules, an individual can apply for leave to remain on the basis that he 
or she is stateless.148 The criteria that govern whether to grant or refuse such leave to remain 
include whether the applicant: is recognised as a stateless person by the Home Office; is not 
admissible to their country of former habitual residence or any other country; and has 
obtained and submitted all reasonably available evidence to enable the Home Office to 
determine whether he or she is stateless. The statelessness provisions in the Immigration 
Rules were introduced in 2013. There has never been a right of appeal against such decisions. 
If someone is granted limited leave to remain as a stateless person, but refused indefinite 
leave to remain, then there is no right of appeal against either this. The question of whether 
there should be a right of appeal does not appear to have been explicitly considered. For 
instance, the issue was not discussed in the Parliamentary debates concerning the 
Immigration Act 2014. 
 
Decisions concerning statelessness are qualitatively different from many standard types of 
decisions concerning leave to enter or remain. This is because a person who is stateless is 
neither admissible to their country of former habitual residence nor to any other country. An 
applicant can seek an administrative review of a refusal of leave to remain as a stateless 
person and then judicial review. The case-file sample contained five statelessness judicial 
reviews. In each of them, the key underlying issue was a challenge to the Home Office’s 
assessment of the evidence. However, any challenge by way of judicial review is restricted to 
error of law grounds. Three challenges were refused. One was conceded by the Home Office 
and no data was available on the remaining case. 
 
One of the cases was misconceived. A young child had been born in the UK. The parents had 
been unable to register the birth with the relevant overseas country because their passports 
were with the Home Office for over two years. The Home Office rejected a statelessness 
application on behalf of the child because the child had been stateless were born, but the 
parents could now register the birth as the passports had been returned. There was no 
evidence that the parents had contacted the Home Office about the return of their passports. 
                                                          




The claimant sought judicial review, which was refused permission by the Upper Tribunal 
(case 245). 
 
Other cases from the sample and referred to in interviews with representatives highlighted 
the difficulties with using judicial review as a remedy in such cases over and above the normal 
difficulties associated with judicial review. These problems included that it is an unwieldy, 
expensive, and inaccessible remedy compared with ordinary tribunal appeals, the difficulties 
of getting legal aid for a case, and the lack of finality for both the claimant and the Home 
Office. Statelessness decisions are typically fact-specific in which personal evidence, 
credibility, and country information will normally be of crucial importance in deciding 
whether someone qualifies for the status. As one representative noted: 
 
“In statelessness cases the relevant evidence could be a letter from an embassy saying 
that they don’t recognise the person as one of their nationals. It could be a letter from 
the Palestinian mission saying that the person concerned has a Palestinian passport 
but is nevertheless not entitled to enter Palestinian territories because s/he does not 
have an ID card. It could be objective evidence about which Palestinians can and which 
Palestinians can’t enter Palestine and an expert report.”149 
 
In judicial review, such evidence cannot be considered and evaluated - even though an Upper 
Tribunal Judge is well-placed to undertake this type of assessment. 
 
It could be argued that statelessness decisions are of a similar weight and importance as 
refugee and human rights decisions. There are, of course, some differences. For instance, 
refugee decisions focus on risk on return whereas statelessness decisions are concerned with 
inability to return. Furthermore, in refugee decisions, there is a lower standard of proof 
whereas in statelessness decisions, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.150 
Nevertheless, there are also similarities. Like asylum and human rights decisions, 
statelessness decisions are typically quite fact-specific and can raise complex issues of fact, 
evidence, and law. It is therefore anomalous that someone can appeal on asylum and human 
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rights grounds, but not on statelessness grounds, especially when the latter type of decisions 
are of a similar weight and importance and raise analogous factual and legal issues. As one 
representative commented: 
 
“We’re beginning to argue that you should have an Article 8 appeal when you make a 
statelessness claim. Potentially, that could mean that you could end up with an appeal 
on Article 8 in relation to your statelessness claim but not on statelessness grounds, 
which is a bit bizarre. That’s not particularly good. It would be just a roundabout way 
of getting to an appeal, but not actually on statelessness issues. The current situation 
is anomalous. Judicial review is not an adequate remedy. There should be a full right 
of appeal instead.” 
 
On the other hand, there are wider issues concerning the overall robustness of the 
immigration system. For instance, there is a risk that statelessness is being abused as a route 
to remaining in the UK is being abused by representatives who submit unmeritorious 
applications. If a right of appeal was introduced, then this would give the green light to a 
greater use of statelessness as a backdoor route to remaining in the UK. 
 
Recommendation 
There are arguments for statelessness decisions attracting a right of appeal. Consideration 
should be given to whether a right of appeal in such cases would be a more effective remedy. 
 
Domestic Violence 
Under paragraph 289A of the Immigration Rules, a victim of domestic violence can apply for 
indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The sample contained three challenges 
against the refusal of indefinite or limited leave as a victim of domestic violence—none of 
which were successful. 
 
The issues here concern the availability and scope of appeals against such decisions, the 
complexity of the legal position, and the appropriateness of judicial review. The High Court 
has noted that the primary and secondary legislation concerning appeals against domestic 




violence victim to navigate even with expert representation, which many such victims do not 
enjoy”.151 In the same case, the High Court ruled that some, although not necessarily all, 
applications for leave to remain as a victim of domestic violence are also human rights claims 
and therefore attract a right of appeal. However, those individuals who claim to be victims of 
domestic violence, but whose claims are not human rights claims do not have a right of appeal 
and can only seek administrative review and then judicial review. In practice, there is then a 
separate procedure between domestic violence applications and human rights applications. 
In addition, it has been reported that success rates through administrative review have been 
2 per cent compared with previous appeal success rates of 82 per cent.152 
 
As with statelessness decisions, domestic violence cases raise fact-specific evidential issues of 
allegations of domestic violence and counter-allegations. Decisions in such cases often involve 
the evaluation of contested factual evidence and the personal credibility of the claimant and 
others. It is widely accepted that such matters are best resolved not through a paper-based 
review of legality, but through a fact-finding tribunal hearing oral evidence from the 
appellant. Arguably, domestic violence decisions are of similar weight as asylum and human 
rights decisions, which do attract a right of appeal. Overall, the most appropriate remedy in 
domestic violence cases is not administrative review and then judicial review, but an ordinary 
appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. 
 
Recommendation 
Domestic violence decisions should attract a right of appeal. Consideration should be given 
to whether a right of appeal in such cases would be a more effective remedy. 
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7. Claimants and costs 
This section considers some remaining issues that affect claimants. It presents data 
concerning the views and experiences of claimants and representatives. It considers the 
position of litigants in person. It also considers issues relating to funding and costs. 
 
The views and experiences of claimants and representatives 
The views and experiences of claimants 
We wanted to collect data concerning the views and experiences of claimants; what do they 
make of judicial review? We experienced various practical difficulties in accessing and 
interviewing claimants. We tried to access claimants via law firms and many were unable or 
unwilling or too busy to facilitate this. We encountered other difficulties in accessing 
claimants. Many were reluctant to be interviewed because of privacy concerns. It is often the 
case that claimants have a deep scepticism of authority and are concerned that their details 
might be disclosed to the relevant authorities. There are ethical concerns concerning 
extremely vulnerable claimants. There are also obvious difficulties in trying to access 
claimants who have instructed less reputable representatives. Seeking to interview claimants 
in immigration detention also presents difficulties. Nonetheless, we were able to interview a 
small number of claimants concerning their experiences and perspectives of judicial review. 
Such interviews cannot be considered to be representative of all claimants’ experiences. 
Nevertheless, the interviews provide valuable data on the views and experiences of the 
claimants concerned. 
 
Claimant 1: Sangeen153 
Sangeen had sought asylum, been refused and had his appeal dismissed. He was then 
detained in order to be removed quickly. His first representative was going to make an asylum 
fresh claim. The representative then changed his mind and refused to make the fresh claim. 
The claimant then changed representation. Sangeen’s second representative submitted a 
fresh claim on his behalf. This was then refused. The representative also sought an injunction 
against the removal and judicial review of the Home Office’s refusal to accept his fresh asylum 
                                                          




claim. The Upper Tribunal granted the injunction against removal on the basis that the nature 
and volume of material submitted for the asylum fresh claim required more detailed 
consideration than the judge could provide in a quick removal judicial review. Sangeen was 
then released from detention. The asylum fresh claim judicial review took about a year and a 
half. The Home Office then offered to withdrew its decision, to which Sangeen agreed. After 
hearing nothing from the Home Office for a few months, both Sangeen’s solicitor and MP 
contacted the Home Office to prompt a decision. Sangeen was later detained by the Home 
Office for removal purposes and his case was refused by the Home Office. However, the Home 
Office did not serve either Sangeen or his solicitor with a reasoned decision and he had no 
right of appeal. Sangeen was informed that he would be removed from the UK. His solicitor 
then made another fresh asylum claim, which was refused again, and then another judicial 
review. According to Sangeen: 
 
“It was stressful because the Home Office was not replying to the court even. Because 
the court said, ‘we had a judicial review and you (the Home Office) need to respond 
to the judicial review as soon as, quicker’. But the Home Office did not respond, they 
took quite a long time. After that, they had to, because my case was in the court and 
the judge was asking them to respond.” 
 
Sangeen’s solicitor then agreed with the Home Office to withdraw the judicial review if the 
Home Office made a new decision and if Sangeen could exercise an in-country right of appeal 
against a refusal decision. After some eight months, the Home Office refused the asylum claim 
with an in-country right of appeal. Sangeen appealed: 
 
“When I attended the tribunal court, the Home Office representative said he didn’t 
know why my case had been refused, when he saw everything, my evidence, 
everything.  He said, he’s going to speak with his colleague, with the Home Office, 
whether he’s going to come to the next hearing or not. So, the judge said, ‘okay, the 
Home Office have seven days to respond’. After that the Home Office said, ‘okay, 
we’re not going to the court, and we’re going to grant you the refugee status very 





Sangeen was then granted refugee status by the Home Office. Reflecting on his overall 
experience, Sangeen said: 
 
“My experience with the Home Office has been awful. They said ‘no’ to me for about 
four years. They refused my case around five or six times. They put me on a wait for a 
long time and they kept refusing my case, without looking into my case, without 
looking into my evidence and without knowing the fact that my case is genuine, they 
just kept refusing and they just decided once; once they decided they want to deport 
you, they stick on it, they don’t care. But, it was judicial review that saved my life. If 
there was no judicial review, the Home Office would have deported me a long time 
ago. I know there are some cases that just try to abuse the system, they just go for 
judicial review with no reason. But for me, the judicial review was very fair.” 
 
Claimant 2: Gladstone154 
Gladstone had applied overseas to enter the UK as a spouse. His first application was deemed 
to be invalid because of an out of date form he had been used. Gladstone then submitted 
another application, which was refused without a right of appeal. He then sought judicial 
review: 
 
“Well, at the time I had an immigration advisor. She was claiming to be a solicitor, but 
in the end she couldn’t represent me at judicial review, so then she kind of left me on 
my own. So, I had to get all the documents done and submitted, my statement of 




“It wasn’t a straightforward process at all.  There’s a strict process that you have to 
follow, lodging the application itself, serving notice. It’s quite longwinded and it isn't 
as clear cut or straightforward as one would have thought.” 
 
                                                          




The Home Office then withdrew its decision and granted Gladstone leave to remain under the 
10-year route, but not permanent settlement. He then sought judicial review of this with the 
support of a lawyer and was ultimately granted leave to remain. According to Gladstone: 
 
“The two judicial reviews, they took about two years. It wasn’t just my life on hold, 
but my partner’s life, my whole family life. I was just in a very bad stressed out state, 
really depressed. It was a really daunting and challenging whole process, the whole 
two years was kind of like there’s a cloud over your head in terms of your legal status. 
It was just a horrible experience. I did all my research, I did put a lot of hours into doing 
the research. I don’t think the judicial review process is actually set up for anybody to 
challenge the Home Office on their own. The Home Office themselves make things as 
difficult as possible. They overlooked their own policy of the twenty-eight day grace 
period, and that was one of the fundamental reasons or arguments I used for my case. 
I think that legal aid would benefit a lot of people trying to then challenge flawed 
decisions I think, if I’m right, from my experience, there are a lot of other people who 
will get put in that same situation. But because they don’t have the financial resources 
or they feel incapable of doing it themselves they don’t challenge decisions and then 
they get deported, and all of this is under the radar.  I think also the Home Office could 
benefit in conducting interviews. So, they would invite applicants to conduct an 
interview so then they could submit any evidence. You could have like a proper 
interview, like face-to-face it’s more human rather than dealing with paperwork. The 
whole way the Home Office decides on cases and applications, I think, is 
fundamentally flawed. It doesn’t feel human and kind. It feels kind of robotic, 
everything is based upon numbers, reducing migration.” 
 
Representatives’ perspectives on the experiences of claimants 
We also interviewed representatives about their experiences of handling their clients. A 
principal theme here was the difficulties claimants experience in understanding judicial 
review alongside other problems and uncertainties in their lives. As one representative noted, 
claimants “don’t really understand the distinction between the merits of their case, whether 




the decision was made.”155 Furthermore, it can be quite difficult to explain this to claimants. 
For instance, in para 353 fresh claim cases, claimants “can get frustrated that they are not 
getting the remedy that they want”.156 According to representatives: 
 
“What is it like for clients? It’s really difficult to explain to them what is happening. A 
judicial review is really difficult to explain anyway to a client because of its technical 
nature and the fact they are not going to get a substantive decision from the High 
Court or the Upper Tribunal. And then when you are spending two or three years in 
litigation, it’s very hard on the client, extremely hard on the client. We have had some 
really, really difficult moments with very vulnerable, mentally unwell clients.” 
 
“It’s quite hard to explain to a client that in a judicial review, they are not going to 
come out with refugee status, which is what the client wants. And in a judicial review, 
we are not putting forward all this evidence, it is not like we are in a first-tier tribunal 
and we have appealed the decision. Instead, we are arguing that a decision that has 
already happened is unlawful. It is all about the past.  So, it is hard for clients to 
understand that this is not really going to give them what they want. It is just the next 
step on the way.” 
 
“The High Court has this obsession with what it calls rolling JRs. But there are times in 
which a case changes so significantly that it becomes another case, but more often 
than not, that does not happen. … It’s also tricky because life does not stand still. Often 
we are forced to issue claims before we’re able to get evidence. I had a client recently 
who was so unwell that my trainee who went to the detention centre, asked her to 
see this client first because they were so concerned about his welfare. And they asked 
her to report back afterwards about how he was and he was so clearly unwell and we 
had to issue a judicial review. We are not able to produce a full on medical report 
because the removal window had already started and we are going to want to produce 
evidence in that case.” 
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“Clients find judicial review very hard to understand. So, your typical claimant, 
because they're privately paying, a lot of our clients can speak English and some of 
them are students or Tier 1 general. So, they are relatively well-educated and 
relatively less vulnerable than many. We have to explain it again and again and again 
what a judicial review process is, in person at least once at length, and in writing at 
least twice, because it's so bewildering.  This is a hugely time consuming and expensive 
stage to get not much of anything, except back to where you ought to have been 
before you even started, and the different stages and the permission.” 
 
Representatives also highlighted difficulties concerning claimants in judicial review hearings: 
 
“In judicial reviews, clients cannot speak in court, unless they seek permission from 
the judge. If they have previously had an appeal in which they spoke, and then have a 
judicial review, in which they cannot speak, clients get concerned. They are worried 
as to whether the judge will be able to hear their voice. We explain that their voice is 
essentially in their grounds, and/or the barrister speak on their behalf. So, they find 
that in terms of access judicial review is quite limited compared to a statutory right of 
appeal and that’s also an issue that they tend to take up with us.” 
 
“It is really hard for clients to understand judicial review, especially if they have got 
English as a second language and they are in detention and they are really stressed or 
they’ve got mental health problems. It is really hard for them to understand that, 
unfortunately, it is not an appeal. So, I will constantly have clients saying ‘Oh, you need 
to tell the Judge about this, we need to argue this’, and we will say ‘no, it is not about 
what is happening now. It is about whether the decision that was made whenever was 
lawful and whether we should get a right of appeal and then you will be able to argue 
your case’.  And actually for them to understand this could go on for years and years 
is really difficult.” 
 
“From our client’s point of view, he found the paper permission stage and the whole 
thing baffling. He had been in the judicial review system process for about a year by 




unlike in an asylum appeal - and I know they’re not all perfect and they don’t all go 
smoothly - but the client can see the judge in the court. They can give evidence and 
hear the submissions, but in a JR paper permission, they’re not exposed to any of that 
at all.  So, I think their confidence in the process can be quite low, because of that.” 
 
Litigants in person 
It is generally accepted that litigants in person are more likely to encounter problems and 
obstacles than those in receipt of good legal advice and representation.157 The judicial review 
system has been designed on the assumption that litigants will be advised and represented. 
Consequently, the system finds it difficult to accommodate the needs of litigants in person. 
As the Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person noted, “litigants in person are not in 
themselves ‘a problem’; the problem lies with a system which has not developed with a focus 
on unrepresented litigants.”158 That Working Group recommended that judges should be 
enabled and empowered to adapt the system to the needs of litigants in person, rather than 
vice versa. These considerations apply equally to judicial review in general and immigration 
judicial review in particular. One underlying assumption of the judicial review process is that 
litigants will have specialist advice and representation to assist them through what is a 
technical and complex legal process. 
 
In addition to the ordinary difficulties encountered by litigants in person, persons seeking to 
challenge immigration decisions by way of judicial review often face further obstacles. Some 
claimants will have difficulties in communicating in English. Immigration and asylum law is a 
notoriously complex area of law. It is also a quick-changing area of law in which new cases are 
decided and then appealed to the higher courts. Litigants in person may also understand little 
about the nature of the proceedings. They often struggle with the conceptual difference 
between an appeal and review. There are also important differences for litigants in person 
between statutory appeals and judicial review proceedings, which can mean that the latter 
type of proceedings may pose greater challenges. In an appeal, a litigant in person can attend 
a hearing in person and the judge can provide assistance in person. By contrast, in judicial 
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review proceedings, there is much more emphasis upon the initial preparation of the grounds 
of challenge. Further, the permission stage is considered initially on the papers. Other 
challenges include: not understanding the limited role of judicial review, including its 
technical and legalistic nature; limited understanding of directions and the need to comply 
with them; the underlying complexity of the Immigration Rules and legislation and the 
enormous and ever-changing volume of case-law.  
 
Judges noted that there are particular challenges when handling cases brought by litigants in 
person. It can be difficult for both representatives and judges to explain to a litigant in person 
the nature of judicial review. Many potential litigants may be desperate and/or suffering from 
stress and anxiety. Some will be detained in immigration detention. Vulnerable immigration 
detainees are open to exploitation by unscrupulous “advisers” who sell standard templated 
grounds of challenge which are not individualised to the circumstances of the particular 
person and do nothing to assist. Some litigants in person will bring cases that lack merit. 
Conversely, some with potentially good or strong cases will find it difficult to access the 
judicial review process. 
 
Representatives highlighted the practical challenges: 
 
“How is the judicial review system working? It probably seems to the judges that the 
system is working better than it is some of the time. Judges see the high volume of 
judicial review cases. So, they might well assume that people have access to judicial 
review. Whereas I think in practice there are quite a large number of people who are 
unrepresented and so either some of them will try and put their own judicial reviews 
in sometimes, but they don’t really go anywhere; or they just don’t have any access to 
the system at all.”159 
 
“Unrepresented people in detention is a big issue. We have come across people that 
are ‘helping’ (in inverted commas), people to put in judicial reviews which are just to 
try and frustrate removal.  Although they might frustrate removal initially they can just 
                                                          




cause so many problems because judicial review is a big deal, there are real cost 
consequences and there are things you have to comply with. So, if someone is 
unrepresented and they don’t serve the claim on the Home Office for example after 
they have issued it, it can get struck out or if they don’t send their certificate of service 
to the court to tell them they have served the claim on the Home Office.  There is no 
reason why people would know or understand that. So, cases can get struck out and 
there can be cost consequences which can affect future immigration applications. 
People who are unrepresented, I think, really struggle. And also in terms of what they 
are actually arguing and their grounds with the judicial review. A lot of people put in 
judicial reviews because they are desperate but they don’t really understand what 
they are doing. The risk is that it taints all JRs and especially all removal JRs.”160 
 
“Many people in detention seem to know about JR. It’s amazing the number of 
litigants in person just lodging their own JRs. They come to see me at the detention 
duty advice surgery and say, ‘I have got a JR outstanding. Can you do something?’ I 
look at it and say, ‘No, because this is absolutely hopeless. There’s no merit. There’s 
nothing I can do’. But as I say, it’s amazing how they pick it all up from somewhere.”161 
 
  “I see people who want me to do cases on a direct access basis and members of the 
public coming straight to me, and some of them have done a lot of JRs themselves, 
unrepresented, but they are clearly hopeless. They often do more than one and they 
keep on losing. But what they haven't spotted is they keep losing because, actually, 
there's nothing in it. Because the Secretary of State behaves so badly, because the 
procedure is so confusing to them, it's harder for people, the litigating person, to see 
clearly that what's really going on, to realise that there simply isn't a point of law they 
can take.” 
 
From the observation of litigants in person appearing in oral renewal hearings, it was 
apparent that litigants in person require additional assistance to help them understand the 
judicial review process. In one case we observed, the judge explained to the applicant’s 
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mother, who had attended on his behalf, the format of a permission hearing and the limited 
role of judicial review. In the particular case, the applicant was overseas and his mother had 
sought to progress with his case. The applicant’s mother had spent some £5,000 paying a law 
firm to help. Just before the oral renewal hearing, the law firm had informed her that they 
would not be attending the hearing as the Home Office decision under challenge had been 
superseded by another decision. The mother was clearly confused and upset by the 
proceedings. She also felt aggrieved and badly let down by the law firm. The judge gave 
reasonable assistance to the mother. The judge also provided contact details of both the 
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Solicitors Regulation Authority so that the 
mother could contact another representative and seek redress against the law firm. 
 
Judges highlighted the difficulties concerning litigants in person. As one Judge explained: 
 
“It’s pretty difficult for a judge. It really does test your judgecraft skills, to have a 
litigant in person in a judicial review oral renewal hearing and to explain to that 
person, either through an interpreter or if there isn’t an interpreter, through very, very 
simple English, what the difference is between an appeal and judiciary review.  
Because if it’s a para 353 case that would be somebody who ordinarily would have 
been through the appeal process and is now seeking to put in more material and you 
have to say to that person, judicial review is really quite a different animal.  We are 
essentially bound, although there are cases that blur the boundary from time to time, 
but we are normally bound by the position as it was at the date of the decision that is 
under challenge, so you cannot expect to come up today with more arrest warrants, 
newspaper articles and so forth.”162 
 
There are also inherent limits as to what type of assistance judges can provide. First, it is only 
possible for judges to assist litigants in person at oral renewal hearings. It is not possible to 
provide such assistance at the paper permission stage. At this stage, the judge will consider 
the case on the papers and litigants in person will have their case considered on its own 
merits. Cases do not commence at the oral renewal stage. Some litigants in person refused 
                                                          




on the papers may not proceed to an oral renewal hearing. Assistance by a Judge at an oral 
renewal hearing is unavailable in such instances. More information needs to be readily 
available to litigants in person at a much earlier stage. 
 
Second, there are legal limits as to how far litigants in person can be assisted. Consider, for 
instance, compliance with procedural rules such as time limits. Is there scope for some 
discretion when a litigant in person does not comply with a time limit? In Hysaj, the Court of 
Appeal held that being a litigant in person is not of itself sufficient reason to excuse a failure 
to comply with procedural requirements. According to Moore-Bick LJ: 
 
“Litigation is inevitably a complex process and it is understandable that those who 
have no previous experience of it should have difficulty in finding and understanding 
the rules by which it is governed. The problems facing ordinary litigants are substantial 
and have been exacerbated by reductions in legal aid. Nonetheless, if proceedings are 
not to become a free-for-all, the court must insist on litigants of all kinds following the 
rules. In my view, therefore, being a litigant in person with no previous experience of 
legal proceedings is not a good reason for failing to comply with the rules.”163 
 
Another view is that litigants in person are, on the whole, actually better off without 
representation than being badly represented. As one judge explained: 
 
“People often do better coming in person than by having a bad representative. The 
reason why is that litigants in person are very good at explaining what their situation 
actually is. They might not be good at identifying case law or legal language, but they 
can tell you the facts and if we know the facts then we can probably work out what 
the situation is, as long as we’ve got enough of the bare bones there to start from. 
Whereas a bad representative can just simply not advise them to put in the right 
paperwork, pursue challenges which are hopeless where they should be doing 
something different instead; where there’s a much easier, quicker, cheaper 
alternative than judicial review proceedings. And you get to the point where, you 
                                                          




know, sometimes you get counsel who’s got the papers the night before but they 
come along and say, ‘Well, I can’t really speak to any of the grounds of challenge but 
there is this one really good ground but that’s not actually before you.’ And they have 
to try and make applications on the day to amend the grounds which are not normally 
successful because it’s far too late. But then individuals may lose their chance. I mean 
normally there’s something else they can do with the Home Office but you can’t 
always rectify badly drafted proceedings at a later stage.”164 
 
Those judges interviewed also noted that, in permission decisions, they take into account that 
a person is acting as a litigant in person. For instance, in one case, the judge noted that “[t]he 
grounds are vague in nature and insufficiently particularised, although I make allowance for 
the fact that the Applicant is not legally represented” (Case 135). Another judge interviewed 
highlighted the problems and difficulties that can arise when a litigant in person seeks judicial 
review and the Government Legal Department offers a consent order. The judge noted that 
the litigant in person will not have any idea as to what a consent order is or realise that the 
Home Office is to retake its decision. 
 
The Upper Tribunal is fully aware of the issues and challenges concerning litigants in person. 
An Upper Tribunal Judge has been assigned responsibility for considering the provision of 
assistance to litigants in person and has been discussing the issues with external stakeholders. 
Consideration is being given, in conjunction with the Upper Tribunal User Group, as to 
whether and if so how to formulate a guide to assist litigants in person in judicial review 
proceedings. There are already various guides for litigants in person.165 In 2013, the Upper 
Tribunal produced a guide for unrepresented appellants as regards statutory appeals.166 It is 
also necessary to inform litigants in person about the nature and format of judicial review 
proceedings. It is therefore sensible to devise leaflets that provide guidance tailored to 
immigration judicial reviews. Such guidance could take the form leaflets that HMCTS staff can 
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give out which set out what a litigant in person must do at the various stages of the process. 
Such leaflets could include a glossary explaining technical terms and refer to the relevant 
practice statements. An important issue in designing such leaflets would be to test their 
usability in advance. 
 
Another option would be to develop online videos or tools. HMCTS has produced some 
YouTube videos on social security tribunals and other tribunals.167 Equivalent videos could be 
devised for litigants in person bringing immigration judicial reviews. They could explain and 
highlight what the Upper Tribunal is like, what happens in it, how things are done, and how 
best to prepare a case. 
 
There might also be a need for detailed guidance aimed at practitioners. There is already a 
lengthy Administrative Court Guide.168 This provides detailed legal guidance on bringing a 
judicial review case in the Administrative Court. As regards immigration judicial reviews, the 
Upper Tribunal has issued various decisions with important procedural and other points 
particular to the immigration judicial review jurisdiction. An equivalent guide could draw upon 
the Administrative Court Guide, but be focused on immigration judicial reviews. Another issue 
is the degree to which the digitisation of the judicial review process will provide digital 
assistance to claimants. 
 
Recommendation: 
It is recognised that litigants in person need more support throughout the judicial review 
process. This could be provided through a combination of leaflets, online guidance, videos, 
and digital assistance. 
 
Funding 
Most, but not all, claimants receive advice and representation. There are three main ways 
litigation is funded: claimants pay privately; conditional fee agreements (commonly referred 
to as a ‘CFA’); and legal aid. For those paying from private funds, the most straightforward 
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way is to simply pay the bill. A fixed fee could also be agreed with lawyers. This may allow 
claimants to make their expenditure more predictable. However, this transfers risk to lawyers 
who may be reluctant to accept it. Because of this, fixed fee agreements are sometime 
bundled together with a CFA into what is known as a Discounted Fee Agreement. CFAs are 
sometimes referred to as “no win no fee agreements.” All of these arrangements broadly still 
depends on the means of the claimant. 
 
Legal aid is another source of funding. To be eligible for legal aid, the claim must be of a kind 
that is ‘within scope’;169 and the applicant must be able to satisfy the ‘means test’170 and the 
merits test.171 Recent reforms have restricted access to legal aid and have prompted concerns 
about access to justice.172 Restrictions on when legal aid would be paid were also 
introduced—for instance, legal aid is only payable if permission is granted.173 This is designed 
to encourage strong challenges, yet representatives informed us that the risk involved often 
operate as a disincentive. 
 
It is difficult to know the average costs of an immigration judicial review. The legal costs will 
vary in accordance with a number of factors, such as: the length of litigation; the complexity 
of a case and the amount of work involved; the type of case; the rates charged by a law firm; 
and whether Counsel is instructed. We were informed that an initial judicial review claim 
might cost in the region of £1,000-1,500. If Counsel is engaged and a case proceeds to a 
substantive hearing, then costs can increase considerably. As one representative explained: 
 
“I think firms vary wildly in what they charge. I would say we used to try to do fixed 
fees for around £2,000, and then we decided we were protecting the Home Office 
here and we had no idea how long this is going to go on. So, we've got conditional fee 
arrangements and, when we actually bill at an hourly rate, we have bills of 
£10,000/£15,000. Now, they don't pay that. That's including counsel. They don't pay 
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all of that. But if you look at the number of hours that go in, at a reasonably hourly 
rate, that is the cost.”174 
 
Another representative noted that “People find judicial review expensive. They understand 
that it costs far more than appeals, and they find it to be an expensive route.”175 
 
The issues can be more complex in practice because some claimants change their 
representatives throughout the process. This can happen when a claimant has initially 
received poor quality advice from one provider and then instructs a new set of 
representatives. This can in turn increase costs. For instance, the new set of representatives 
has to undertake work that done poorly or not done at all by the first set of representatives. 
 
From our sample of cases, the vast majority of immigration judicial review claims were self-
financed. It was not clear what the structure funding arrangements took or the rates being 
charged. This may vary from one law firm to another. It was not always clear from the case-
file whether applicants had legal aid. The best source of establishing whether applicants had 
legal was via the claim form. In many cases, it is likely that if legal aid is granted it was after 
the permission stage. In cases where there was no evidence of legal aid, we recorded the case 
as not having legal aid. In five cases, there was clear evidence from the file that the case was 
in receipt of legal aid. Overall, the picture we encountered if that legally-aided claimants do 
exist, but are rare. One representative explained: 
 
 “You can, potentially, get legal aid for the judicial review. It’s still at risk. There are still 
lots of problems. The risk is for the clients because there’s the risk of the Home Office's 
costs. So the client can be put off the judicial review in circumstances where, if it were 
an appeal, they would feel more confident about having a go. Also, you only get legal 
aid if you get permission.”176 
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Exceptional case funding is available to applicants whose human rights or European Union 
rights would be breached if they do not have legal aid.177 Broadly speaking, this means that it 
would be unfair or impossible for a claimant to handle their own case. The volume of 
applications under the exceptional case funding scheme have been less than the government 
expected when it established the scheme. As a result, there were concerns that the process 
of applying was an onerous one as the form was lengthy and required detailed answers to a 
range of questions derived from case law on Article 6 ECHR, there was no procedure for 
urgent cases, and a large amount of evidence was required in certain cases. As a result, there 
was further concern that solicitors in private practice were reluctant to make lengthy and 
time-consuming applications, for which they would not be remunerated if the application was 
not granted. In I.S. v Director of Legal Aid Casework and the Lord Chancellor,178 both the High 
Court and Court of Appeal voiced similar concerns. In November 2015, following the High 
Court’s judgment in I.S., a new ECF application for was introduced. This was shorter and also 
allowed for an application for funding to investigate whether a full ECF application was 
worthwhile. 
 
According to the Legal Aid Agency’s published statistics there now has been an increase in the 
number of people applying for ECF in general, and for immigration claims in particular. LAA 
statistics show that between the beginning of April 2015 and the end of March 2016, there 
were 493 applications for ECF for immigration cases, of which 326 were granted. Across the 
same stretch of time in 2016/2017, there were 1,008 applications of which 693 (71%) were 
granted. These figures still remain lower than expected when the scheme was introduced. 
 
In relation to immigration judicial review, the general concerns about exceptional case 
funding were reflected in our data. One representative noted that the complexity of the 
process can dissuade some representatives from applying: 
 
“The process to apply for ECF still acts as a disincentive although there is perhaps more 
knowledge about how ECF works and how to apply for it. The number of grants of ECF, 
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the rate of grants, seems to be quite high, but the number of applications that are 
made is still relatively low. From my experience and the work that I’ve done on 
projects to do with immigration judicial review and access to justice, it seems that 
representatives aren’t willing to do this – they are reluctant to apply for ECF.” 
 
Recommendation: 
The process for applying for Exceptional Case Funding needs to be accessible and 
proportionate. There have been some improvements, but further work is required. 
 
Litigation costs 
The general principle on costs applies in immigration judicial review proceedings: costs follow 
the event. This means that losing party will normally bear both their own costs and those of 
the other side. The underlying rationale is that a party has been compelled by the conduct of 
the other party to come to court in order to vindicate his legal rights. Normally, there will be 
a causal link between the underlying merits of a legal claim and the award of costs.179 In 
deciding what order to make on costs, the court will have regard to all the circumstances, 
including the conduct of the parties; whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even 
if that party has not been wholly successful; and any admissible offer to settle made by a party 
which is drawn to the court's attention. In M v Croydon LBC, the Court of Appeal issued 
guidelines concerning costs in the following situations.180 
 
1. The claimant has been wholly successful whether following a contested hearing or 
pursuant to a settlement. In this situation, the claimant should be able to recover 
all of his costs, unless there is some good reason to the contrary. 
 
2. The claimant has only succeeded in part following a contested hearing, or pursuant 
to a settlement. In this situation, when deciding how to allocate liability for costs 
after a trial, the court will normally determine questions such as how reasonable 
the claimant was in pursuing the unsuccessful claim, how important it was 
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compared with the successful claim, and how much the costs were increased as a 
result of the claimant pursuing the unsuccessful claim. When a case has been 
settled, the court will, at least normally, be in a significantly worse position to 
make findings on such issues than where the case has been fought out. Where the 
parties have settled the claimant's substantive claims on the basis that he 
succeeds in part, but only in part, there is often much to be said for concluding 
that there is no order for costs. 
 
3. There has been some compromise which does not actually reflect the claimant's 
claims. In this situation, there is an even stronger case for there to be no order for 
costs.  This is mitigated, he said, by the proviso that there will be some cases in 
which it may be sensible to consider the underlying claims and consider whether 
it was “tolerably clear” who would have won if the matter had not settled. 
 
The issues involved in dealing with costs are fact-specific. Further, the courts has often stated 
that costs applications must not be allowed to become in reality cases in which the underlying 
merits of a claim have to be determined. Satellite litigation around costs should be avoided. 
 
In the vast majority of cases, the Upper Tribunal will award costs against the claimant when 
refusing permission. The level of the Respondent’s costs is assessed by the Government Legal 
Department. The sum of costs will include the costs of preparing and filing an 
Acknowledgement of Service on the basis of the number of hours involved, reading the claim, 
advising and corresponding with the client, and drafting the summary grounds of defence. If 
a case proceeds to an oral renewal, then the costs of representation will be included. If the 
Government Legal Department has not submitted an Acknowledgement of Service, then the 
judge will typically not make any costs order. If permission is granted, then a decision on the 
award of costs will be reserved for the conclusion of the substantive hearing. If a claim is 
settled following the grant of permission—as is the norm in such instances—then the consent 
order will typically include an agreement that the Home Office pay ‘reasonable costs.’ This is 





There is generally a lack of data on costs in judicial review.181 There is no easy way of 
calculating the overall costs involved in judicial review. Through our case-file analysis, we had 
access to data on costs awarded, usually after the grant of permission. This provided a 
window into the areas of costs but the question of how much claimants have paid for services 
or how many people found the prospect of costs to be a barrier to bringing a claim is 
unknown. If a challenge is refused permission, then the judge will normally order costs against 
the claimant. In cases where there was an order for a specific amount of costs at permission, 
the range of awards ran from £90 to £1,148. The average award in those cases was £458. 
 
In theory, costs should drive litigant behaviour to resolve cases without running up large 
expenses. In practice, the issue of costs seems to generate frustration and angst. As one 
representative noted: 
 
“There will be arguments over costs. We were right to issue a judicial review claim 
when we did. But the court will nearly always say, ‘No order as to cost’ if the claim 
becomes academic and that’s them thinking they’re being generous because you’ve 
wasted the Home Office’s time. But actually you had no choice when you issued it but 
you’re not going to get paid at all because there’s no legal aid funding unless you’ve 
got permission.  So that’s the kind of freezing thing on sensible litigation. It also means 
that the Home Office can afford not to reply to pre-action correspondence because 
they still don’t have to pay any costs if it becomes academic later.”182 
 
However, it is not necessarily all one way. From the Home Office’s perspective, there is the 
situation in which the claimant, having been refused on the papers, renews on different 
grounds and is granted permission. In such circumstances, the Home Office might argue there 
is good reason why it should not pay the initial costs. 
 
How many unsuccessful claimants pay the costs awarded against them? The Home Office and 
the Government Legal Department collect data on how much litigation debt from immigration 
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judicial reviews remains outstanding and how many claimants who have to pay costs in 
practice do so, but this information is not publicly available. However, the overall position 
seems to be that very few, if any, unsuccessful claimants pay their costs.  
 
Further, the Upper Tribunal does not award the full costs of unsuccessful judicial review 
claims. In other words, the Home Office’s legal costs can be many times greater than the 
amount of costs awarded to them and what costs are awarded to the Home Office are rarely 
paid by claimants. As a result, it makes more much sense for the Home Office to settle cases 
frequently, including cases that could ultimately be successfully defended, than pursue 
litigation and thereby risk higher costs – costs that are unlikely to be paid if the Home Office 
is successful. For instance, the cost to the Home Office of reconsidering a decision is in the 
region of hundreds of pounds. By contrast, the cost to the Home Office of defending a judicial 
review in a substantive hearing can amount to something in the region of 80,000 to £100,000. 
 
From the Home Office’s perspective, the issue of costs is one area of the judicial review that 
does not work as it should. Costs awarded by the Upper Tribunal do not cover the entirety of 
the Home Office’s litigation costs. Those costs awarded against claimants are not recovered. 
The Home Office cannot pursue solicitors and representatives for legal costs, only claimants, 
who will not typically be able to pay. From this perspective, there is little, if any, incentive 
from the costs regime to deter representatives from taking on unmeritorious judicial review 
claims because they will not bear the costs involved. Instead, the consequence is that the 
Home Office (ultimately the taxpayer) will bear the costs of winning – despite the legal rule 
that costs follow the event. Furthermore, while the Home Office has the resources of the 
state behind it, the reality is that those resources are both limited and have diminished in line 
with overall reductions in public spending. The greater the costs incurred through judicial 
review litigation, the less resources are available to improve the quality of decision processes 
and substantive decisions. 
 
In 2016, a specific power to refuse immigration applications on the basis that an applicant 
owes a litigation debt was introduced as a general ground of refusal in Part 9 of the 
Immigration Rules. This power is discretionary and applies to applications made on or after 6 




litigation, including judicial review. It instructs caseworkers to take into account all litigation 
debts, including those accrued before 6 April 2016 when considering applications made on or 
after 6 April 2016.183 There is an operating presumption in favour of refusal of all application 
types, save for a few exceptions. To check for debts, there is communication between the 
Home Office’s Litigation Finance Team and caseworkers considering applications. Though 
there is a general presumption in favour of refusal where an unpaid litigation debt exists, 
Home Office caseworkers must consider whether refusal is reasonable taking account of all 
relevant factors, including: how the debt was accrued; level of cooperation with Home Office 
debt recovery attempts; the location of an applicant; the purpose of the application; an 
applicant’s ability to pay; how long the debt has been outstanding; and the amount of the 
debt. 
 
The approach to litigation costs in judicial review was considered by Lord Justice Jackson in 
his review of civil litigation costs.184 There has long been an active debate on what the best 
model for distributing litigation costs in judicial review is. The key models regularly discussed 
are:  
 
1. the current, general cost-shifting rule whereby the losing party bears their own costs and 
those of the winning party; 
2. both parties bear their own costs regardless of the outcome of the case (what has been 
called ‘the US rule’); 
3. one-way costs shifting, where one party will never be required to pay the other’s costs, 
regardless of the outcome, but costs may be awarded in that party’s favour; 
4. qualified one way costs shifting (QOCS), where one party will not normally be required to 
pay the other’s costs regardless of the outcome, but where that general rule is qualified, 
so that costs may be awarded against the party if certain conditions are met; and  
5. a system of fixed costs, where the costs that can be recovered from the opponent are 
fixed by reference to the type of claim and stage reached in the proceedings.  
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Jackson LJ’s Final Report was published in December 2009. It concluded that QOCS is ‘the right 
way forward’ for judicial review.185 This was because: it is the simplest and most obvious way 
to comply with the UK’s obligations under the Aarhus Convention in respect of environmental 
judicial review cases (where costs caps operate); it is undesirable to have different costs rules 
for environmental judicial review and other judicial review cases; the permission requirement 
is an effective filter to weed out unmeritorious cases, therefore the present approach is not 
necessary to deter frivolous claims; it is not in the public interest that potential claimants 
should be deterred from bringing properly arguable judicial review proceedings by the 
financial risks involved; and QOCS has proved satisfactory in Canada. Jackson LJ ultimately 
suggested the following costs rule should be adopted: 
 
Costs ordered against the claimant in any claim for personal injuries, clinical 
negligence or judicial review shall not exceed the amount (if any) which is a reasonable 
one for him to pay having regard to all the circumstances including: 
(a) the financial resources of all the parties to the proceedings, and 
(b) their conduct in connection with the dispute to which the proceedings 
relate.186 
 
It was also suggested that, in order to ‘strike the right balance as between claimant and 
defendant in judicial review proceedings,’ claimants should no longer be able to recover a 
success fee in claims funded by a contingency fee agreement. The Government’s response 
rejected QOCS in judicial review but ended success fees.187 I 
 
n November 2016, Jackson LJ announced a further review of civil litigation costs. As part of 
this further review, a working group was set up under Martin Westgate QC. The group was 
given the task of ‘work[ing] up the detail of a model based on the current regime for Aarhus 
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claims that could be applicable to judicial review claims more generally.’188 The final Westgate 
Group’s recommendations concluded that the introduction of a version of the Aarhus model, 
in most cases, would be an improvement on the current costs rule in judicial review. 189 
 
Recommendation 
There is a need for a detailed review of how costs operate in practice drawing upon data 
from the Home Office and the Government Legal Department. This review could examine 
more detailed information as to costs with a view to reaching a better understanding of 
costs in this area and how costs influence behaviours. 
 
                                                          






8. Current, future and comparative approaches to the operation of 
immigration judicial review 
This section considers some remaining issues relating to the current and future operation of 
the immigration judicial review system. These issues include: the jurisdiction of the Upper 
Tribunal; Tribunal Case-workers; digitalisation; the appropriateness of alternative dispute 
resolution; whether appeal rights should be restored or introduced. The section ends with a 
comparative look at the French and Dutch systems. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal 
One question that arises is whether or not other types of immigration judicial reviews could 
be usefully transferred from the Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal. When the 
transfer occurred in 2013, some types of immigration judicial reviews remained at the 
Administrative Court, most notably detention and nationality cases. The justification 
advanced for the Administrative Court retaining detention cases is often the constitutional 
nature of such claims given that such cases typically involve actions for damages for unlawful 
imprisonment. However, one judge queried whether nationality judicial reviews could also be 
transferred to the Upper Tribunal: 
 
“It always seems rather odd to me that we can deal with nationality issues in appeals, 
but we cannot in judicial reviews. That seems a bit random. You can see the force of 
keeping other things in the high court, most obviously detention cases. But I would 




Consideration should be given as to whether other types of immigration judicial review work 




                                                          




Upper Tribunal Judges are assisted by both administrative staff and Tribunal Case-Workers 
(TCWs) or UTIAC lawyers. There are three TCWs in the Upper Tribunal. They undertake pro-
active case management, provide expert advice and assistance to the parties and the judiciary 
by overseeing how cases are managed.191 They can also exercise judicial functions under 
delegated powers. Their functions are controlled by Rules and practice directions. At present, 
TCWs are focused upon exercising case-management functions to ensure swift and efficient 
consideration of cases with regard to issues such as: extension of time; adjournment requests; 
compliance with directions; and ensuring that case-files are ready to proceed to a hearing so 
as not to waste judicial time and to ensure that the process is running smoothly. TCWs also 
work particularly on identifying cases raising linked issues and test cases. For instance, TCWs 
had been working on Dublin/Third country cases and ETS cases stayed pending decisions from 
the Court of Appeal. 
 
The general view from within the Upper Tribunal is that the system of using TCWs is working 
effectively. They are seen as a valuable resource that enables a significant amount of work 
currently undertaken by the Duty Judge to be delegated, thereby freeing up a judge to deal 
with substantive matters. The lawyers exercise delegated powers in judicial reviews and this 
is to be piloted in the Tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction. There will also be delegation of more 
mundane matters from TCWs to Caseworkers. TCWs and caseworkers work to a judge who 
trains and supervises them. By contrast, one representative highlighted a different 
perspective: “We had a very strong claim and should have succeeded. But we were refused. 
There was a lot of correspondence which suggested that the court lawyer was playing a much 
stronger role than we would have expected and making, I thought, decisions that we would 
have expected the judge to make.”192 
 
TCWs themselves identified some areas for development. First, while there was a good level 
of TCW staffing, it was not thought to be optimally utilised in terms of numbers of staff. 
Second, working practices could be made leaner. Third, it was thought that there could be 
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more joining-up between appeals and judicial review. For instance, the admin teams for 
appeals and judicial review are largely separate from each other. Also, there are different 
databases between appeals and judicial review. Linking up these databases could enable the 
overall immigration administrative law processes to be more efficient. Overall, the 




Given that tribunal caseworkers are now exercising some powers and roles previously 




Alongside most judicial processes, the immigration judicial review system is a paper-based 
process. Case-files are assembled and both the parties add documents to the file as the case 
progresses. This can often produce physically large case-files. One practical challenge with a 
paper-based system is that new and additional documents must be linked up with the physical 
case-file. If documents are not linked up in a timely way or are lost or mislaid, then serious 
problems can arise. Current processes do make some use of email. The judicial review claim 
form can be completed online, but it needs then to be printed out and posted to the Upper 
Tribunal. 
 
There is a wider programme of tribunals modernisation that is currently being developed and 
implemented.193 A major aspect of this reform programme is to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of tribunal processes by moving from current paper-based systems to digital 
processes.194 Experience in other tribunals, in particular the Traffic Penalty Tribunal, strongly 
indicates that there are considerable efficiency and accessibility gains to be made from online 
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systems. Case administration can be improved by digitalisation in terms of speed and 
efficiency. 
 
There is a digitalisation project currently being developed, known as the “RCJ project.” This is 
a joint project between the Administrative Court and the Upper Tribunal to introduce an 
online system for judicial review. This will include an IT and database common platform. 
Claimants will be able to file an application online and upload documents. The Home Office 
and the Government Legal Department will likewise be able to upload grounds of defence 
and other documents to the online system. The idea is to have a root and branch reform away 
from a paper-based system to an online system in which all forms, grounds of challenge, 
listing of cases etc. will be placed online. 
 
Many of the Judges and representatives we interviewed noted that changing the current 
paper-based to an online process would be a timely and welcome reform. This would enhance 
the accessibility and efficiency of the process. We also encountered a receptiveness from 
some representatives, though they expressed the desire to know more about this project. At 
a simple practical level, one representative highlighted that being able to pay the judicial 
review fees online rather than going to the Fees Office at Field House would be a practical, 
beneficial development. 
 
It is likely that the digitalisation of judicial review will enhance the efficiency of the process 
and is therefore a welcome development. However, so far, relatively few details about the 
project have been made publicly available. It is not known how the new systems will work in 
practice and when it will be introduced. For instance, would a digitalised system involve only 
online document sharing? Or would it include the use of video-link for oral renewal and 
substantive hearings? 
 
On the use of video-link, there are arguments both for and against its use. In favour of video 
link, there would be the convenience involved for claimants and representatives. On the other 
hand, most representatives appearing before the Upper Tribunal at Field House in central 
London are located within a five- or ten-minute walk away. Furthermore, video-link hearings 




parties and representatives outside the hearing room, which is just as important as the formal 
hearing itself. Such informal discussion assists the efficiency of proceedings by enabling the 
parties to narrow down the issues or to agree consent orders. 
 
Another area of uncertainty whether litigants in person would be able to seek advice from 
the Assisted Digital service established by HM Courts and Tribunals Service. Overall, it would 
be helpful to know more from the Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service 
about the scope and nature of this project, the principles informing its design, the broader 
direction of travel, and the timeline for implementation. 
 
Recommendation 
The Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service should disclose more 
information about the digitalisation project, the principles informing its design, the broader 
direction of travel, and the timeline for implementation. It needs to be clarified whether 
litigants in person will be provided with digital assistance and the scope of this assistance. 
 
Alternative dispute resolution 
One of the original purposes of the research project was to investigate whether delay 
accounted for a significant proportion of judicial reviews claims and, if so, whether such cases 
can be resolved through a quicker and less expensive alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
process, such as a specialist complaint-handling body. One of the findings of the research 
noted above is that while Home Office delay used to account for a greater proportion of the 
judicial review caseload, it does not currently feature in a significant way. Nonetheless, the 
research considered the issue of ADR and collected the views of representatives and judges 
on the possible adoption of ADR methods. There are a number of points to make in this 
respect. 
 
First, both representatives and judges overwhelmingly saw little, if any, scope for ADR. 
Representatives highlighted that ADR would not be a formal, judicial, and independent 
process and therefore compared ADR unfavourably with the judicial process. For instance, 




respond much better to threats of judicial review.”195 Another representative noted that “the 
difficulty is that with these types of cases, particularly with removal cases, the Home Office 
takes quite a robust view. I can’t see that they would agree to ADR. I don’t see the Home 
Office being flexible. There are very strong policy reasons for wanting to enforce removal. 
Obviously, the Home Office’s point of view is that they have made lawful decisions.”196 
Similarly, judges saw little scope for mainstream ADR techniques such as mediation or 
arbitration.  
 
“ADR is not something that really works in public law cases very well. So, it’s not an 
arbitration or a mediation or a getting people round the table just to deal with, in the 
majority of cases.  But there are alternative ways of ADR, not the kind of standard ADR 
that you would expect in other parts of the court system, but there are ways that 
things can be resolved without a judicial review. And I think it’s about information to 
applicants and legal reps about appropriate cost. But in many cases I’d look at a file 
and think well, there’s a really easy answer to this problem which is not a JR - it’s 
another application or it’s a letter to the Home Office or it’s just putting in the 
documents that you didn’t put in the first time round.”197 
 
Nevertheless, to some extent, there are already various alternatives to judicial review in 
operation. First, there is administrative review by the Home Office. We encountered different 
views concerning the effectiveness of administrative review. As one judge noted: 
 
“Where there’s an administrative review process - so all the points-based type of 
system cases - it has to be JR because there is no other way of challenging it. On the 
administrative review process: I have seen some decisions which are good and I have 
seen some which completely miss the point.  Errors are repeated or, you know, cases 
where there’s been two or three administrative reviews and because at each point the 
decision has been changed slightly, in which case they – it generates a new right and 
then it still ends up in a JR because it hasn’t been sorted out.” 
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Some representatives commented critically on the usefulness and adequacy of administrative 
reviews, noting that they expected reviews to uphold initial refusal decisions and viewed 
administrative review as a preliminary stage before seeking judicial review: 
 
“The problem with administrative review is that the Home Office have given the 
claimants very limited grounds of appeal.  When you submit an administrate review 
application, in effect it goes to another case worker at the Home Office who simply 
reviews the original decision and the majority of the time the outcome of the 
administrative review is just relying on the refusal letter. It doesn’t really engage with 
the representations that are submitted with the administrative review. So, in my view, 
an administrative review, as a remedy, I think, is not very good for claimants, hence 
why they decide to go for a judicial review where there’s oversight by a judge, who is 
independent from the Home Office. Furthermore, with administrative review, there is 
no impartiality from the claimant perspective.” 
 
“Administrative review is just another decision under challenge, so you are challenging 
both the initial and the review decision. You have to find flaws in both. It may be that 
the first decision has been largely superseded by the review so they may have said, 
‘Oh yes, we’ve made a mistake in X but we still stand by our overall conclusion’ in 
which case you’re focusing on the second decision. But I don’t think it really changes 
the experience of challenging it very much. I don’t think it’s treated with more 
deference by the court, for example.” 
 
There have, though, been improvements to the Home Office’s administrative review system 
following reports by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration.198 It is 
possible that further improvements could be undertaken. In this respect, it is also important 
to note that the Law Commission intends to undertake a law reform project on administrative 
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review in general and this could lead to improvements in administrative review systems in 
general.199 
 
Another form of ADR is how cases are settled between claimants and the Home Office. As one 
judge explained: 
 
“The individual cases I have, and I think my colleagues have as well, issued orders to 
try and get the parties to agree things and to try and narrow down and define the 
issues.  So I don’t think it’s a kind of general push but on a case by case basis it can be 
appropriate.  So particularly for examples cases where expedition is sought or there’s 
a vulnerable individual, I try to make sure there’s agreement at least in the case 
management perspective in terms of directions.  An example would be a number of 
cases brought in relation to unaccompanied asylum seeking children, often those who 
are in France – there’s a handful of those cases, where the claimants have tried to 
engage with the Home Office and haven’t got much response.  They’ve issued 
proceedings to try and deal with this.  They’ve asked for a list of directions and 
expedition and things to be complied with. I’ve looked at those in some cases saying, 
‘Well, I’m not going to make those directions because it – the Home Office have got 
to be given a realistic chance to have legal advice and respond.  But this is a case where 
sensible grown-ups with proper legal reps on both sides should be able to agree an 
appropriate way forward which should avoid the use of court time doing so.’ And then 
I’ll say, ‘Please go away and agree this amongst yourselves and if not, you’re coming 
to court and explain why you haven’t agreed or we’ll deal with it in court.’  And we 
can do short case management hearings of that nature for particular cases which often 
does lead to quite a lot of agreement between the parties.”200 
 
Some representatives also explained how they often raise issues with the local Member of 
Parliament in a case in which the claimant had attended the Home Office reporting centre 
and been detained: 
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“We were really trying to get to the Home Office to find out what was going on. So, 
we got our client to contact their local MP to make enquiries, and then we received a 
decision that was backdated about a month or so, but it was handed to the client in 
his hands. We are always asking for most of the cases in which big issues come up for 
help from the local MP, who is helpful. Sometimes the Home Office don’t respond or 
the detention centre’s phone number doesn’t work.  They are never giving any 
response so we are asking through the MP that’s quicker and easier. Most of the MPs 
are helpful.” 
 
Judges also noted how judicial reviews can quickly become academic for practical reasons. 
For instance, when judicial reviews issued on the same day as further representations are 
submitted before removal. If the further representations are submitted and then the removal 
is deferred or the representatives are considered, then this will often render the judicial 
review unnecessary. Similarly, in entry clearance cases where the applicant has not submitted 
the correct documents, then it would be quicker and cheaper in the long run for the applicant 
to submit a fresh application with the correct documents and explain the matter rather than 
seek judicial review. Furthermore, some judicial reviews can become academic very shortly 
after they have issued, certainly by the time they come for an oral hearing, because something 
else has happened and therefore there is no purpose in in dealing with it because the person’s 
immigration history has moved on since the claim. As one judge put it, “there is a need I think 
for people to stand back and practically look at the situation rather than jump for a judicial 
review claim.”201 A related point is that better communication between the parties before 
oral renewal and substantive hearings could enhance the efficiency of the process. 
 
Overall, there are various mechanisms which operate as de facto ADR methods, in particular 
settlement. Introducing a separate form of ADR before judicial review is unlikely to work and 
there is little appetite for it. 
 
Recommendation 
                                                          




Rather than introducing an ADR mechanism, it would be more profitable to enhance the 
quality and efficiency of existing processes. This could include: reducing the number of 
hopeless judicial review claims lodged, improving the Pre-Action Protocol process, and 
better communication between the parties before oral renewal and substantive hearings. 
 
Should some appeal rights be used rather than judicial review? 
Given the limited scope of judicial review as a remedy, the question arises as to whether or 
not appeal rights should be used rather than judicial review. Under the Immigration Act 2014, 
immigration decisions can only be appealed on asylum and human rights grounds. It is 
possible for some decisions to be challenged under Article 8 on human rights grounds on the 
basis that the decision was not in accordance with the law. However, the question arises as 
to whether a wider range of Home Office decisions should attract a right of appeal. 
 
The question whether to have appeal rights is partly a technical matter of administrative law. 
For instance, the Leggatt review of tribunals suggested that the allocation of disputes to 
tribunals should be informed by the following values: participation; accessibility for users; and 
specialist expertise of the tribunal.202 At the same time, the existence of appeal rights is also 
a policy issue to be determined by the Government and Parliament. Tribunal appeal rights are 
always statutory. Any change to the current position would require primary legislation. At a 
policy level, the matter raises a number of issues such as the desirability of having appeal 
rights and the cost, delay, and resources involved in administering appeals. 
 
There are three possible options: (1) restore all appeal rights to the position pertaining before 
the coming into force of the Immigration Act 2014; (2) restore or introduce appeal rights in a 
limited range of cases, for instance, cases that raise important issues of fundamental rights; 
or (3) do nothing. 
 
The principal argument in favour of option 1 – restoring appeal rights – is that an appeal 
provides a more effective remedy than judicial review. It is quite possible that someone would 
have been successful in an appeal where they cannot be in a judicial review because is limited 
                                                          




to considering the legality, procedural fairness, and reasonableness of the challenged 
decision. Previous high appeal success rates are not replicated within judicial review because 
of its limited nature. At the same time, there are legitimate issues concerning the current 
pressure on the tribunal system and limited resources. 
 
The arguments against restoring appeal rights include the associated cost and delay of 
appeals. Further, the rationale behind the removal of appeal rights under the Immigration Act 
2014 was to limit appeals only for those decisions that raised the most important issues, such 
as fundamental rights cases. Restoring appeal rights beyond this would require Parliament to 
re-frame its policy for immigration appeals. This is a possible option, but it is principally a 
policy issue. 
 
Another issue is that restoring appeal rights to the position prior to the Immigration Act 2014 
would do little to reduce the overall volume of judicial reviews. This is because, as considered 
above, most judicial review litigation is concentrated in areas such as certification and para 
353 fresh claim decisions, in which judicial review is being used to obtain a right of appeal. 
Introducing appeal rights in such areas would reduce judicial review litigation, but would 
undermine the basic purpose of these filtering mechanisms, which is to reduce unfounded 
appeals. 
 
What then of the possibility of restoring or introducing appeal rights in a limited range of 
cases, for instance, those cases that raise important issues of fundamental rights? The 
research has highlighted various decisions that do not attract full rights of appeal, such as 
decisions concerning human trafficking, statelessness, and domestic violence. The research 
has also highlighted the limited remedy provided by judicial review in such cases. 
Furthermore, the right of appeal to the tribunal is generally a quicker remedy than judicial 
review. 
 
It is arguable that extending full appeal rights in such cases would be fulfilling the policy 
rationale behind the Immigration Act 2014, which was to limit appeals those decisions that 
affect fundamental rights. Human trafficking, domestic violence, and statelessness decisions 




not specifically consider the issue of appeal rights in human trafficking, statelessness and 
domestic violence cases when debating the Immigration Act 2014.203 Arguably, the lack of full 
appeal rights in such cases is anomalous when set against the policy behind the Immigration 
Act 2014 to restrict appeals to cases of fundamental rights. 
 
The number of such decisions is not particularly large. The associated costs and delays caused 
would be limited. It might be argued that the number of such cases would increase if full 
appeal rights were introduced as abusive unmeritorious would be lodged in the appeal system 
to delay removal. On the other hand, scope for this already exists with regard to asylum and 
human rights appeals. Furthermore, the need to limit abuse should not be achieved at the 
cost of preventing genuine claimants from proving their case. Accordingly, it is recommended 
that consideration be given to introducing appeal rights in a wider range of decisions, such as 
domestic violence and statelessness decisions. Introducing appeals in such cases would 
provide individuals with a more effective and timely remedy than judicial review. 
 
Recommendation 
There are some types of decisions that are low in number in which there is a strong 
argument for having appeal rights. These are decisions concerning domestic violence, 
statelessness, and human trafficking. These decisions are relatively small in scale and of 
fundamental importance to the people involved. Judicial review is typically an inadequate 
remedy because the issues raised are factual and evidential. It seems anomalous that 
asylum and human rights decisions attract a right of appeal, but that other ‘fundamental 
rights’ cases do not. Accordingly, it is recommended that the introduction of full appeal 
rights for such decisions be considered. 
 
 
What happens elsewhere? A Comparison with France and the Netherlands 
We wanted to compare the UK system with what happens elsewhere in Europe. To do so, we 
looked at equivalent systems in France and the Netherlands. Both of these countries have, 
like the UK, implemented the Asylum Procedures Directive. We contacted academic and 
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practising lawyers in those countries for information. We also collected information from the 
internet and other sources. 
 
A major difference between administrative law remedies in the UK and elsewhere in Europe 
is that the UK draws a clear distinction between the two separate procedures of judicial 
review and tribunal appeals. In the UK, judicial review and tribunal appeals are discrete 
jurisdictions and procedures. 
 
France 
In France, asylum claims are considered initially by the French Office for the Protection of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), which is an administrative body.204 Refusal decisions 
can be appealed to the National Court of Asylum (CNDA).205 The CNDA systematically 
examines the merits of whether to grant refugee protection or subsidiary protection. The 
court holds hearings. Legal aid is automatically available, unless the appeal is considered to 
be clearly inadmissible. 
 
In France, there is a procedure broadly similar to para 353 asylum fresh claims. An individual 
previously refused asylum can apply for a new asylum claim, but only if they present new 
evidence supporting their case they had no knowledge of before the court's decision (if it is 
older than the date of the decision) or were in such a vulnerable situation at that stage they 
were not able to disclose it before. This includes the situation in which the conditions in the 
relevant country have worsened. If, after the preliminary examination OFPRA considers that 
the “new evidence” or facts do not significantly increase the risk of serious threats or of 
personal fears of persecution in case of return, then it can declare the subsequent application 
to be inadmissible.206 An individual whose fresh asylum claim has been refused can challenge 
that refusal before the court. A suspensive appeal can be lodged within a time period of 1 
month when: (i) the subsequent application has been deemed inadmissible by; or (ii) OFPRA 
has rejected the admissible subsequent application after it has been processed through the 
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accelerated procedure. The CNDA will then have 5 weeks to issue a decision on the appeal.207 
We were informed that individuals can submit various successive applications if they are still 
in France. We were also informed however that the rules were being tightened up to make it 
more difficult for people to stay and to apply for other types of residency cards after a failed 
asylum claim. 
 
There are, broadly speaking, equivalent situations that arise in the UK’s process of certifying 
asylum and human rights claims. As regards asylum claims, we were informed that there was 
a proposed law passed by the French Parliament would reduce delays and increase the scope 
for out of country appeals before the CNDA.208 An asylum claimant who has been refused and 
is appealing to the CNDA could ask the court to suspend the removal order against him. 
 
As regards human rights claims, an individual who has managed to stay in France for a 
sufficiently long period of time, such as three or five years or seven or ten years depending 
on the individual’s profile, can lodge an application to remain under Article 8 ECHR. For such 
applications to succeed, it is necessary for applicants to demonstrate that they are integrated 
in the sense that their private life now belongs in France as evidenced through marriage and 
children. We were informed that a “circulaire” (a formal statement by the executive 
interpreting a legal text) issued by the French Interior Ministry of 2012 allows the national 
authorities (“prefectures”) to regularise illegally present nationals. 
 
An applicant refused under Article 8 ECHR can appeal the decision in France and is allowed to 
remain in-country throughout the first instance proceedings. However, if the tribunal rejects 
the claim, then the applicant may be deported and have to appeal from abroad through a 
lawyer. The family reunification procedure can take some time and requires that a Third 
Country National returns to his country of origin, to wait some months, possibly even years, 
                                                          
207 Ibid. 
208 ‘France approves controversial immigration bill’ (BBC News, 23 April 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43860880> (accessed 19.11.2018); K. Willsher, ‘Macron faces 
internal dissent as MPs pass tough immigration bill’ (The Guardian, 23 April 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/23/macron-faces-internal-dissent-as-mps-pass-tough-




for a decision. In 2014, the French government lost five cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights for violating Article 8 ECHR in the context of family reunification decisions.209 
 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, asylum and immigration decisions are taken initially by the Dutch 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). Most asylum claims are processed through an 
eight day procedure.210 A key difference with the UK is that initial decisions are mostly taken 
by legally trained staff. Dutch “case workers are required to have a university degree. Most 
are lawyers, some studied anthropology or specific cultures. Their training is based on the 
European Asylum Support Office curricula and lasts at least 9 months.”211 Another difference 
is that the Dutch system does not have two separate procedures for separate decisions on an 
asylum claim and on the decision whether or not to return an individual. Instead, a single 
composite decision is taken. The decision to refuse asylum includes the decision to remove. 
There is no possibility to appeal the expulsion itself. 
 
Before commencing a judicial challenge, the individual must use the administration’s 
objection procedure. This is commenced by lodging a notice of objection with the 
administrative authority in question. If the objection is declared unfounded, an application 
for judicial review may be lodged with a District Court. Judicial challenges against refusal 
decisions are decided in the first instance by a District Court. At the appeal stage of the asylum 
procedure asylum seekers continue to have access to free legal assistance. No merits test 
applies. A particular feature of the Dutch system is that most asylum claims are decided within 
less than two months including appeals. Onward challenges lie to the Dutch Council of State. 
The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State is the highest administrative 
court.212 
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There are some key differences between the UK and Dutch judicial procedures. First, Dutch 
administrative law judges are generalist rather than specialist. Second, although phrased in 
the language of appeal, in the Dutch system, the administrative court is limited to that of 
reviewing the initial decision on the grounds of illegality. Dutch administrative law does not 
draw the same distinction between judicial review and tribunal appeals that is drawn in the 
UK. A Dutch administrative court will typically quash an administrative decision because it has 
not been sufficiently well-reasoned. The case will then be sent back to the immigration service 
to be re-decided. A Dutch court will never, for instance, rule whether an asylum claimant is 
credible or has a well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee Convention. 
Accordingly, the type of scrutiny afforded by the Dutch courts is called marginal judicial review 
as contrasted with intensive judicial review.213 
 
In 2016, the Dutch Council of State ruled that the Asylum Procedures Directive did not impose 
a general intensity of judicial review under administrative law in asylum cases: 
 
“In the Dutch context, the Regional (District) Court is not allowed to examine the 
overall credibility of the statements of the asylum seeker intensively (full review). This 
is, according to the Council of State, due to the fact that the IND has specific expertise 
to verify statements of the asylum seeker and is therefore in general in a better 
position to examine the credibility of the claim. An administrative judge can never 
substitute his or her own opinion on the credibility of the asylum seeker’s statements 
for that of the authorities. Where contradictory or inconsistent statements are made 
by the asylum seeker, the review can, however, be more intensive; this is different 
than it used to be. The other elements – not the credibility of the statements – for 
assessing whether the asylum seeker qualifies for international protection (de 
zwaarwegendheid) have always been reviewed intensively by Regional Courts.”214 
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Appeals against an asylum refusal decision automatically suspend the applicant’s removal. 
This does not apply when an application is deemed manifestly unfounded. During the process 
of a challenge to the Council of State or if there is a further asylum application, a claimant will 
not have the right to stay in the Netherlands. If an individual wants to prevent removal, it is 
necessary to request the court to issue an interim measure to suspend removal during an 
appeal. In some cases, it is necessary to seek an urgent procedure in order to prevent 
expulsion. 
 
As regards family life applications, individuals seeking can apply for a regular residence permit 
on family unification grounds, but must first return to their country of origin first before 
applying. We were informed that such applications are usually rejected on the basis that the 
applicant is still in the Netherlands. 
 
As regards fresh asylum claims, an individual previously refused asylum can subsequently 
lodge a “Repeated asylum application” (HASA). This process usually takes one day and is 
termed the one-day assessment (EDT). The applicant can submit fresh circumstances and is 
then invited for an interview with the immigration service. The basic principle is that the 
asylum seeker must submit all the information and documents known to him or her in the 
initial asylum procedure. However, the circumstances and facts submitted in a subsequent 
application are considered ‘new’ if they post-date the previous refusal decision. In some 
circumstances, certain facts, which could have been known at the time of the previous asylum 
application, are nevertheless being considered ‘new’ if it would be unreasonable to decide 
otherwise. This is the case, for example if the asylum seeker, only after the previous decision, 
gets hold of relevant documents which are dated from before the previous asylum 
application(s).215 
 
If the immigration service thinks that there are no grounds for granting asylum status or there 
is nothing new, then they can provide an intent of rejection on the same day. The applicant 
will then have one day to consult a lawyer and to respond. On the third day, a decision will be 
                                                          






made. This is a very quick procedure so as to reduce delay and also limit the ability of asylum 
applicants to access reception facilities again. 
 
An individual whose repeat asylum application has been refused can appeal the decision to 
the District Court. The appeal has to be lodged within one week after the rejection. The 
lodging of an appeal does not automatically suspend the asylum seeker from retaining lawful 
residence in the Netherlands. This means that the applicant may be removed during the 
appeal. To prevent removal, the asylum seeker has to request for a provisional measure with 
the District Court. 
 
Discussion 
Some comments can be made on the basis of this brief comparison. First, while there are 
differences in administrative and judicial procedures, all countries handling asylum and 
immigration applications must address similar issues. Second, compared with the UK, both 
the Netherlands and France, have a more unitary system of judicial challenges. There is not 
the equivalent and complex interpenetration between judicial reviews and statutory appeal 
rights as exists in the UK. This is most apparent from the comparison between the UK and the 
Netherlands. Dutch administrative courts exercise a jurisdiction akin to judicial review in 
England and Wales. There is no equivalent of the statutory appeal jurisdiction of the First-tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in the Netherlands. There are both advantages 
and disadvantages of this – depending on the point of view. A limited single right of challenge 
to an administrative court is a simpler process than a system in which statutory appeals and 
judicial review intermingle with one another at various stages. On the other hand, having a 
limited right of challenge provides less potential protection for the individual when compared 
with a full right of appeal on both issues of fact and law as is the case in the UK. It is also 
important to highlight that other factors will condition and affect the system of administrative 
law remedies. For instance, in the Dutch immigration service is generally perceived to be an 
efficient administrative body staffed mostly by trained lawyers and makes relatively quick 
decisions. The Dutch system is not perfect or without any problem. Over recent years, 




unable to ensure ensuring quick procedures staffed by sufficient personnel and resources.216 
Nevertheless, the perceptions of the Dutch administrative process appear quite encouraging. 
In considering these matters, it is therefore important to bear in mind two points: first, the 
historical-legal traditions that influence the selection of administrative law remedies; and 
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This report has investigated how the immigration judicial review system is operating in 
practice. More specifically, the report has presented empirical evidence as to the types of 
immigration decisions challenged by way of judicial review. 
 
The evidence shows that judicial review is an important remedy for challenging the legality of 
administrative decisions. In many instance, it is a claimant’s last chance to vindicate their 
rights and provides an important safeguard against injustice. However, this report has also 
demonstrated that the process is under strain in a number of respects. The system is a largely 
one centred on the permission stage, with substantive disputes being rare. Claims are of 
various quality. Many claims contained standard and formulaic grounds of challenge are 
refused permission because the Upper Tribunal decides that they are unarguable. The quality 
of representation varies drastically, with instances of poor representation being common. At 
the same time, there is also evidence that initial Home Office decisions, and the processing of 
judicial review claims by both the Home Office and the Government Legal Department, could 
be enhanced. More effective communication between the parties could improve the 
effectiveness of the overall judicial review process.  
 
In the wider context of immigration administrative justice, the evidence presented in this 
report suggest that some areas need revisiting.  In relation to some categories of immigration 
decision-making, a right of appeal to a tribunal would be a more effective remedy than judicial 
review. With the ongoing HMCTS Transformation reforms increasing the use of technology in 
courts and tribunals, there is scope for increasing the accessibility and efficiency of the judicial 
review process. 
 
All of this presents a challenge of justice system design. It is clear from our analysis there is 
no “magic bullet” reform which will lead to less litigation and more justice. Issues we have 
identified within the judicial process usually have complex causes and are interlinked. 
Furthermore, many of the difficulties that appear in the judicial review process are 
manifestations of much wider problems outside of the process, such as flaws in initial 




which are tested and reviewed when implemented. Our evidence base suggests the following 
recommendations are worthy of consideration: 
 
1. Representatives that make use of standard, formulaic grounds of challenge need to 
undertake better preparation of judicial review claims. 
2. There are a variety of mechanisms to deal with vexatious claims: the Upper Tribunal’s 
internal reporting system; deeming claims to be Totally Without Merit; Hamid hearings; 
and referrals to regulatory bodies. The recent reduction in the number of judicial review 
claims may be in part attributable to greater use of these mechanisms. The most effective 
way of seeking to reduce the number of hopeless judicial review claims is to reduce the 
levels of poor quality representation by pulling up those firms that lodge abusive and 
vexatious claims. 
3. Most judicial review challenges are refused permission. We encountered many robust 
Home Office decisions. At the same time, there were also cases in which the Home Office 
decision was not robust and sustainable. Better initial decision-making requires that the 
Home Office learns lessons highlighted through the judicial review process. Better 
feedback mechanisms could be put in place to achieve this. 
4. More involvement of legally trained staff, such as tribunal caseworkers, at the Pre-Action 
Protocol stage could increase the efficiency of the process if it leads to fewer cases being 
conceded at later stages of the judicial review process.  
5. The process of settling claims through a consent order could operate more efficiently if 
there was improved communication between the parties throughout the process. 
6. Repeat judicial reviews can be unnecessary, inefficient, costly, and likely to cause anxiety 
to claimants. To reduce the risk of this, the Home Office needs to exercise greater care 
when re-taking a decision so as to prevent further litigation. Fresh Home Office decision 
letters following a successful or conceded judicial review should be checked, if necessary 
by senior case-workers, to ensure compliance with the consent order or a ruling from the 
Upper Tribunal. Furthermore, when a consent order is agreed, then both parties need to 
fulfil their obligations. Further judicial reviews against the Home Office to ensure 
compliance with consent orders are wasteful and should be unnecessary. 
7. HMCTS should routinely collect data on the types and categories of immigration judicial 




8. The Home Office’s power to certify cases as clearly unfounded should be exercised 
carefully and only when appropriate. There may be a need for further guidance for 
decision-makers on this point. 
9. Parliament and the Government ought to consider whether to re-introduce appeal rights 
in certain categories of case, such as: human trafficking; statelessness; and domestic 
violence cases. Arguably, such cases could be better handled through the appeals system 
than judicial review. 
10. Litigants in person need more support throughout the judicial review process. This could 
be provided through a combination of leaflets, online guidance, videos, and digital 
assistance. 
11. The process for applying for Exceptional Case Funding needs to be more accessible and 
proportionate. Further improvements are required beyond those already implemented. 
12. There is a need for a detailed review of how costs operate in practice drawing upon data 
from the Home Office and the Government Legal Department. This review could examine 
more detailed information as to costs with a view to reaching a better understanding of 
costs in this area and how costs influence behaviours. 
13. Consideration should be given as to whether other types of immigration judicial review 
work could be usefully transferred from the Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal, 
such as nationality cases. 
14. Given that tribunal caseworkers are now exercising some powers and roles previously 
undertaken by judges, it is necessary to ensure that there is appropriate monitoring and 
oversight. 
15. The Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service should disclose more 
information about the digitalisation project, the principles informing its design, the 
broader direction of travel, and the timeline for implementation. It needs to be clarified 
whether litigants in person will be provided with digital assistance and the scope of this 
assistance. 
16. Rather than introducing an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism, it would be 
more effective to enhance the quality and efficiency of existing processes. This could 
include: improving the Pre-Action Protocol process and encouraging better 
communication between the parties before oral permission and substantive hearings. 
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